HOME ABROAD
A Profile of the Dutch Diaspora in New Zealand
Randstad is one of the world’s leading recruitment & HR services consultancies, with specialist divisions covering the following areas in New Zealand:

- accounting, banking & financial services
- business support & contact center
- construction, property & engineering
- education
- industrial
- information technology
- human resources
- policy, research & evaluation

Randstad is passionate about matching people with organisations - as when the right people are in place, it creates enormous potential and opportunities for businesses and careers. We call this ‘shaping the world of work’.

T: 0800 735 328
www.randstad.co.nz

Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment

Migration Research... taking you beyond the horizon

Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Wellington
# Table of Content

1. **Foreword**  
   *Boudewijn (Boyd) Klap, CNZM, QSO*
   Page 3

2. **Speech at Conference on Dutch Diaspora in Australia and New Zealand**  
   *Arie van der Wiel*
   Page 5

3. **The Dutch in New Zealand: Past, Present and Future**  
   *Professor Jacques Poot*
   Page 7

4. **Second and Third Generation Dutch in New Zealand: A Theoretical Framework**  
   *Dr Tanja Schubert-McArthur*
   Page 19

5. **Second and Third Generation Dutch in New Zealand: Research Findings**  
   *Dr Tanja Schubert-McArthur*
   Page 29

6. **Dutch Diaspora and Citizenship**  
   *Arie van der Wiel*
   Page 38

7. **Dutch Societies in New Zealand**  
   *Arie van der Wiel and Christine Hofkens*
   Page 65

8. **Recent Migration to New Zealand from the Netherlands**  
   *Paul Merwood and Jelle Hatenboer*
   Page 77

9. **Clogs and Tulips: A Qualitative Research Study on Attitudes and Behaviours of Second and Third Generation New Zealanders of Dutch Descent**  
   *Theo Muller*
   Page 85

10. **Outcomes round table discussions at Conference on Dutch Diaspora in Australia and New Zealand**

11. **Biographies of the contributors**

1 Foreword

It is a real privilege for me to write the foreword to this book which searches the hearts and minds of the second and third generation Dutch in New Zealand.

As a Dutch migrant to New Zealand in the 1950s, I have experienced at first hand the values and characteristics that the Dutch brought to their newly adopted homeland: these are a strong independent spirit, self-discipline, inbuilt creativity and hard work. While much has been written about the lives of the first generation Dutch in New Zealand, far less is known about their offspring, the second and third generation. In fact, we know so little about them that the term ‘Invisible Dutch’ is often used to describe them.

The origins of this book came from a one-day Dutch Diaspora Conference in Melbourne on 15 November 2013. The Embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Australia and New Zealand had organised a seminar with academics from Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands, as well as representatives of Dutch migrant organisations ‘Down Under’. They considered the past, present and future of the Dutch diaspora in both countries. In their opening addresses, both Ambassadors Annemieke Ruigrok (Australia) and Arie van der Wiel (New Zealand) expressed their wish to better understand the opportunities that the next generation has to offer to strengthen the cultural, political and economic ties between the Netherlands, and Australia and New Zealand.

The main objective of the initiative was to develop a joint strategy aimed at how best to keep the Dutch heritage alive in Australia and New Zealand. This heritage is built on a long history but also on very strong people to people linkages that immigrants have with their birth countries. The conference was seen as a start to discuss the findings of two pilot studies carried out in Australia and New Zealand among next generation Dutch migrants, and to look into the possibilities of a broader follow-up in the future.

This book brings together the results of the New Zealand part of the research program, initiated by the New Zealand-Netherlands Foundation. For many years the Foundation’s focus has been on a stronger engagement with the second and third generation Dutch migrants in its activities.

The reasons for targeting the next generation are evident: because of their numbers, they give the Dutch diaspora a special position in New Zealand. Although there are no official statistics, Dr Suzan van der Pas and Prof Jacques Poot estimate that there are around 100,000 second and third generation Dutch migrants in New Zealand. But who are they and what remains of their ‘Dutch Touch’? Although we have integrated very well, we still keep to a certain extent our own identity, in particular when it comes to frankness. Or as is sometimes said: the Dutch are too honest to be polite; the Kiwis are too polite to be honest.

This study will help us get a better understanding of the next generations of Dutch in New Zealand. It also shows us growing diversity between the second and third generation Dutch. Instead of one Dutch Kiwi identity, the research of Dr Tanja Schubert found a whole spectrum of identities that ranges from feeling ‘very Dutch’ to ‘not Dutch at all’.

Although in many ways the profile of the Dutch diaspora in New Zealand and Australia show great similarities, the findings of this study indicate that there are also significant differences in their Dutch identity. The citizenship study by Ambassador Arie van der Wiel revealed that in New Zealand the majority (60%) of the first generation migrants kept their Dutch nationality, whereas in Australia most (80%) changed citizenship. It is not entirely clear what caused this distinction, i.e. differences in economic opportunities, assimilation policies or legal issues. Encouraging is that the number of Dutch passport holders is still growing according to a survey by the embassy, mainly due to New Zealand born applicants. The great majority of them is dual national. As they gradually will become the backbone of the future linkage between between
our two countries we need to develop a strategy around this target group: the next generation Dutch dual citizens in New Zealand.

The study also touches upon the recent migration to New Zealand from the Netherlands in the chapter written by Paul Merwood. Those who arrived since the 1990s have remained much more Dutch than the first wave of migrants. Most of them intend to return home and therefore keep in close contact with their birth country. It was fascinating to see that, whereas the results from the pilots were almost the same, the actions suggested from the research were quite different. In Australia, they want to focus more on the new generation migrants, while in New Zealand the focus is primarily on the second and third generation.

Finally, I would like to briefly highlight a few recommendations from the working groups. In first place the issue of dual identity raised by Prof Lydia Wevers: a large number of Dutch descendants still have strong emotional ties to their Dutch identity. Many have lost that identity officially when they naturalised, because of the very restrictive Dutch policy on dual nationality. The study shows a growing interest among second and third generation migrants to obtain Dutch citizenship. Secondly, there is the lack of interest by the Dutch government in supporting cultural organisations in emigration countries. An institute that facilitates Dutch culture similar to the British Council could contribute to a stronger Dutch identity. The establishment of an Erasmus centre in the traditional emigration countries should be considered by the Dutch government. And thirdly, there needs to be a more active promotion of student exchanges focused particularly on the second and third generation. Traditionally, students from Down Under go to the UK. A more active policy on working holiday schemes and internships in the Netherlands may change this trend. And on a more personal note, but also supported by the chapter on Dutch societies, there is a strong desire for more cohesion among the Dutch organisations in New Zealand. To attract the interest of the second and third generation – especially those with dual nationality – a new institutional approach is needed: less focused on the traditional clogs and tulips and more on the modern and contemporary Dutch culture.

Many people have contributed to this book in the form of support, information sharing and providing ideas. I would like to mention here a few people in particular. Prof Leo van Wissen of the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI). NIDI has become the caretaker of this research initiative on next generation Dutch diaspora together with the two Netherlands embassies in Australia and New Zealand. A special word of thanks goes to the Chair of the conference, Prof Loretta Baldassar (University of Western Australia) and Femke Withag, of the Dutch embassy in Canberra. Femke, as coordinator, became the ‘mother’ of the success of this Dutch Diaspora Conference in Melbourne. And last but not least Thomas Kleine Schaars, who was immensely helpful with editing the final manuscript.

I am sure this book will contribute to the debate about the possibilities and challenges for retaining Dutch heritage in New Zealand.

Boudewijn (Boyd) Klap, CNZM, QSO

Founder President of the New Zealand-Netherlands Foundation
New Zealand Dutch migrant history shows great similarities with the Australian story. Also New Zealand saw a large influx of Dutch after the Second World War as around 20,000 settled here between 1950 and 1960. We estimate that the total number of people of Dutch descent is currently almost 120,000 – one quarter of whom still have Dutch or dual nationality.

With such a large community you would expect a strong visibility of the Dutch culture. However, as a migrant community they integrated so well that they are often referred to as the invisible Dutch; and many seem to have lost their identity. We would love to see the community become more visible. Obviously not to reverse the integration process but to strengthen our cultural, economic and political ties.

Let me suggest some challenges and opportunities as food for thought for the discussion today. Some may be a bit provocative.

Why did these Dutch integrate so well? I would like to share with you four possible explanations. Two are closely linked to the Dutch culture and tradition and two related to the host country’s policy and environment.

I will start on the Dutch side. Has the strong integration something to do with the Dutch character and psyche? The Dutch are said to be highly individualistic. Going it alone is held in high esteem. Unlike many other ethnic groups, the Dutch do not form a close-knit community. Calvinism probably lies at the root of this. Although true Calvinism nowadays encompasses less than 10% of the population, its related value linger[s] on. It is therefore sometimes said about the Dutch that one third is Protestant type Calvinist, one third is Catholic type Calvinist, and one third has no religion type Calvinist.

The easy integration may also be caused by the fact that they do not have a high profile and therefore a less visible national identity. Take, for instance, the Dutch kitchen. Dutch food is not very appealing to foreigners. The Dutch are known for mashing all their food. This is why you will find hardly any Dutch restaurants abroad, yet many Asian, Italian and Greek restaurants. But there are plenty of Dutch food shops where you can buy your ingredients for home cooking. Queen Maxima (then still Princess) also referred to the national identity crisis some years ago. It caused a heated debate in the Netherlands. So the extent to which we lack, or lost, our identity is definitely not felt by everybody in the same way.

On the host side I would like to mention two other possible reasons for the loss of visibility. The successful integration may be to a large extent the result of New Zealand’s and Australia’s assimilation policy. For example, New Zealand’s policy of scattering new immigrants throughout the country – also known as the pepper potting approach. This was to avoid clustering of ethnic migrant groups. From all the different groups, the Dutch have spread themselves most widely in New Zealand. Furthermore, the great majority of the male migrants married non-Dutch women. The assimilation policy also led to many Dutch immigrants not speaking their language at home, whereas many other immigrant groups continued speaking their languages at home.

Secondly, the successful integration may have been helped by the fact that going to a country with a Western outlook was easier than settling in a country with a completely different culture. However, the Anglo culture that dominated Down Under was not always friendly towards the Dutch. Some of the first wave of Dutch immigrants were criticised for working too hard and were told to slow down in the workplace.

Most likely the truth is a combination of these factors. But it is striking that the integration process shows great differences, both between the various ethnic groups and within the Dutch community itself.
A minority of Dutch protested against the assimilation process by starting clubs to speak Dutch, play Dutch card games, sing Dutch folk songs and celebrate Dutch national festivals. But less than 30% became member. These days, club membership is so low that these institutions are hardly sustainable.

In the second part of my presentation I would like to focus on three areas where we may find opportunities to strengthen Dutch identity.

The first is the strong ‘Dutchness’ among new migrants. Today’s Dutch migrants are highly educated, often coming with their families for a few years of adventure in New Zealand’s open spaces. They often maintain close links with the Netherlands and speak Dutch at home. Whereas return migration under the first wave of migrants was low, around one third, under the new wave it is significantly higher, with two thirds or more. That is the reason the latter group is often referred to as transnational migrants. These new migrants could be an interesting group to assist in developing a strategy on how to strengthen Dutch identity Down Under.

Secondly, my hope rests also a little bit with the third generation Dutch. Let me explain. One has to keep in mind that assimilation is not a simple linear progression, but one that moves back and forth across the generations. Or as a historian wrote about the migration process: ‘what the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember’. And in interviews in New Zealand during the pilot study, first generation migrants indicated that (surprisingly) their grandchildren seemed suddenly more interested in their Dutch roots.

Finally, this shift by the third generation and the sustaining of their own identity by the new migrants may also be the result of greater acceptance of multiculturalism in New Zealand compared to the strong focus on assimilation in the early period of settlement. New Zealand has become ethnically much more diverse, particularly through the large inflow of Asians. Multiculturalism has become an important element in New Zealand’s nation-building. I’m not saying that this goes without resistance. In Europe we experience a kind of reversed reflection of this process and speak about the failure of multiculturalism with emphasis on a stronger integration of migrant communities.

Allow me to make a final remark about the term ‘diaspora’ used in the title for this conference. The concept diaspora, as Stephen Castles writes in his book The Age of Migration, goes back to ancient times and was used for people displaced or dispersed by force. In migration literature a number of common cultural traits are linked to the term diaspora. For example, collective memory about the homeland, idealisation of the ancestral home, development of return movement, strong ethnic group consciousness, troubled relationship with the host society and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement.

In conclusion, the key question we raise at this conference is to what extent we can speak of a Dutch diaspora Down Under. In particular, what is the meaning of Dutch heritage for the second and third generation Dutch migrants? Are they still interested in Dutch culture and tradition? And finally, what initiatives could be undertaken by our two missions to strengthen Dutch identity in New Zealand and Australia?

May I wish you all successful deliberations. I am sure this conference will be of great help on how to keep in touch with the Dutch in Australia and New Zealand.
3 The Dutch in New Zealand: Past, Present and Future

Professor Jacques Poot

1 INTRODUCTION

This paper reviews the past, present and future of the ways in which the Netherlands and New Zealand are linked through migration.

I start in section 2 with a brief overview of the Dutch diaspora in the world. In Dutch history a number of emigration waves can be distinguished. The largest one took place after the Second World War with the main destination countries having a strong Anglo connection and Western outlook.

Next, the history and trends of Dutch emigration to New Zealand will be discussed in section 3. Although the Netherlands has very long historical ties with New Zealand, starting in 1642 with Abel Tasman and his crew the first Westerners who sighted New Zealand, it was only after the Second World War that for the first time a large number of Dutch people settled there.

In the fourth section an attempt will be made to assess the size of the current Dutch migrant community in New Zealand. The size can be defined according to birthplace, ancestry, ethnicity, language or citizenship. For this conference with a strong focus on the next generation it is important to have detailed information about the size of the second and third generation Dutch migrants in New Zealand. The next section describes how different migration from The Netherlands to New Zealand is at present, in terms of numbers, purpose, intended duration of stay, etc.

Section 6 presents a number of characteristics of the Dutch diaspora which could be of relevance for the Dutch heritage debate: with special attention for issues such as age composition, Dutch language ability, socio-economic profile and residential location.

The paper closes with some future prospects of the Dutch diaspora community in New Zealand in general and challenges and opportunities of sustaining Dutch identity in particular.

I would like to acknowledge: Suzan van der Pas, VU University Amsterdam; Paul Merwood, New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE); Statistics New Zealand; Netherlands Embassies in Wellington and Canberra; Ingred Esveldt and Harry van Dalen, DEMOS editors, Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI); and funding from the 2007-2012 Integration of Immigrants Research Programme (FRST grant MAUX0605).

2 DUTCH DIASPORA IN THE WORLD

In this section I will briefly review the different emigration patterns from the Netherlands in the past and to what extent this has led to a Dutch diaspora worldwide. Although the Dutch were great sea farers and successful traders they were not empire builders. Therefore the numbers that settled abroad in the 17th and 18th century was relatively small even in Dutch colonies such as the former Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia.

The first real wave of Dutch emigrants took place between 1820 and 1920. NIDI estimates that the total number of people that left the Netherlands over that period was 273 000. This emigration was mainly to the United States of America and smaller numbers went to Canada and Brazil.

The Second World War brought huge displacements of persons in Europe, including the Netherlands. Many people were pessimistic about future prospects at home, particularly as
regards to employment opportunities. The country struggled to reconstruct its ruined economy and society. Over one-third of the population considered emigration as an option for solving the many problems they were facing (Hofstede, 1964). The Dutch government initiated a policy of actively promoting emigration as a response to the socio-economic problems at the time.

In the 1950s 350,000 left the Netherlands with as main destinations United States, South Africa, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (van Dalen and Henkens, 2007). This emigration flow included a substantial number (around 60,000) who were Indo-European (mixed Dutch-Indonesian) repatriates who had left Dutch East Indies after Indonesia’s independence. With the economic boom of the 1960s in the Netherlands gradually emigration was replaced by a large influx of immigrants, in particular from Morocco and Turkey.

Since then, there have been several smaller waves of emigration from the Netherlands, for example peaking in the early 1980s, around 2006 and recently. Over the past decade (2003-2012) the number of emigrants fluctuated between about 100,000 - 140,000 annually, peaking at 144,000 in 2013 (Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2014). Approximately half of these emigrants consist of people returning to their country of birth. The other half are Netherlands born emigrants.

Where do these new emigrants go to? There is a considerable migration by Dutch born people towards neighbouring countries: Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom but also to France, Spain and other European countries. In total over two-third headed for European destinations. Only 10% went to the traditional destinations of the 1950s ((Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2014)).

Who are they and why leaving? Major reasons for leaving were and still are: dissatisfaction with the Dutch welfare state and institutions, such as law and order and social security, and the quality of public space: pollution, nature, crowdedness (Henkens and van Dalen, 2007). Quite a significant number of these emigrants are pensioners. Around ten percent of all Dutch pensioners live abroad. Another growing category of new emigrants are second generation migrants returning to their country of ancestry. Descendants of Turkish and Surinam migrants are examples of this return migration phenomenon. This flow counts for around 10% of the emigration wave of Dutch born emigrants (Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2014). Recent Dutch born emigrants are people with an above average level of education and in the higher brackets of the income distribution. Their socio-economic profile differs strongly from the Dutch emigrants who left immediately after the Second World War.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>112,944</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>112,253</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>106,397</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>282.2</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>92,240</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>82,545</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>48,037</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>27,082</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>22,460</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>21,772</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>18,683</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>15,285</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9,603</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>8,488</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>7,360</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In table 1 an overview is given of the Dutch diaspora worldwide. Statistics are based on 2000. The table shows that there were around 775,000 Netherlands born living abroad in 2000. Over
40% stays in Europe and a similar proportion in the so called traditional emigration countries. When based on more recent figures (not available for all countries) a shift can be seen in favour of Europe, probably around 50% now. In most former destinations the Dutch born population is going down.

It may be concluded that, contrary to what is widely believed, emigration from the Netherlands before the Second World War was rather limited. It is true that the Dutch were and are to be found all over the world, but only relatively small numbers settled down abroad. The largest Dutch diaspora communities overseas are from the past 100 years and to be found in Canada, Australia, US and New Zealand.

3 THE HISTORY OF DUTCH MIGRATION TO NEW ZEALAND

Only a few Dutch people settled in New Zealand before the Second World War. Censuses in the 19th and first half of 20th century indicated that the Dutch community counted only roughly 100 people in New Zealand (Schouten, 1992).

From 1945 onwards initially small groups of immigrants, both from the Netherlands and from the former Dutch East Indies, arrived in New Zealand. These first groups of arrivals impressed employers, setting the scene for much larger inflows.

In the 1950s the New Zealand government approached the Netherlands government for the recruitment of skilled immigrants. In October of that year a Migration Treaty was signed. The government agreed to share the cost of moving migrants to New Zealand. The migrants in return would have to perform a job assigned to them for 2 years. New Zealand did set a quota for 1200 men and 800 women aged between 18 and 35 for the first year.

Immigration rapidly increased, even surpassing the quota and New Zealand tightened selection to 1000 in 1953 in response. Participation in the Assisted Migration Program as it was called diminished, from 55% of immigrants in 1953 to 11% in 1958 because migrants disliked the two year job assignment and because the Dutch government implemented a general subsidy for emigration in 1955. The New Zealand government took also part in this program. In 1956 90% of the immigrants were subsidized; the percentage would remain that high for a long time (Schouten, 1992; Priemus, 1997).

The peak years of arrival were 1951, 1952 and 1953 (see Figure 1). During this period an aggregate intake of more than 10,000 settlers was recorded. Between 1951 and 1968 in total 28,366 Dutch born immigrants arrived in New Zealand and 23,879 settled. Almost half of all
immigrants from outside the Commonwealth were Dutch, making them by far the single biggest group of non-British immigrants to New Zealand at that time.

The annual number of immigrants dropped sharply below the annual quota of 1000 by 1963 and even further to around 400 by 1968. Since then and throughout the 1970s, the flow of immigrants from the Netherlands did not cease altogether, but remained around 500 per year. An exception formed the early 1980s when the number of immigrants increased again notably and exceeded 1000 for a short period partly due to a recession in the Netherlands.

The reasons for the end of the post-war Dutch migration wave were predominantly economic: the Dutch economy was doing well in the 1960s. And therefore the Dutch government stopped promoting emigration actively. In 1992 the migration agreement between the Netherlands and New Zealand was terminated; on the one hand because for many years the quota had not been met but also due to a change in New Zealand’s immigration policy. From the early-1990s New Zealand introduced a point-based selection system that was much more market oriented and less historically based i.e. giving preference to white immigrants. This change had a great impact both on the ethnic and educational composition of the immigrants in New Zealand. It initiated in particular a large influx of people from Asian countries into the country. Table 2 shows clearly the growing diversity of the migrant communities in New Zealand.

The new immigration policy of New Zealand had also strong influence on Dutch emigration. There was a further drop in the numbers, but also a change in the socio-economic profile of the emigrants. Compared with the previous emigration waves from the Netherlands, migrants in the 1990s and thereafter had much higher educational qualifications.

With this New Zealand policy change also return migration became more frequent. Statistics (see figure 2) indicate that around one third of the Dutch emigrants over the past 20 years returned. This is more than double the return rate compared with those that arrived in the 1950s and 1960s. These differences are the result of changing profiles of Dutch migrants over the years coming to New Zealand.
The Dutch community in New Zealand not only refers to the Dutch-born immigrants but also to their descendants and others who identify with the Dutch ethnicity such as spouses and children of Dutch born immigrants. In this respect ethnic identity refers to a communal and individual identity expressed as an idea of “our people, our origins” which varies in the intensity with which it is felt and expressed.

The extent to which someone belongs to the Dutch community can be defined according to birthplace, citizenship, ancestry, language or ethnicity.

Using birthplace as measure for enumeration of the size of the Dutch community one counts in fact only the first generation migrants. These numbers are every five years gathered through the population census (with 7 years between the 2006 and 2013 censuses). It tells us how many people born in the Netherlands are still in New Zealand. It doesn’t give us the total emigration flow. The latter figure includes also people who have re-emigrated and have passed away.

We estimate that around 50,000 Dutch people migrated to New Zealand between 1947 and 2013. This includes about 1500 Indo-Dutch emigrants (Schouten). According to the 2013 population census there were a little less than 20,000 first generation Dutch born migrants living in New Zealand in March 2013 (see Figure 1). Studies have indicated that overall around one quarter of the Dutch born emigrants have re-emigrated which is about 12,500 in total. This would mean that around 17,500 Dutch emigrants have passed away over the past decades.

Given the age structure of the Netherlands born community we can assume that the coming years the number of Dutch born emigrants will fall further, and even more dramatically than what happened over the past years. In the ranking list of countries of origin of immigrants in New Zealand, the Netherlands has dropped from the 5th largest in 1996 to number 9th in 2006 (see table 2), to 12th in 2013 and most likely to a very modest position 10-15 years from now.

However when measuring the size of the Dutch community in terms of ethnicity or ancestry the ranking position will remain much stronger. The population census collects information about cultural identity or ethnicity. Figure 3 is showing both the numbers of people who identify themselves as Dutch in New Zealand as well as what their place of birth was.

Figure 3 indicates that many 2nd and 3rd generation Dutch migrants consider themselves still ‘Dutchies’. Striking is that the numbers with Dutch ethnicity have stayed much more stable and showed between 2001 and 2006 even a slight increase. The year 1996 was an ‘outlier’ when almost 48,000 identified themselves with the Dutch ethnicity. In that census the question on ethnicity included Dutch as a separate box that could be ticked. Since then the form design has been changed and Dutch is only mentioned as an example that respondents can write in a box for other ethnic groups. One has to conclude therefore that the ethnicity data have to be used with a certain precaution. However, what is evident from the census data that the share of the second and third generation identifying themselves with the
Dutch ethnicity is still rising. Recent 2013 census data show that in March 2013 28,503 NZ residents stated that they had Dutch ethnicity, which is only slightly less than in 2006.

A third way of measuring the Dutch community is through citizenship. Unfortunately the New Zealand population census does not ask a question about a person’s nationality. The embassy estimates the number of residents in New Zealand with Dutch citizenship to be at least 20,000. This bottom-line is based on the number of passports issued annually in New Zealand namely around 4,000. The validity of a passport is five years. However a study by the embassy has shown that the number of Dutch citizens is much higher as many elderly Dutch don’t extend their passport anymore as they are not able to travel. In chapter 6 by Arie van der Wiel, a more detailed analyses of this survey will be presented.

The next indicator is the number of people still speaking the Dutch language. This indicator will however more extensively be dealt with in the section 6 the social-economic profile of the Dutch migrant community. The 2013 Census has shown that the number of Dutch speaking people in New Zealand is around 24,000, a decline with more than 10% compared with the previous survey. By comparison, about 27,000 New Zealand residents speak Afrikaans.

The last indicator for establishing the size of Dutch diaspora is by counting the number of Dutch descent. The first generation is enumerated through the population census. For the second generation one could use vital statistics that include the number of registered births with one or two parents born in the Netherlands. Using this methodology the size of the Dutch diaspora in New Zealand is estimated to be almost 120,000 (van der Pas and Poot, 2011). With that number the Dutch are still ranked in the top-ten of the largest ethnic communities in New Zealand.

We will close this statistical overview of counting the Dutch by briefly analysing the inflow of short-term visitor arrivals to New Zealand from the Netherlands. They are not falling under the definition of migrants but some sub-categories definitely have a link to the migration history and they could become future migrants themselves. The total number of arrivals peaked at around 27,000 in the year ending September 2003 to 21,000 in the year ending September 2013.
Figure 4 shows the composition by type of visitor. The drop may be the result of recession in the Netherlands following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and also the high value of the NZ dollar in euro, which makes New Zealand an expensive country to visit. Business visits are growing, however, and the number of people visiting relatives remains quite stable, suggesting that the level of contacts between migrants and their relatives overseas is even under difficult circumstances maintained.

5 SHIFTS IN THE MIGRATION PATTERN

A major change in international migration in recent decades has been the growing complexity in migration patterns and the shift from permanent settlement to temporary migration for work or study. Dutch migration to New Zealand is no exception. Table 4 shows the number of people of Dutch nationality issued a student permit and compares that with the number issued a work permit and those granted permanent residence. About three quarters of more of the visas are granted as temporary work permits. Figure 5 shows that particularly those granted temporary residence under the working holiday scheme (WHS) has been increasing fast.

It is clear that while the number of Dutch coming to study in New Zealand is small (less than 200 per year), those issued a work permit exceed those granted permanent residence by as much as five times. The decrease in people applying for permanent residence was probably influenced by the recent economic crisis. People will be less willing to search for temporary employment in other countries when there is considerable economic uncertainty.

Box 1 gives a short summary of the New Zealand Residency approvals to Dutch citizens since 2001/02. It is noted that a temporary stay in New Zealand...
may be the prelude to permanent settlement.

Figure 6 shows the number of Dutch nationals who obtained permanent residency between 2001/02 and 2012/13 and the proportion of those who had been issued a work permit previously.

The figure shows that while the number of Dutch national granted permanent residency has been declining since 2005/06, the proportion of those who previously held a work visa shows an upward trend and is now around 70% to 80%.

As noted above, the largest and fastest growing temporary work scheme is the Working Holiday Scheme. In Box 2 a summary is given of this scheme.

In another chapter of this publication a more elaborated presentation is given of the functioning of the Working Holiday Scheme.

6 SOCIAL - DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DUTCH MIGRANT COMMUNITY

The dynamics of the profile of the Dutch migrant community can best be understood by dividing the Dutch migration movement into three distinctive cohorts each covering roughly 20 years: post-war immigrants i.e. those who arrived in the 1950s and 1960s; skilled immigrants, i.e. those who arrived in the 1970s and 1980s; and transnational professionals i.e. those who arrived in the 1990s and thereafter.

This will be demonstrated in what follows by means of a description of the social-demographic characteristics and outcomes of the three cohorts, focusing on: age at arrival, number of children, religion, education, income, occupation, level of urbanisation, geographical distribution and language use. Much of what is written in this section is sourced from the report by van der Pas and Poot (2011).
Table 5 summarises the results of a number of social-demographic characteristics for each of the three cohorts.

In terms of age composition there is a striking difference between the average arrival age of Dutch migrants in the three cohorts. The first cohort of Dutch migrants was predominantly between 20-29 years old when they arrived in New Zealand. This is not surprising considering that the ordinances of the Assisted Passage Scheme targeted assistance to single persons who were in this age range. Dutch migrants were predominantly single on arrival, often marrying a Dutch partner soon after arrival.

More recent cohorts of Dutch migrants are on average older on arrival and therefore more likely to arrive as families with young children. In terms of average age, the difference between the Dutch and other main ethnic communities in the three cohorts is not very significant. What however is a growing concern that the Dutch born migrants in New Zealand are becoming relatively much older than the population generally. This problem is clearly illustrated in Box 3 and Figure 7.

Most of the Dutch immigrants of the 1950s are now in their seventies and eighties. Till now little attention has been given by policymakers to the ageing of immigrant groups.

Only a small percentage of the first cohort of women, the post-war immigrants, have remained childless (see table 5). For the skilled immigrants of the 1970s and 1980s this percentage is higher and for the more recent immigrants six times as high as the first cohort. However for this
last group we need to take into account that child bearing has not yet been completed. Post-war Dutch immigrant women are clearly characterized by having had large families with more than a third having had four or more children.

The fact that the post-war Dutch immigrants had larger families may reflect their religious background. Almost 40% of post-war Dutch immigrants were Catholics who traditionally have larger families at home. Most of the post-war Dutch immigrants were born and brought up in a society where everything was organised along a number of religious and political groups, the so-called ‘zuilen’ (pillars). Migration to New Zealand was supported by church-run immigration organisations. Interestingly, among the religious groups the percentage of Catholics declined across the arrival cohorts from 38% to 20% while the Protestant faith remained stable at 15%. The secularisation of Dutch society can also clearly be seen in the sharp increase in the proportion of people with no religion across the arrival cohorts.

Looking at the educational level of the three cohorts, the 2006 census data show that each successive arrival is much better educated (Table 5). Moreover, even in the first cohort, about one-third had post-school education. The percentage with a tertiary qualification among post-war immigrants was lower than among other ethnicities bit thus reversed for the skilled immigrant and transnational immigrant cohorts. When comparing the educational level of Dutch immigrants in New Zealand and Australia in the 1970s, Kruiter (1981) showed that, at that time, Dutch immigrants in New Zealand were, on average, higher educated than Dutch immigrants in Australia.

When we compare the median income level of those of Dutch ethnicity and immigrants of other ethnicity in New Zealand it is found that the median income of the retired post-war cohort of immigrants of other ethnicities is rather higher than that of the Dutch. However, for those under 65, the census data show that the employed Dutch earn somewhat more than other immigrants. The difference in income between the Dutch cohorts of skilled immigrants and transnational professionals versus the corresponding other ethnic groups is primarily due to that the former being better educated on average.

Looking at the occupational composition across the three arrival cohorts, the results show a number of interesting differences when comparing those of Netherlands ethnicity and those of other ethnicity. Generally, the proportion of professionals has been increasing in successive cohorts. Among the Dutch skilled immigrants (1967-1986) and Dutch transnational professionals (1987-2006) arrival cohorts, the percentage of Dutch immigrants who work as legislators, administrators, managers, and professionals is greater than for immigrants of other ethnicities arriving at those times, but this is not the case for the post-war immigrants, who are more in semi-skilled occupations rather than high-skilled occupations. Particularly, the percentage of trades workers arriving during the 1947-1966 period is high (12% compared with 7.8% for other ethnicities). Nonetheless, it is clear that at all times Dutch migration had a smaller proportion of unskilled immigrants (plant and machine operators, labourers etc.) than other immigrants. In contrast, the Dutch are much more likely to be working in agriculture or fisheries. The difference is particularly large for the most recent arrival cohort (1987-2006): 13% versus 2.8%. The majority of these Dutch workers in the primary sector are probably self-employed farmers. Across each arrival cohort, the percentage of Dutch immigrants working as trades workers declines and becomes closer to that of the immigrants of the other ethnicities.

Generally, the older Dutch are highly urbanised (see Figure 8), despite a relatively large proportion starting working life on farms in New Zealand. Possibly a high degree of urbanisation for this older generation of immigrants is important for access to specialised health and residential care. On arrival, many of the first cohort of Dutch immigrants were directed to suitable employment in various parts of the country under a bonding scheme that required them to work for employers they were assigned to for a period of two years. As a direct consequence of this policy that promoted geographical dispersal, the Dutch immigrants were spread throughout the country in a pattern similar to the distribution of the total population. Moreover, the residential stability of Dutch immigrants was high. In 1964 almost half of the Dutch immigrants had not moved from the place they had settled on arrival, and the other half
had lived in only two or three localities. As noted earlier, the more recent cohorts more often live in rural areas, coinciding with their life-style motives for leaving their country of origin.

Generally, immigrants are more spatially concentrated than the New Zealand-born population because they are more urbanised but as noted above, in the 1950s Dutch immigrants were spread throughout the country in a pattern similar to the distribution of the New Zealand population. Therefore clearly, the Netherlands-born are more integrated geographically in New Zealand than other immigrants. The latter tend to cluster more, with many residing in the main cities and in particular in the Auckland metropolitan area. This geographical dispersion of the Dutch immigrants has contributed to their high degree of assimilation (Trlin, 1975).

The number of people who can have a conversation in Dutch on everyday things has been declining (see Table 6). Although the majority of those who could speak Dutch in the 2006 census were Netherlands-born (65%), there was also a reasonable proportion who were New Zealand-born (23%).

This suggests that there is an intergenerational transfer of the Dutch language to the second generation. By 2013, the number of New Zealand residents who can speak Dutch has declined to 24,000, but it is not known at the time of writing of this chapter how many of these were born in New Zealand.

In a study on language maintenance of the three generations of Dutch immigrants in New Zealand, Hulsen, de Bot en Weltens (2002) indicate that the number of first language contacts in the social network both in the country of origin and the host country plays an important role in language maintenance. On the other hand, not all those who were born in the Netherlands maintained the ability to speak Dutch after migrating to New Zealand. Data from the 2006 Census suggest that around 80% of New Zealand residents born in the Netherlands can speak Dutch. Some of the others would have migrated as small children who were educated at home and in school in English, but others may have lost the ability to speak Dutch in their endeavour to fully assimilate in New Zealand society.
7 CONCLUSION

This chapter explored the dynamics of the Dutch community change in New Zealand during the last half century.

There has been a slow decline in the number of Dutch-born residents in New Zealand predominantly due to deaths among the post-war migrants and relatively little replacement immigration. However, given that most of the surviving post-war immigrants have now reached high ages, the decline is likely to accelerate in the years to come. Clearly the Dutch community is undergoing a pronounced age-structural transition and, with 40% aged over 65, the Dutch are among the most aged immigrant communities in New Zealand. Until recently little attention has been given to the ageing of the immigrant groups. Moreover, the rapid assimilation of the Dutch into New Zealand society appears to have made them invisible both in terms of being immigrants and also in terms of their status as an increasingly ageing community.

The research by van der Pas and Poot (2011) showed that there are different profiles of the post-war immigrants, skilled immigrants and professional transnational immigrants with the first cohort mostly younger on arrival, more religious, less educated and having more children than the subsequent cohorts. The most recent immigrants are the best qualified, with more than half having a post-school qualification. Most of them are only temporarily in New Zealand. They maintain often strong links with the Netherlands both in terms of contacts, language and cultural identity.

In box 4 some future trends with regard to the Dutch in New Zealand are given.

---

The future....

- Real cost of travel continues to decline: more mobility and particular temporary/circular migration
- New notions of citizenship, particularly for the professional “class”
- Generally, the visitor population of NZ and other countries will continue to increase relative to the resident population
- Travel and migration reinforce each other
- More than ¼ of NZ resident population will be foreign born but the share of Netherlands born will continue to decline sharply
- The demographic future of Europe: ageing, more migration, more volatility and potential intergenerational conflict (Demetrios Papademetriou, MPI)
  - 3% of Dutch population has plans to migrate
  - Quality of life motives dominate
  - For such people, AU and NZ could become increasingly attractive
- ‘Business as usual’ is the most unlikely scenario (Hein de Haas, Oxford University)
- That’s no excuse for inaction: what would we like the future to be (for the Dutch population in Australia and New Zealand)?
Second and Third Generation Dutch Migrants: A Theoretical Framework

Dr Tanja Schubert-McArthur

INTRODUCTION

Three cohorts of Dutch migrants arrived in New Zealand: post-war migrants in the 1950s and 1960s assisted by a labour scheme between the Netherlands and New Zealand governments, skilled migrants in the 1970s and 1980s, and transnational professionals since the 1990s (van der Pas and Poot 2011). Although the Dutch were “by far the biggest single group of non-British immigrants” (Yska 2006: 123) in New Zealand in the 1960s, most became ‘invisible migrants’ and assimilated quickly. However, what does the literature say about the identity formation of the descendants of Dutch-born immigrants, the second and third generation Dutch in New Zealand? And which theoretical concepts might be relevant to research the topic?

This chapter provides the theoretical framework for the research project on second and third generation Dutch in New Zealand (see chapter five). Furthermore it includes a literature review on the Dutch in New Zealand as well as relevant migration studies and research on second and third generation migrants more generally. To start with this chapter gives some historic background of the Dutch immigrants in New Zealand.

BACKGROUND

The connection between the Netherlands and New Zealand goes back to 1642 when Abel Janszoon Tasman was the first European to sight this land in the South Pacific that he called ‘Staten Landt’. Later a Dutch cartographer renamed it ‘Nova Zeelandia’, after the Dutch maritime province, and British explorer James Cook subsequently anglicised the name to New Zealand. Tasman did not set foot on land, but his crew encountered Maori resulting in bloodshed, killing several men on both sides. Although Tasman only stayed for a short period and surveyed a fraction of the New Zealand’s coastline, his contribution is not to be underestimated, as “[i]t was Tasman who opened the way for the European history of New Zealand” (Wilson 2006: 11).

2.1 Before World War II

New Zealand’s immigration politics as well as the economic situation in the Netherlands shaped Dutch immigration to New Zealand. This pattern corresponds with migration theory suggesting that there are certain push factors, which make the status quo unfavourable and pull factors, which attract the migrant to a new destination (Lee 1966). Dutch immigration to New Zealand was very limited in the 19th century with only 127 Dutch – among them Catholic missionaries – living here in 1874. A 1938 report suggested to open migration to other countries than Britain in order to counterbalance the shortage of skilled labourers, thus: “The Netherlands came to be seen as an alternative source of Aryan Europeans (Yska 2006: 122)”, providing “good Germanic genes but without the politics” (Belich 2001: 538). A trial of five Dutch carpenters marked a ‘happy experiment’ and resulted in more demand for this prototype migrant of “fine type, of athletic built and well educated” (Schouten 1992: 50).

2.2 The ‘first wave’ between 1951-1954

Dutch migration peaked in the early 1950s under the New Zealand Assisted Passage Scheme that lured many skilled migrants out of post-war Europe to New Zealand. The Netherlands after the war was a place of destruction and economic hardship facing high rates of unemployment and overpopulation (Hofstede 1964). Furthermore, the fall of Indonesia as a Dutch colony in 1949 saw 500 colonists and ex-army soldiers migrate to New Zealand. Between 1951 and 1954
an astonishing total of 10,583 Dutch migrants arrived in New Zealand, at a peak time for Dutch emigration when 40,000 annually left the Netherlands. The motivations of those first wave Dutch migrants were economic, political and sociological factors (Thomson 1970: 153). Although they had to undergo a strict selection process, having their fare paid and the prospect of a prosperous economy and work made them come in the thousands.

In the 1960s "[a]lmost half of all migrants from outside the Commonwealth were Dutch, making them by far the biggest single group of non-British immigrants at that time" (Yska 2006: 123). The first wave Dutch migrants are sometimes called 'the lost generation', because they faced hardship during the war, meaning their "youth was shattered by war" and abnormal circumstances overshadowed "perhaps the most important and exposed years of their adolescence" (Thomson 1970: 153). According to Thomson (1970: 153f) military occupation, invasion and post-war recovery left them with a negative imprint that "would have done little to create or stabilise a sense of identity and for them the major step of emigration was relatively easy". Hofstede (1964: 28) underpins the great disappointment this young generation of Dutch felt, which led to their subsequent emigration as their equilibrium was disturbed. Many of those Dutch migrants were tradesmen or dairy farmers coming from a working class milieu (Thomson 1970: 163). The first wave enjoyed a support network (paid by the Netherlands government) that included Dutch ministers, priests, social workers and immigration officers which disappeared as funding ceased.

2.3 Later cohorts
Van der Pas and Poot (2011) suggest that subsequent cohorts of Dutch migrants to New Zealand were quite different to the ‘first wave’, in terms of motivations and aspirations. They came as skilled migrants or transnational migrants, mainly for ecological and lifestyle reasons from a prospering middle-class. As Leek (1990: 4) points out the 1960s migrants came for ecological motives and were ‘better off’ economically, well-educated and with better English language command than their countrymen who came in the 1950s, but perhaps for these reasons they were also less motivated to “suppress their Dutchness” (Leek 1990: 8).

2.4 Number of Dutch in New Zealand
It is very difficult to determine the number of people of Dutch descent living in New Zealand as Dutch who have been naturalised are not statistically recorded and through intermarriage and socialisation ‘New Zealander’ becomes the ethnicity of their off-spring. In the 1996 census almost 48,000 ticked the box ‘Dutch’ for ethnicity, whereas in the 2006 census, when the respondents had to tick ‘other’ and fill in their ethnic affiliations themselves only 29,000 identified as Dutch (van der Pas and Poot 2011: 23). Van der Pas and Poot (2011: 22) estimate the total of New Zealand residents of Dutch ancestry including the second and third generation, but excluding non-Dutch spouses, to be 116,700.

3 THEORY
According to Takezawa (1995: 199) identity is formed by common experiences and shared habits which are maintained in the community and passed on to children. It is possible to maintain multiple identities in different contexts and situations, thus unconsciously maintaining Dutchness through festivals or educating children. Nagel (1996: 11) suggests that immigrants reconnect with their identity at certain points in the life cycle, for example when they have children of their own or when they retire. Although assimilation with the host culture was assumed for a long time, we know now, that “individuals can choose to adapt, resist or withdraw from the host society’s definition” (Parrillo 1991: 7). Tap (1997: 15) emphasises the “volitional dimension of ethnicity”, which gives individuals a choice. Ethnic identity “lies at the intersection of individual ethnic self-definition (who am I) and the collective ethnic attribution (who they say I am)” (Nagel 1996: 21). This results in an ‘ethnic layering’, as Nagel (1996) suggests, in which layers are activated or deactivated at different times. Reading Takezawa’s (1995) book about Japanese Americans, Tap (1997) was struck by the similarities: both showed upward mobility in terms of social and economic standing and seemed to assimilate easily, yet
the predicted complete absorption did not happen, on the contrary, the Japanese Americans revived their cultural distinction.

This interview quote (Te Papa 2000: 53) emphasises the choices that migrants make regarding their identity:

“We also have kept some of the Dutch customs because when you go to a new country you can choose. You can ditch some of the things that you think are not so nice in this country and you keep some of the good things of your own background and your own culture.”

According to Jaspal and Cinnirella (2012) the identity formation process is motivated by external factors (acceptance by others) and internal factors (aim to live a purposeful and satisfied life). ‘Migration network theory’ and ‘transnational migration theory’ can be very useful for interpreting research findings. Social network theory views social relationships in terms of nodes and ties. The network can be used to determine the social capital of individual actors (Kadushin 2012). Migration networks are defined as interpersonal ties that bind migrants and non-migrants together within a situation of mutual commitments that can be drawn upon to facilitate entry, adjustment, and employment at points of destination (Massey 1987). These interpersonal ties between migrants and non-migrants are important in assessing and relating it to the Netherlands, as it shows and reflects the degree of assimilation. Migration is also a network-creating process, which develops an increasing number of contacts between places of origin and destination (Spittel 1998).

Transnationalism is commonly defined “as the process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:1). Transnational behaviour is practised by visits to the home country and use of ethnic media, which is increasing because of globalisation and the internet (Castles and Miller 2009). Welz (1998) has written about the difficulty undertaking research when the participants are ‘moving targets’ who live transnational lives and Marcus (1995) proposed ‘multi-sited ethnography’ as a tool to capture their mobility. Transnationalism is commonly defined “as the process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:1). Transnational behaviour is practised by visits to the home country and use of ethnic media, which is increasing because of globalisation and the internet (Castles and Miller 2009). Welz (1998) has written about the difficulty undertaking research when the participants are ‘moving targets’ who live transnational lives and Marcus (1995) proposed ‘multi-sited ethnography’ as a tool to capture their mobility.

4 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on Dutch migrants in New Zealand suggests quick assimilation due to multiple factors, including pressure to assimilate, ‘pepper-potting’, intermarriage and sacrificing Dutch language and culture for the sake of the children’s future in New Zealand. Yska (2006) emphasises that Dutch migrants tend to become Kiwis rather quickly and retain their language and culture less than other ethnic minorities in New Zealand. According to Yska (2006) this phenomenon is due to a number of factors, some utilised strategically by the New Zealand government to assimilate migrants and some due to the migrants’ uneasy relationship with the Netherlands. The pressure to ‘discard their Dutchness’ followed the aim to make the Dutch migrants into ‘new Britishers’, as senior immigration official Dr Reuel Lochore (1951: 89) stated. This aim was assisted by ‘pepper-potting’, that is scattering migrants all over the country in order to prevent ethnic clusters, and promoting assimilation. Especially assisted migrants who had to work and live where the government sent them for the first two years after arrival, found themselves isolated from their compatriots and dispersed throughout the country. Thus, Dutch migrants were forced to blend in to the New Zealand way of life. Women often missed the ‘gezelligheid’ and were homesick; while the men made friends through work, the women often
stayed home and became isolated (personal communication Christine Hofkens, February 2013; see also the film ‘Bride Flight’ by Ben Sombogaart 2008).

4.1 Intermarriage
The New Zealand Assisted Passage Scheme subsidised only singles of a certain age range, promoting young people to immigrate and intermarry. Between 1950 and 1964, a total of 6,261 Dutch singles came under this scheme, many getting married within their first year after arrival (Thomson suspects that they came with their fiancées or brought them over later). The ‘bride flight’ of 1953, when Dutch women engaged to Dutch men were flown in to balance the shortage of women, did not fulfil expectations that they all marry Dutchmen, as many women married locals and became Kiwis.

Thomson (1970: 166) is certain that the “process of rapid adjustment” is mainly due to the high rate of intermarriages with New Zealanders: between 1954 and 1967 60.2 per cent of Dutch males choose non-Dutch wives, 80 per cent of whom were New Zealanders. He estimates that this rate will go up as the Dutch citizens who immigrated as children or were born here get married, saying that “it is highly unlikely that children born in New Zealand of Dutch parents, or of mixed marriage where one parent is Dutch, will seek partners of Dutch origin” (Thomson 1970: 166).

4.2 Settling patterns
Interestingly, the Dutch did not settle in high concentrations in certain areas which is “in sharp contrast to the concentrations shown by all other immigrant national groups with the exception of those from the United Kingdom” (Thomson 1970: 157). Instead, Dutch are distributed rather evenly over New Zealand resembling the distribution of New Zealand’s total population. This was encouraged by the New Zealand government as part of the assimilation policy, as van Dongen (1992: 74) states:

“In practice, any desire by the Dutch to hold on to their heritage or simply seek solace in one another’s company was stymied by the government’s settlement policy. To prevent them living or working in a ‘foreign cell’ they were scattered the length and breadth of the land.”

In addition, compared to New Zealanders, the Dutch migrants tended to be rather stationary and the majority still lives in the first location they lived at when they arrived. Groupings in streets or residential areas are uncommon among the Dutch, except in Wainuiomata and in the vicinity of the Roman Catholic churches served by Dutch priests in Christchurch. Thomson (1970: 167) sees the scattered settling pattern of the Dutch as their key to assimilation which is in “direct contrast with the concentrations favoured by other immigrant groups, concentrations which in the eyes of the host population may be socially undesirable”. However, the need to carry a ‘registration book’ whenever they moved and informing the officials about their whereabouts might have prevented the Dutch from changing locations, as it was easier to stay put.

4.3 First generation: Similar European cultures and a desire to assimilate
By appearance Dutch migrants blend in, but their foreign accents give away their different origin. The men of the first wave have been seen as ‘sensible and hard-working’ to the extent that they have been criticised for working too hard and asked by their fellow colleagues to slow down (Yska 2006:125). The ‘industrious Dutchie’ became a popular stereotype, but the Dutch became infamous for their ‘thrift and abruptness’ that was in stark contrast to the Kiwi mentality. Overall, it seems Dutch are “most acceptable additions” to New Zealand society. The Dutch asked in 1964 about their experiences with New Zealanders (Thomson 1970:165) mainly agreed that they are ‘welcoming’ (75 per cent).
An informant for the exhibition ‘Nieuw Zeeland – Going Dutch’ (2000-2002) at Te Papa suggested that Dutch integrated so well into New Zealand society, because Anglo-Saxon culture is quite similar: “If it is bi-culturalism it is not a difficult bi-culturalism” (Te Papa 2000: 46), as opposed to Maori culture that is quite ‘alien’ to the Dutch. Playing sports alongside New Zealanders was another contributing factor to successful integration.

Boyd Klap, founder of the NetherlANZ Foundation who arrived in 1951 was quoted in a newspaper article (Dom. Post 14 Feb 2003: A6), stating: “I am not Dutch. I still have an accent, but I feel a complete New Zealander – with great pride in my Dutch heritage”. On the contrary, Mr Conijn, interviewed for Te Papa’s ‘Going Dutch’ exhibition remarked: “I will always be a Dutchman. I was born in that country, I have lived there for 26 years, but I do hope my children will assimilate here and they will say well I am a New Zealander, that’s our aim” (Te Papa 2000).

These statements show that the first generation Dutch had a great desire to ‘fit in’ and assimilate; if they themselves did not achieve this goal then they encouraged their children to do so.

An interesting hypothesis comes from a second generation Dutch who featured in Te Papa’s ‘Going Dutch’ exhibition (2000: 44) saying that the quick assimilation of the Dutch indicates a strong Dutch identity and a pragmatic strategy rather than an identity crisis:

“[..B]ut it has never been a sense of being ashamed of your Dutchness either. It comes from a position of strength, I think. You know that you are Dutch. You are proud of your Dutch heritage, but if you want to communicate and live effectively in a country then there are certain things that you need to do to communicate to people, so you play the game or you participate... I think it is a tremendously strong position to be in.”

Mr Conijn, who came in the 1950s and was interviewed by Te Papa (2000: 42) states that he feels estranged from Dutch mentality today, saying he is not so interested in the Netherlands anymore ‘out of sight, out of mind’. The parents were a strong link to Holland, but once they died he didn’t go back anymore. The first generation migrants realised that the places of their childhood memories often no longer existed or they got lost looking for them (Te Papa 2000: 50). When they could not re-create a sense of belonging in Holland, they realised that they had become Kiwis. Thomson (1970: 163) gives clues why the Dutch have integrated so well into New Zealand society:

“Although initially suspected, perhaps, for their diligence and less ready sense of humour their lack of concentration spatially, economically and socially has tended to reduce the distinctiveness that sets different ethnic groups apart from a host population. A background much more comparable to the New Zealand norm than that of either peasants from southern Europe or Polynesia, intellectuals from Berlin or displaced persons camps made adjusting much easier.”

4.4 Dutch clubs and other initiatives

There have been efforts to keep the Dutch culture alive in New Zealand, such as Dutch clubs, Dutch radio programmes and newspapers, language schools and Sinterklaas celebrations, but many reject these efforts to create a ‘communal identity’. Most Dutch have mixed feelings about the Dutch clubs, finding them important on the one hand, but not participating often (except for festivities or to greet royal visitors). The first wave migrants with their experience of war trauma and assimilation policy had little desire to meet, whereas the younger generation who arrived recently have not much in common with the first migrants. According to Tap (1997: 79) there exists an ‘us/them boundary’ within the Dutch community in New Zealand along regional variations (Dutch dialects, customs), motivations for migration, age, attitudes and socio-economic status not only between cohorts but also between people of the same cohorts, which made it difficult for the Dutch to formally organise cultural initiatives. Many did not feel the need to mix with other Dutch in New Zealand at all. This was particularly the case with the first cohort who arrived in the post-war years “with loose bonds and a rather limited cultural
identification with their surroundings” (Hofstede 1964: 28) in the Netherlands. The disinterest in engaging in Dutch culture can be interpreted according to Yska (2006: 124) with the war trauma and disruptions that the ‘lost generation’ of 1950s Dutch migrants endured: “On reaching their adopted country, many kept their heads down and suppressed their heritage. Some believe their experiences made them assimilate too well”. Being different was stigmatised in New Zealand and the Dutch consequently utilised strategies that are common among all minority cultures, as Takezawa (1995: 199) points out, suppressing their own culture and pursuing the dominant culture. However, it is important to note that not all ethnic minorities in New Zealand kept a low profile and comparing the Dutch to the Polish community (Ducat 1992) it is astounding how much the Polish retained and celebrated their culture in a strong club culture (choir, youth club, language school, bridge club, dances, club house etc.). The retaining of the Polish culture can be understood in the light that the Polish believed their political exile in New Zealand was temporary and thus felt the need to prepare themselves and their children for their return, whereas the Dutch came here to stay.

Leek (1990: 8f) makes an ‘underdeveloped herd-instinct’ and a ‘low ethnic self-image’ of the Dutch responsible for the phenomenon of becoming ‘invisible’. According to Walker-Birckhead (1995: 63) the Dutch are good at hiding their real personalities in order to avoid conflict. However, Walker-Birckhead (1995: 63) warns against such ‘schizophrenic’ behaviour:

"However, such a strategy would not be without its own costs, including managing the transition between inside and outside, in particular maintaining the integrity of the inside, given the overwhelming pressure from outside; hence, I suggest, the ongoing preoccupation with character and Dutchness.”

The national tolerance is seen as grounded in Calvinism, which also influences their work ethics. Grüter and Stracke (1995: 38) argue that Calvinism has “brought an attitude to life where every conceivable issue has to be measured by principles affecting all, whether Catholic, communist, Jew or agnostic”. Religion is certainly a factor that contributed to the ‘invisible Dutch community’ (van Dongen 1992) in New Zealand as well as keeping ‘Dutchness’ alive. Becoming ‘invisible’ does not necessarily mean that the Dutch did not retain their culture, but they did so in the private sphere and at different stages in their lives, as Leek (1990: 10) states:

“So, outside the sanctum of their busily and fussily decorated homes, the Dutch may be great assimilators; they proved themselves efficient in their chosen careers, they are successful in business, their children have become better educated than they were themselves; and in their leisure time, they have taken to outdoor pursuits [...] like ducks to water. But in the privacy of their home they have remained various breeds of Dutch: Brabanders, Friesians, Limburgers, Groningers – and they oddly become more so again after the children have grown up and left the nest.”

This comment suggests that Dutch migrants become more Dutch when getting older. I discuss this hypothesis in the next section.

4.5 Becoming more Dutch?
As other ethnic minorities became more visible, the Dutch also came out of their shell more, which could be seen as ‘ethnic mimicry’. “The encouragement of multi-culturalism in schools has seen many migrants questioning old precepts of assimilation and recent migrants who have not been exposed to the same pressure to abandon their culture, have injected new energy into the Dutch community” (Schouten 1992: 179). The multicultural discourse then, is responsible for “stimulating ethnic consciousness” (Takezawa 1995: xv). Interestingly, nearing retirement-age the Dutch migrants tend to reclaim their culture more actively, some make their home at ‘Ons Dorp’, the Dutch retirement village in Henderson, Auckland while others return to the Netherlands permanently. In her Master thesis Relinde Tap (1997) researched the phenomenon that immigrants of the first wave revive their Dutch identity when they age, which she sees as a
result of social isolation, a loss of the command of English and a longing for Dutch food. Van Dongen (1992: 88) points out that aging Dutch turn back to a nostalgic past:

"After a life time of hard work, many older migrants are now turning back to their pasts, reverting to their language and yearning for the emotional aspects of a culture they left behind. They look back to their years in Holland with a delectable nostalgia, and try to balance what they have gained with what they have irretrievable forfeited."

Perhaps that development can be explained with Schouten's (1992: 170) model of four stages of immigration:

"First [Dutch migrants] seek fellow Dutch people already living here, who can speak their language and give advice. Next they strive for total independence, concentrating mainly on careers. In the third stage, typically at age 55 after children have left home, they ask 'why are we here.' Finally there is often a reversion to the language and culture of their birth."

'Ons Dorp', the Dutch retirement village was conceived in 1977 in response to a growing need for health care after government cuts and a demand for socialising in their native tongue by Dutch of the first generation. It opened in 1983, but can only serve a small number of people. The demand of home care was first met with a Dutch social worker paid with funding from the Netherlands for three years, but when his contract finished, the 'Friendly Support Network' in Auckland was established in 1986. This Dutch community group offers coffee mornings, home and hospital visits in other locations, like Waikato, Palmerston North, Wellington, Christchurch and Timaru, reflecting the widespread Dutch population. A homecare service is planned, but had not been set up in 1997, as Tap (1997) notes. In 1992 'Holland House' in Auckland was bought in order to provide a space for the Dutch community to meet (Tap 1997).

Special occasions, such as the 1992 Tasman year celebrations seem to spark interest in Dutch culture among migrants and their descendants (Yska 2006: 124). Similarly, the Kings inauguration on 30th April 2013 attracted many people with Dutch heritage in New Zealand who were usually not associated with the Dutch community.

4.6 Language retention
Speakers of the Dutch language decline, and “[s]tudies have shown that children of Dutch migrants retained less of their parents’ language than other ethnic minorities” (Yska 2006: 124). However, speaking the Dutch language is “increasingly seen as the key to keeping the culture alive” (Yska 2006: 124), and consequently efforts to establish Dutch language schools have been made since the 1990s. Through Dutch broadcasting on Christchurch’s ‘Echo Radio’ and increasingly satellite radio and tv, access to Dutch language programmes becomes easier. There seems to be a myth that Dutch was not spoken in the homes in New Zealand, yet, in interviews with Dutch migrants (Te Papa 2000) many mentioned that Dutch was spoken within the home environment. Although some parents were told by teachers that they should only speak English to their children in order to not confuse them, the parents often spoke Dutch to them regardless (Te Papa 2000: 53). Some Dutch migrants have even set up Dutch language schools in Auckland, Taupo and Wellington.

Researching the language of three generations of Dutch in New Zealand Kroef (1977) predicted that the language fades from second generation and third generation and might disappear altogether because it is not utilised enough. Perhaps Leek's (1996: 209) assumption that the regional dialects are unintelligible might play a role here: “The home dialects were an embarrassment and obstacle for many provincial Dutch, even – perhaps even especially – in communicating with former compatriots”.

HOME ABROAD 25 A Profile of the Dutch Diaspora in New Zealand
4.7 Passport as indicator of identity
An indicator for retaining Dutch culture or assimilating to New Zealand is holding on to the Dutch passport or being naturalised, however, the personal advantages and disadvantages at a given times influence the decision as much as the desire to express one’s identity. Thousands who came in the 1950s gave up their Dutch citizenship to become naturalised as New Zealanders. However, restrictions meant they often felt as second class citizens and in 1970 only 25 per cent of Dutch migrants had New Zealand passports, yet two-thirds had stayed in New Zealand permanently.

When New Zealand was truly Peter Grandiek’s home, he became a New Zealand citizen; he said about his rationale (Te Papa 2000:50):

“I thought this is my home, this is my children’s home so I only saw it as the right thing to do, that I would become a New Zealand citizen. Because I owed nothing to my Dutch background, as being a Dutchman or having Dutch nationality. The important link to me was that my children were going to be New Zealanders, which, of course, they are.”

This suggests that genealogy, rather than birth, determines identity formation: the parents constitute a strong link to the Netherlands, but once they die, the children who are New Zealanders are the strongest link, thus New Zealand become home.

4.8 Second and third generation Dutch in New Zealand
The literature on second and third generation migrants in New Zealand is generally very scarce, and the research on Dutch migrants is no exception to this. Often, the descendants of Dutch-born migrants are only mentioned in passing, lamenting their loss of the Dutch language and lack of interest in their Dutch heritage. However, my personal, informal conversations with second and third generation Dutch as well as some essays written by them (see Schouten 1999) suggest that Dutch was often spoken at home (even though they might not speak it themselves) and they are interested in their Dutch heritage. This research aims to close this gap in the literature and find out how Dutch the second and third generation migrants really are.

Dutch descent, however, is no guarantee for Dutch identity, as Schouten (1992: 257) states: “The majority of migrants’ children regard themselves as New Zealanders, and apart from a limited knowledge of the Dutch language and a taste of Dutch food, they probably see themselves as Dutch in name only.” In contrast, Tap (1997: 30) saw a growing interest in Dutch culture among the descendants:

“Increasingly more and more people of Dutch descent, first and second generation, appear to want to retain their Dutch identity, their ‘Dutchness’, and pass it on to their children and grandchildren. This is done in many different ways, including the Dutch language school, Holland House, Dutch food shops, coffee mornings, Dutch radio programmes and recently the establishment of a Dutch cafe.”

An interesting paper written by Julia de Bres together with her father Joris de Bres (2008) proposes a non-threatening network of Dutch-Kiwis that embraces the second and third generation and makes them ‘feel’ Dutch (2008: 24). Julia de Bres, who is second generation Dutch herself, reflects her journey of identifying more and more as Dutch as an adult, yet, being reminded by New Zealanders ‘oh but you’re not really Dutch’ and people in the Netherlands that she does not truly belong there either.

The Dutch display within Te Papa’s permanent exhibition about migrants in New Zealand ‘Passports’ exhibition that opened in 1998 portrays ‘the Vlaar family’ who arrived in 1954 providing an example of three generations of Dutch in New Zealand. It is a story of settling in after initial struggle (didn’t know how to cook roast and thought parsnip and pumpkin were cattle food), retaining their Dutch heritage in privacy (other Dutch migrants replaced their far away family; their house was filled with mementoes of their lives in Holland; Aad was president.
of a Dutch club), but also making a contribution to New Zealand society (sewing competitions; Boy Scouts leader; canoeing in Commonwealth Games). They stated their success as migrants with their children thinking of themselves as “true blue New Zealanders. The grandchildren, however, take enormous pride in their Dutch heritage” (Te Papa 1996: 73). This suggests that the second generation assimilates to a great degree, while the third generation shows more interest in their Dutch roots. This might be encouraged by their parents respectively, as first generation migrants want their children to fit in, whereas second generation Dutch want their children to have what they missed out on (learning Dutch language and culture).

Vincent Heeringa who grew up as a child of Dutch migrants in the 1960s and 70s shares his identity in an interview for Te Papa (2000: 43):

“I've always felt very strongly that I am both [Dutch and Kiwi]. I've felt quite comfortable having a foot in both camps. The good thing about being white and looking European is that you get away with being on the face of it, just an ordinary New Zealander, but then there was this kind of surprise factor or this additional factor which made me feel special or unique and I guess because the Dutch largely have been successful in New Zealand and Holland [is] a successful western country. I've never felt cause to feel embarrassed or anxious about being Dutch. I've never been proud to be Dutch.”

Nevertheless, he wants his children to be proud of their Dutch heritage and goes to some length to strengthen their Dutch roots: he pays a teacher to teach them Dutch language, gives them Dutch treats, provides them with the skills to ‘live over there for a while’ or at least instil in them ‘the sense of having some roots back in Holland’ (Te Papa 2000).

He realised later in life that his upbringing had been quite Dutch as Dutch was spoken at home and his English is ‘peppered with Dutch words’, most his friends have a Dutch connection, Saint Nicholas was the day he received presents (5th Dec) and Dutch foods, such as liquorice, speculaas, sour herrings, ‘Zwartwit’ (black and white sherbets) and ‘zoethout’ (liquorice root) were treats for him. But although his parents belonged to the Reformed Church where 90 per cent were of Dutch descent, they never belonged to a Dutch club “because there was always this underlying determination to try and be New Zealander” (Te Papa 2000: 45).

The importance of ‘food from home’ has been demonstrated by Bönisch-Brednich (2002) and Schubert-McArthur (2007) for first generation German migrants in New Zealand, who often strengthen their links to their country of origin and family by receiving ‘food parcels’. The passing on of ethnic food traditions is under-researched, but as the comment above shows, could be a lead to retaining Dutch heritage in New Zealand for third and second generation migrants.

It is often assumed that the second generation Dutch lose interest in their Dutch heritage and become Kiwis, however, the literature suggests that there is a growing interest among third generation Dutch to explore their cultural heritage. In my own circle of friends there are a few second generation Dutch who are searching for their identity on a ‘big OE’ [overseas experience] to the Netherlands and often come back ‘transformed’ in their sense of belonging. Schubert-McArthur (2009) suggested that the holiday in the country of origin serves the purpose of re-evaluating the decision to migrate as well as purchasing goods that the immigrants miss in New Zealand; whether or not this is also true for second and third generation Dutch has to be tested.
REFERENCES


MM Research (2011) ‘Beyond Clogs and Tulips: exploring new opportunities to connect and promote Dutch heritage in New Zealand’.


Yska, Redmer (2002). An erand of mercy: Captain Jacob Eckhoff and the loss of the Kakariki. Wellington: Banzhee
5 Second and Third Generation Dutch in New Zealand: Research Findings

Dr Tanja Schubert-McArthur

1 INTRODUCTION

This paper was prepared for the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Wellington, New Zealand to summarise the findings of a pilot study investigating the identity of descendants of Dutch immigrants to New Zealand. The research question was to determine what Dutch ancestry means to the second and third generation of Dutch in New Zealand. Often described as the 'invisible Dutch' (Pegge 2006; Yska 2006; Te Papa 2000) immigrants from the Netherlands who arrived in the 1950s seemed to assimilate very well into New Zealand society, yet consequently seemed to pass on their cultural heritage to a lesser degree than immigrants from other countries. Since the 1970s New Zealand's immigration policy has changed towards multiculturalism, which allowed the skilled migrants of the 1970s and 80s as well as the transnational professionals who arrived since the 1990s to remain more Dutch than previous Dutch immigrants (van der Pas and Poot 2011). This study aimed to examine the effects of this radical assimilation on the descendants of Dutch immigrants and whether the immigration policies and frameworks (assimilation in the 1950s and multiculturalism since the 1970s) or other factors have an impact on their identities.

Australia has a similar historical relationship with the Netherlands as New Zealand. Daniëlle Koop has conducted a research project focusing on the same questions in Australia simultaneously. Both these studies contributed to the Migration Conference that was held on 15th of November, 2013 in Melbourne, organised by the Royal Netherlands Embassies of Canberra and Wellington.

1.1 Sample

The study is based on 15 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with Dutch descendants and empirical research including participant observation at events of the Dutch community (inauguration of the Dutch king, Dutch playgroup for pre-schoolers) in New Zealand. The sample comprised of six men and nine women of whom six lived in Christchurch, four in Wellington, three in the Waikato (close to Hamilton) and one in Auckland and Masterton respectively. Contact was established through personal contacts, social media (Facebook) and 'snow-balling', avoiding a bias towards Dutch descendants who are already actively involved with Dutch clubs.

The interviews lasted between 25 and 80 minutes with an average duration of 60 minutes and were either conducted at a café (eleven participants) or the participant’s house (four participants). In two cases the interview was conducted with two people simultaneously, but counted as one interview: in Christchurch I interviewed two sisters and in Masterton a married couple who were both descendants of Dutch immigrants.

The participants represented the immigrant generations as follows: five second generation, five 2.5 generation (parent born in the Netherlands, but arrived in New Zealand before the age of six; one was born in New Zealand and raised by her Dutch grandparents), four third generation and one 1.5 generation (born in the Netherlands, but arrived in New Zealand as a two year old).

1.2 Uniqueness of the Dutch in New Zealand

The Dutch connection to New Zealand goes back to Abel Tasman’s voyage in 1642 making Tasman the first European to sight New Zealand’s coastline (Schouten 1992). Dutch migrants arrived in large numbers in New Zealand in the 1950s when the Netherlands were struggling economically post-war while New Zealand required migrants to strengthen the labour force (Hofstede 1964; van der Pas and Poot 2011).
The governments of New Zealand and the Netherlands signed an agreement that supported so-called ‘assisted migration’ to New Zealand as the Dutch were thought to be particularly suitable migrants due to their high work ethics, will to assimilate and a similar cultural background to Anglo-Saxons. As a result, the Dutch assimilated into New Zealand society quicker and more easily than other ethnicities. Their successful assimilation also suggests weaker ties to their Dutch heritage and less identification with Dutch culture in the third and second generation than in other ethnic groups. The descendants of Dutch immigrants are highly-educated (with the exception of two participants all had university degrees) and integrated.

2 IDENTIFY OF DUTCH DESCENDANTS IN NEW ZEALAND

“I am fluent in Dutch. ... I consider myself Dutch. I raise my kids Dutch.” (Sophia van den Bogaard, 31 years, 1.5 generation)

“I’m a Dutch-Kiwi, I had a different upbringing [to other New Zealanders].” (Joyce van Laar, 30 years, second generation)

“My parents were really, really proud to be Dutch. And I felt really at home when I was there. I don’t know, I just feel Dutch!” (Frieda Vlaardingerbroek, 36 years, 2.5 generation)

“I am a New Zealander. Dutch is one of my ancestries, but also German and Ukrainian.” (Monique Waayer, 27 years, third generation)

“I’m a Kiwi with a Dutch last name and history. ... I don’t have much of a connection to Dutch [things]. ... Dutch is a nice add-on.” (Clare Francis, nee van Bysterveldt, 30 years, third generation)

Although this study indicates that the connection among Dutch descendants and their relationship with the Netherlands is not very strong in general, it also showed that the Dutch did not fully abandon their heritage and often maintained Dutch cultural elements within their families and houses. While they are not flag-waving patriots, they do express the Dutch part of their identity in many ways, such as an affinity for Dutch food specialties and the Dutch soccer team as well as exhibiting Dutch characteristics, such as being hard-working, straight-forward and money-conscious.

The descendants of Dutch migrants were born and raised in New Zealand, they look and sound like New Zealanders and consequently describe themselves as ‘Kwis’, however, they all acknowledge their Dutch heritage to some degree. Unless they have a Dutch last name, there is no need for them to mention their Dutch heritage in everyday encounters, but if asked about their ethnicity or talking to a person with a Dutch connection they are happy to reveal their Dutch background.

3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GENERATIONS

“[For my parents the Dutch heritage is] less important than for us. They left Holland. We never made that choice. They are still Dutch, compare everything with Holland and complain about New Zealand. We’re more curious.” (Sophie van den Bogaard, 31 years, 1.5 generation)

“When the first generation dies out, the links [to the Netherlands] will vanish.” (Leonie Waayer, 43 years, second generation)

“[My mum would] certainly describe herself as a New Zealander. But for her, her Dutch heritage is more important. She has much closer family ties to Holland. She’s the one responsible for keeping those ties going. She goes to Holland every time she goes to Europe.” (Sebastian Bisley, 34 years, 2.5 generation)
In general this study indicates that the first generation is the link back to the Netherlands and the keeper of the Dutch language, traditions and culture; they have the most personal contacts with family members in the Netherlands and keep their descendants informed. Their degree of connectedness strongly influences subsequent generations’ links to and interest in the Netherlands and Dutch culture. The Dutch connection generally dilutes from generation to generation, unless it is rekindled by visits to and from the Netherlands or strengthened by own first-hand experiences. Thus the second generation generally identifies more with their Dutch heritage than the third generation. When the first generation passes away, this often means the link to the Netherlands is seriously weakened. However, some second and third generation participants had a strong desire to explore their ancestor’s and their own roots and managed to create new links, for example by visiting places of significance for their family in the Netherlands, meet the extended family or make new Dutch friends.

The distinction between second and third generation as well as the in-between generations were relevant, as the participant’s interest in their Dutch heritage weakened the further removed they were from their ancestor who immigrated to New Zealand. However, it was by no means the only or most important factor for maintaining Dutch culture. The age when a parent or grandparent arrived in New Zealand was crucial, because the younger they were, the less they had been exposed to Dutch culture and the less likely they were to pass it on to their children. However, the participants whose parents came to New Zealand as children and the one participant who arrived as a two year old, stated that being born in the Netherlands had an important influence on them feeling Dutch and therefore not entitled to claim a full New Zealand European (Pakeha) identity.

The Dutch connection was weaker if only one parent was Dutch, and even weaker if only one grandparent was Dutch. Thus, intermarriage can be seen as an important factor for assimilating to New Zealand society. However, two participants in my sample had married another Dutch descendant which made their Dutch connection stronger. To sum up, whether someone was second or third generation certainly mattered for how Dutch they felt, but other factors also influenced their identity, as is outlined further in the next section.

4 FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE IDENTITY OF DUTCH-KIWIS

4.1 Upbringing, exposure and generation

“Mum taught me Dutch-based cooking, which is using certain spices with certain things. We had olliebollen at Christmas time. We opened our presents on Christmas Eve, which I think is a Dutch tradition. It’s hard to pinpoint Dutch things, because it’s just my way of life.” (Frieda Vlaardingerbroek, 36 years, 2.5 generation)

“[Dutch culture was passed on] not as much as I would have liked. … Dutch wasn’t spoken at home, only at family gatherings was Dutch spoken. We had evening meals at the table and dad would teach us Dutch words for everything on the table” (Leonie Waayer, 46 years, second generation)

“I grew up in a very staunch Catholic community in Te Aroha, which is a small town with 3,000 population. But at the Catholic primary school 85% of the kids were Dutch, the Dutch had lots of kids. The church was the Dutch club, like family, everyone was friends with each other. It was like Little Holland!” (Christina Mellar, 43 years, second generation)

In my sample upbringing and exposure to Dutch culture as a child seemed to be the most influential factors for maintaining links to the Netherlands and the Dutch culture as adults. Particularly participants who grew up in rural areas (e.g. the Wairarapa and the Waikato) exhibited a stronger Dutch identity than those who grew up in the city, which can be explained with both areas having a large Dutch community through the Reformed and Catholic Church respectively that fostered relationships with other Dutch families and the recreation of ‘Little Holland’ within New Zealand. Chain-migration of family members from the Netherlands (e.g. siblings or parents migrating later) and having large numbers of children (five siblings was no
exception in my sample) contributed to large Dutch families who settled in the same area and sustained Dutch traditions over time.

Even today, some families have big family gatherings at halls where Dutch food is served and the children perform 'items'. Others, especially those from mixed-ethnic ancestry (e.g. Austrian-Dutch and German-Dutch) stated that the proximity to and the amount of time spent with the Dutch grandparents or other Dutch relatives in New Zealand influenced their Dutch connection. While Dutch culture was present to some extent (Dutch language spoken at home, Dutch food, Sinterklaas) in most households while growing up, most participants were raised as Kiwis and consequently identified as ‘Kiwi with Dutch heritage’.

An interesting finding among the farmers in the sample was that they often had farm workers from the Netherlands on their farms, meaning their children were exposed to more, and more recent Dutch culture growing up.

### 4.2 Language

“I suppose, language isn't a big importance for me personally, as long as they can make themselves known.” (Michael Kloeg, 29 years, second generation)

“I speak very little. My Japanese is better than my Dutch.” (Martin Poot, 21 years, second generation)

“Yes, I would [like to learn Dutch], but I don't think I will. (laughs) If you had someone to speak to, but Mum stopped speaking, because she found she didn't have anyone to speak to either.” (Sally Peel, 23 years, third generation)

Apart from three participants (one 1.5 and two second generation) who claimed to be fluent in Dutch and one 2.5 generation who lived in the Netherlands for an extended period and picked up the language, all others had very limited Dutch language skills and referred to a few Dutch ‘family words’ or phrases in Dutch. It seemed that while the second generation reported Dutch being spoken at home sometimes (although they replied in English), the third generation was raised in an exclusively English-speaking environment and little effort was made to teach them Dutch.

In addition, some third generation participants reported that their parents made a deliberate decision not to speak Dutch to them, because the parents themselves struggled at school with their limited English, having only learnt Dutch at home. If Dutch is spoken around the house today, it is when Dutch relatives visit, at family gatherings or as a secret language that the young children cannot understand. Two participants (one second and one third generation) mentioned that they received Dutch language tuition in an after-school programme or by a private teacher, learning to read and write in Dutch, but no others reported such formal teachings as for them it was only passed on orally.

Although many participants would like to be able to speak Dutch, there is little regret that their parents did not teach them, and they are not likely to learn Dutch as adults because they are not willing to invest the time and effort. Dutch songs, such as ‘lang zal ze leven’ and nursery rhymes continue as family traditions along with some words, such as ‘gezelligheid’, long after the dominant language has become English. Many participants stressed that family reunions with relatives from the Netherlands who visited New Zealand were occasions for speaking or at least hearing Dutch, having a positive influence on both their language skills and sense of ‘Dutchness’.

### 4.3 Visits to the Netherlands

“I love it! I found the parts that I miss here. It's where I come from. I better understand who I am.” (Sophia van den Bogaard, 31 years, 1.5 generation)
“Visiting the Netherlands enhanced that [Dutch identity], particularly for the kids. It gave me a renewed sense of who I am and come from.” (Christina Mellar, 43 years, second generation)

“I always felt a bit Dutch and wanted to experience it. Here I was the ‘Dutchie’, there the Kiwi. I’m not as Dutch as I thought. I was finding me [my personality] by going there.” (Tony Fransen, 28 years, 2.5 generation)

“[Going to the Netherlands I experienced] the opposite of culture shock: cultural affiliation.” (Sebastian Bisley, 34 years, 2.5 generation)

“I don’t want to live there. I felt adrift: not really as Kiwi, where do I fit in? Ironically, going to Holland has made me a stronger Kiwi. I felt close to Kiwis there.” (Miria Goodwin, 33 years, third generation)

“I don’t feel Dutch enough anymore to go [to the Netherlands]! I’d feel like a tourist.” (Clare Francis, 30 years, third generation)

A major factor how connected to the Netherlands someone felt, was whether or not they had been there in person. Four participants had not visited the Netherlands at all, whereas eleven participants had made between one and 20 trips and four of those stayed long-term on their ‘big OE’ (overseas experience). Although stories told by the family members who were raised in the Netherlands were important to pass on a sense of Dutchness, they were easily trumped by the descendant’s own first-hand experience when visiting.

Trips to the Netherlands were not purely touristic, but utilised to discover the family history by visiting significant sites (e.g. family farm) and family members. However, in some families the contact with family members in the Netherlands had stopped or there was no surviving kin, in which case the descendants felt less connected than the ones who were able to re-establish family bonds. A few third generation Dutch felt so disconnected from their Dutch heritage, that they did not visit, at all even though they went to Europe.

A trip to the Netherlands, however, is no guarantee to feel more Dutch, instead it marks a ‘make or break point’: descendants not feeling very Dutch to start with might realise how many commonalities there are between themselves and the Dutch people they encounter, whereas those feeling quite Dutch already realise how different they are compared to the Dutch. The identity crisis can become further aggravated if their expectations are not met, when they realise how much the Netherlands today differs from the country they remember from their childhood or their ancestor’s stories or how old-fashioned their own Dutch sounds.

This is particularly the case for descendants of Dutch migrants who left the Netherlands shortly after the war in the 1950s. Many participants stressed that as much as they liked visiting the Netherlands they could not imagine living there long-term and were ‘glad’ their ancestors had immigrated to New Zealand. In most cases the trip reassured their Kiwi identity and that New Zealand is their home, while at the same time strengthening their link to the Netherlands through personal connections made. Often friendships with cousins or other people of their age were formed and maintained via social media (Facebook).

4.4 Passports

“I feel that it [having a Dutch passport] solidifies my Dutchness” (Frieda Vlaardingerbroek, 36 years, 2.5 generation)

“[I would like to have a Dutch passport] partly because I identify to some extend with [the] Dutch. I like Holland ... and it would be nice to feel that I was part of it. And partly, because it would be very convenient to have citizenship in a state of Europe.” (Sebastian Bisley, 34 years, 2.5 generation)

In my sample seven participants had only a New Zealand passport, five had dual Dutch and New Zealand citizenship, one had only a Dutch passport and two had a New Zealand as well as another European passport. The ones who did not hold a Dutch passport voiced their regret that
they were not eligible and were able to retell the law changes that made them or their ancestors decide for the New Zealand passport.

Participants who already held a passport from another European country did not strive for a Dutch passport, because they felt it was needless for them. Everyone in my sample would welcome to have a Dutch passport not only for gaining access to the European Union, but also to legitimise their Dutch identity.

4.5 Personality and age
Tanjaa: “Do you think your Dutch connection will get stronger in the future?”

Sister 1: “Not for me” (Clare Francis, nee van Bysterveldt, 30 years, third generation)

Sister 2: “I would like to visit. Maybe when I have kids I will get closer to it. I would hate them to lose it” (Ingrid Steward, nee van Bysterveldt, 28 years, third generation)

“More, I’m the only one who is in the Dutch club. I’m the only girl. My brother lived in the Netherlands since he was 18 years old and has a Dutch girlfriend, but he is not so interested in the culture. I’m involved with the Dutch club.” (Sophie van den Bogaard, 31 years, 1.5 generation)

“As I’m getting older I’m more interested in family history.” (Miria Goodwin, 33 years, third generation)

While upbringing, visits to the Netherlands and a Dutch passport are all factors that shape someone’s identity, individual personality should not be overlooked. Especially the interviews with cousins and siblings who had a very similar or almost identical upbringing suggested that their different personalities and interests are responsible for the variation of feeling Dutch. When I interviewed two third generation sisters in their twenties, the older one stated that she was not at all interested in exploring her Dutch heritage, whereas the younger sister was more adventurous and interested in family history and was keen to rediscover her roots.

The age of the participants also played an important role in their interest in discovering their Dutch heritage. In general, the participants reported that during childhood Dutch aspects of family life were present, but not recognised as such and taken for granted, as teenagers they sometimes got mocked at school for being different and consequently identified more as Kiwi denying their Dutch heritage. However, the older they get, the more interested they often become in the Dutch parts of their identity and some are motivated to visit the Netherlands later in life.

5 REMAINING DUTCH AT HEART: FONDNESS FOR ‘DUTCH THINGS’

5.1 Food and sports
“We make stampot and Dutch traditional food from Holland. The kids love kroketten. We’ve just been to Wellington, so we stopped off at the Dutch shop (laughs) and bought hagelslag and dropjes. You do identify with [Dutch food]. We’ve got maggi, Dutch soy sauce, in the cupboard.” (Michael Kloeg, 29 years, second generation)

“I love the food! stroopwafel, black jellybeans, dad keeps it around and I go to the Dutch shop. ... I support Holland in soccer and wear orange.” (Luke Wevers, 33 years, 2.5 generation)

In their everyday lives today a fondness of Dutch foods prevails: almost all participants regularly buy and eat Dutch food, such as cheese, liquorice and speculaas, but only a few cook Dutch dishes themselves. The other indication for Dutchness in everyday life is a patriotic pride of Dutch sporting achievements. During a world cup or the Olympics the descendants of Dutch
immigrants support the Dutch soccer team or ice-skaters (only if the Netherlands competed against New Zealand were they unsure who to cheer for).

5.2 Economic ties

“I’m excited when I see ‘made in Holland’! ... My dad worked for Philips, so I have a bit of loyalty. Best value for money. Dutch brands stand for better quality. We buy overalls for farming and gum boots from Holland. ... My parents buy cheese moulds etc. from Holland and ship the containers over.” (Sophie van den Bogaard, 31 years, 1.5 generation)

“Shell is Dutch, but they don’t take my AA card [Automobile Association discount card]. I don’t buy Philips over Sunbeam, I’m not that nostalgic.” (Christina Mellar, 43 years, second generation)

“I prefer Philips over Sony, my grandparents instilled that in me. European quality over cheap Japanese.” (Jonathon Westphal, 25 years, 2.5 generation)

The descendants of Dutch immigrants in my sample had very little economic ties to the Netherlands. ‘Made in Holland’ sometimes sparked a nostalgic emotion that might lead to a decision to buy a certain product, but rational factors, such as price and quality remained dominant. Dutch food products are still very popular among the descendants with some paying regular visits to the Dutch shop and others only occasionally buying Dutch foods from the supermarket.

In general, there was a perception that Dutch brands, such as Philips, stand for better quality than ‘cheap Japanese’ products. Interestingly, three participants who work in the farming or food industry (cheese-making, commercial baking) reported to import special equipment from the Netherlands, because it was either unavailable in New Zealand or the quality was perceived inferior to the Dutch product.

5.3 The next generation

Six participants had children of their own, but none spoke Dutch to their children. There is still a perception that the children could be disadvantaged at school if they spoke Dutch at home. Many have a desire to pass on Dutch cultural aspects, such as nursery rhymes and foods to their children. However, especially the third generation feels they know too little Dutch themselves to teach their children. The Wellington Dutch club runs a fortnightly playgroup for pre-school children to immerse them in Dutch language, song and play. Interestingly, only first generation Dutch with their young children utilised it when I visited.

5.4 Dutch clubs

“To be honest, I wouldn’t go, I’m too busy. I don’t know how beneficial it would be. I’m single with four kids and three jobs. I did Dutch dancing as a teenager and found it embarrassing.” (Christina Mellar, 43 years, second generation)

“It depends, if it had the right demographics and age groups – like the Young Farmers [an agricultural club], they have age sections, then yes. Perhaps focus on a single sport, like playing soccer together, or have an A&P [Agricultural and Pastoral] Dutch day.” (Tony Fransen, 28 years, 2.5 generation)

Only one 1.5 generation woman was in the committee of a Dutch club, all other participants perceived that Dutch clubs were for first generation immigrants only, particularly the ones who arrived in the 1950s, and either felt excluded due to their lack of Dutch language or not attracted at all. There seems to be a miss-match between the offers of the current Dutch clubs (card playing, speaking Dutch, recreating a Dutch living room, dancing) and what the descendants would seek (playing or watching sports together, contemporary music, no commitment, young like-minded people). All participants would appreciate a newsfeed about Dutch events and updates from the Netherlands, in form of a Facebook page or e-newsletter.
6 CONCLUSIONS

Firstly, the findings of this study suggest that there is an affinity to ‘things Dutch’ among Dutch descendants that could be utilised to strengthen the Netherlands-New Zealand connection, however, the participants signalled that in order for them to get involved only very little effort should be required. Existing Dutch clubs are rather unattractive to second and third generation Dutch as they are perceived as exclusive to the first generation immigrants who want to speak Dutch, play cards and dance to traditional music. A more modernised, events-based approach bringing younger people of Dutch descent together is recommended, particularly involving watching the Dutch soccer team and eating Dutch food.

Secondly, the vast majority of participants indicated an interest in Dutch events, but did not know where to look for them. Thus, it is recommended to advertise and promote Dutch events better and wider, for example by creating a Facebook page or e-newsletter for Dutch Kiwis that informs about Dutch events in New Zealand and provides news from the Netherlands. This could be a platform for Dutch Kiwis to make connections and meet virtually as well as in real life. Perhaps a ‘win a trip to Holland’ campaign could draw wide attention and get people to sign up and spread the word (share).

Thirdly, as visiting the Netherlands plays such an important role in identity formation as this study showed, scholarships, financial and other support could help Dutch Kiwis to experience the Netherlands and rekindle their connection. Especially in the farming industry and other trades an exchange programme between the Netherlands and New Zealand could facilitate the culture and knowledge transfer between the two countries. Since so many Kiwis base themselves in the UK for their ‘big OE’ [overseas experience], sponsored trips to the Netherlands or language tuition could be offered to reduce barriers for Dutch descendants who would otherwise not visit. Special student or intern visas could be issued by the Embassy for Dutch descendants without a Dutch passport, to stimulate their visit and to show the Embassy’s outreach to the Dutch community.

Fourthly, there is a desire among Dutch descendants to correct popular stereotypes about the Netherlands to a wider New Zealand audience, such as clogs, windmills, tulips and coffee shops. Instead, they would like to see the Netherlands being promoted as a modern country with innovation, creativity and history that is a worthwhile tourist destination. An institute that facilitates Dutch culture, similar to the Goethe Institut [an organisation promoting German language and culture worldwide], could contribute to this by bringing over artists, musicians, DJs or film-makers from the Netherlands and setting up an ‘artists in residence’ programme sending Kiwis over there.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the research findings in Australia and New Zealand, the following recommendations were drafted for discussions to reach Dutch descendants and strengthen their NL ties.

1. Modernise Dutch clubs: perhaps with an events-based approach, bringing younger people of Dutch descent together, particularly involving watching the Dutch soccer team and eating Dutch food.

2. Offer Dutch playgroups and language classes for children to support parents who are keen to pass on Dutch language and culture but are not confident enough themselves.

3. Advertise and promote Dutch events better and broader, for example by creating a Facebook page for 2nd and 3rd generation Dutch that informs about Dutch events and gives news updates from the Netherlands.
4. Establish exchange programmes, scholarships, financial and other support helping Dutch Kiwis to experience the Netherlands, rekindle their connection and facilitate cultural and knowledge transfer. Grants towards trips to the Netherlands from the UK or language tuition could be offered to reduce barriers for Dutch descendants who would otherwise not visit the Netherlands.

5. A special student or intern visa could be issued by the Embassy for Dutch descendants without a Dutch passport, to stimulate their visit and to demonstrate the Embassy’s outreach to the Dutch community.

6. Promote the Netherlands as a modern country and tourist destination. Correct popular stereotypes (such as clogs, windmills, tulips and coffee shops).

7. An institute that facilitates Dutch culture, similar to the ‘Goethe Institut’, could contribute to this by bringing over artists, musicians, DJs or film-makers from the Netherlands and setting up an ‘artists-in residence’ programme sending Australia- or New Zealand-based artists over there.

Due to the small sample of this pilot study findings are not representative and variations might be individual matters rather than universal trends among Dutch descendants in New Zealand. It is suggested to conduct a larger-scale study with a bigger and more representative sample to verify the conclusions of this study. For example, the immigration policy in New Zealand shifted from assimilation in the 1950s to multiculturalism since the 1970s, but this study did not find that the policy change had a direct impact on the degree of ‘Dutchness’ in the participants.

A follow-up study should look into this issue further. Moreover, the factors suggested in this research (upbringing, language, visits, passports, personality and age) should be examined in more detail, perhaps focusing more on religion, and age when visiting the Netherlands and differences between siblings and close kin within the same family. Economic ties could be further tested using detailed surveys with ‘scenarios’ in order to find out what influences the participants’ decision-making process before purchasing a (Dutch) product. Although this study found some interesting correlation between feeling strongly Dutch and growing up in a family of farmers or bakers, future research is necessary to examine to what degree class and economic status impact on identity formation.

REFERENCES


Te Papa (2000) Going Dutch. 90% developed design. Wellington

6 Dutch Diaspora and Citizenship

Arie van der Wiel

1 INTRODUCTION

As discussed in the previous chapter, Statistics New Zealand has two main ways of categorising migrant communities: either through questions related to ethnicity (which refer to cultural affiliation) or through questions of descent (which refer to where people have come from, where people were born). However, there is a third way of identifying migrant communities – through their nationality status (which refers to their citizenship). Unfortunately the New Zealand Population Census does not raise questions about nationality issues. This chapter will explore the citizenship status of the Dutch diaspora in New Zealand. This review will be done for both first generation migrants as well as for the second and third generation.

First we will start with a brief introduction of the concept of citizenship, followed by what policies the New Zealand and Netherlands governments had for acquiring or holding citizenship. To what extent did the New Zealand government encourage migrants to naturalise? How tolerant was the Dutch government to dual nationality?

Next we will show what the response was from the Dutch migrant community. Did many take up New Zealand citizenship, or were they eager to retain Dutch nationality? How many from the second and third generation migrants were able or willing to arrange dual nationality?

After that the Dutch migrants’ citizenship rates will be compared with those of other major migrant communities in New Zealand such as the Chinese, Indians, Koreans, Filipinos and South Africans.

Finally we will discuss the topic of dual identity: the challenge of belonging to two worlds. Some have questioned what happens when host governments, like New Zealand, are tolerant with multiple-citizenship, and ask whether that will impede cultural assimilation and will slow down the development of national identity and cohesiveness. Others argue that migrants who do not fear losing citizenship of their home country are more likely to pursue naturalisation in their adopted countries, and subsequently be more likely to integrate than those who retain long-term residency as aliens.

In the conclusion, the main findings on the take-up rate of citizenship among Dutch and other major migrant communities in New Zealand will be summarised and some conclusions drawn on the possible impacts if rules on citizenship were to be tightened.

I would like to thank everybody who provided information, support and suggestions. Special thanks goes to Han Nicolaas (Statistics Netherlands), Nick and Ros Lambrechtsen and Paul Merwood (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment) for their critical comments on earlier drafts. Finally, I would like to acknowledge Jelle Hatenboer, Thomas Kleine Schaars and Emile Hajema (interns at the Netherlands Embassy in Wellington) for carrying out the passport survey.

2 DEFINING CITIZENSHIP

The term citizenship or nationality indicates the legal relationship between a person and a state (Messina and Lahav, 2006). Possession of citizenship is normally associated with the right to work and live in a country. Citizenship, however, is more than just a formal status, as demonstrated by the possession of a passport. Being a citizen means having the rights to vote and to stand for political office, enjoying equality before the law and being entitled to various services and benefits. It also means having the obligation to obey the laws, to pay taxes and to defend your country.
Laws on citizenship or nationality derive from two competing principles. The law of the blood (jus sanguinis) is based on descent. That is, children usually inherit the citizenship of their parent or parents at birth. The law of the soil (jus soli) automatically confers citizenship to all persons born within the country’s territory. In practice, all modern states have citizenship rules based on a combination of the above two principles, although one or the other may predominate. The law of the soil is applied most consistently in Australia, Canada and the US. The law of the blood is still the dominant legal principle in a number of European countries like Germany, Austria and Switzerland as well as in Japan. There is also a third path to citizenship: naturalisation. Naturalisation allows a non-national to acquire citizenship after he or she has met a set of conditions and tests. Since each country decides who its citizens are, based solely on its own laws, and generally without regard for the laws of other countries, it is quite possible for an individual to be considered a citizen by two or more countries, even if some or all these countries forbid dual or multiple citizenship.

Until half a century ago, the common international consensus was that dual citizenship should be avoided as much as possible. This was clearly reflected both in the citizenship laws of individual countries and in bilateral and international conventions and agreements. Leading politicians of previous centuries found it intolerable for a man to belong to two countries; and saw it as equivalent to bigamy. In 1930, the League of Nations proclaimed that every person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only. A 1963 treaty in Europe required countries to limit dual citizenship, until it lapsed in the late 1990s. Immigrants have commonly had to renounce their old citizenship when taking a new one; the countries that they left have often disowned emigrants naturalised abroad.

Yet over the last few decades an astonishing change has taken place; an increasing number of policymakers regard dual citizenship not as a problem, but rather as a possibility that needs to be negotiated from various standpoints, ranging from simple pragmatic tolerance to active encouragement (Faist et al, 2008).

One reason for more liberalisation is practicality: dual nationality has become harder to control. Increased migration and rising numbers of cross-border marriages mean that ever more children are born to multinational families. Governments that take in many immigrants also see benefits from allowing them to keep their old passports. OECD research (2007) suggests that immigrants who do not fear losing their existing nationality are more likely to pursue naturalisation in their adopted countries and subsequently more likely to integrate than those who maintain long-term residency as aliens.

However, Maas (2010) states that opponents have questioned whether allowing dual citizenship impedes cultural assimilation, increases disconnection from the political process and degrades national identity and cohesiveness. The rise in tension between mainstream and migrant communities is cited as evidence of the need to maintain a strong national identity and culture. They assert that the fact that a second citizenship can be obtained without giving anything up both trivialises what it means to be a citizen and nullifies the consequential transformational and psychological change that occurs in an individual when they go through the naturalisation process.

These different views over the effects of dual citizenship have led Castles and Miller (2009) to distinguish three major models for managing immigration and ethnic diversity.

First, the segregation model. This model treats immigrants as temporary guest workers. It is highly restrictive to other forms of immigration and to naturalisation of immigrants. China, Japan and countries in the Middle East tend to follow this approach.

Second, the assimilationist model. Under this approach, immigrants can obtain citizenship on the condition that they give up some or all cultural, linguistic, or social characteristics that differ from those of the majority population. This model was popular in Australia, Canada and New Zealand till the 1970s.
Third, the multicultural model. This model grants immigrants access to citizenship and equal rights without demanding that they give up cultural, linguistic and/or intermarriage restrictions. There is no pressure for them to integrate or inter-mix with the mainstream population. Many European countries have historically taken this approach, but there is growing criticism against this model.

In sum, a distinction can be made between so-called tolerant countries and restrictive countries acquiring other citizenships without surrendering the original one. New Zealand falls in the category of tolerant countries with its citizenship laws. It has shifted over the past decades from an assimilationist model to a more multicultural approach. The Netherlands citizenship laws are in general classified as restrictive. Contrary to New Zealand, in the Netherlands there is a move away from the multicultural approach towards a more assimilationist model.

3 NEW ZEALAND CITIZENSHIP POLICIES

Until 1949, New Zealanders were British subjects and New Zealand had the same nationality legislation as the UK. New Zealand citizenship was created on 1 January 1949 (Green, 2006). The country’s nationality law was based on the territorial principle: that is, everybody born in New Zealand is a New Zealand citizen by birth. In 2005, the Citizenship Act was amended so that any child born after 1 January 2006 is a New Zealand citizen by birth only if at least one of the parents is a New Zealand citizen or entitled to reside in the country indefinitely. In other words, New Zealand shifted its focus from the law of soil to the law of blood.

Under British rule New Zealand had pursued an unofficial white citizenship policy favouring protestant Anglo-Celtic settlers (Philips, 2006; Beaglehole, 2006). The organised and structured flow of migrants from Great Britain and Ireland started in 1840 and reached its peak between 1870 and 1885 when almost 300,000 flooded into the country. In the search for other-than-British migrants, preference was shown for Scandinavians and Germans in the 1870s followed later by south-eastern Europeans. The most significant group of non-Europeans recruited in that period were Chinese who worked in the Otago goldfields. Between 1881 and the 1920s, the New Zealand Parliament passed legislation that intended to limit Asiatic migration to New Zealand and prevented Asians from naturalising. At the end of the Second World War, New Zealand was a strongly homogeneous society of predominantly British descent. According to the 1945 Census, 95% of New Zealand's population (1.7 million) was of European origin – a level of concentration achieved nowhere else in the British Empire. The remaining 5% consisted primarily of Maori. The Asian (mainly Chinese) and Pacific migrant population made up around 0.5%.

In 1946, the Dominion Population Committee recognized that a carefully planned immigration policy was needed to fill shortages in some secondary and tertiary industries. Although they reaffirmed a preference for immigrants of British stock, they reluctantly admitted that officials should explore the possibilities of securing immigrants from certain northern European countries. This approach was very different to that adopted in Australia, where a broader spectrum of European immigrants was accepted, including large numbers from southern and Eastern Europe.

The 1960s saw some early indications for relaxation of traditional immigration policies. In his survey of attitudes towards immigrants, Andrew Trlin (1992) noted that the problem of labour shortages led some critics of government policy to suggest international recruitment of labour, irrespective of national origins. The 1960s, in particular, saw a strong increase (500%) in the Pacific Island population of New Zealand. However the restrictive “white New Zealand policy” remained in place to a large extent until the 1974 immigration policy review.

The year 1973 became a defining one for New Zealand’s international relations (Scofield, 2011; Zodgekan, 2005). The country’s affinity and status came under pressure, due in part to policies undertaken in Great Britain. In 1973, Britain joined the European Economic Community. New Zealand lost its preferential treatment, including unlimited rights for its citizens to visit the UK.
One of the results of this change was a new citizenship act in 1977. New Zealand passports no longer contained the status of British subject and New Zealand citizen, but instead only stated New Zealand nationality.

However, the real break in the immigration policy took place in the mid-eighties (Scofield, 2011). These changes were primarily driven by New Zealand’s economic reform programme and reflected a marked departure away from the informal solely British-based preference system. The policy changes included linking immigration to the country’s long-term economic interests. This ended the preference for migrants from Britain, Europe or Northern America based on their race, and instead classified migrants on their skills, personal qualities, and potential contribution to the New Zealand economy and society. Effectively the New Zealand Immigration Service ranked the qualities sought in the migrants and gave them priority ranking using a points-based scale.

Through this liberalisation of migration policies, barriers for entry have been removed for a wide range of immigrant groups. Since the 1980s there has been a steady numerical and proportional increase in the overseas-born population in New Zealand. New Zealand’s overseas-born population has increased from 14.4% in 1981 to 19.5% in 2001 and 22.9% in 2006. The 2013 Census showed that 25.2% of New Zealand’s population was born overseas, one of the highest in the world.

The most striking change in the migration pattern is the influx of Asians. In 1986, the Asian community numbered just over 50,000 people. Ten years later it was over 170,000 and in 2006 the numbers more than doubled again to 355,000. The results of the 2013 Census showed that New Zealand’s Asian population has further climbed to 472,000 people. Over this period New Zealand saw a similarly strong economic shift towards Asia. Whereas in the 1960s 80% of New Zealand’s trade was with Europe (in particular with the UK), this has been reduced to around 10% today and Asia has become by far New Zealand’s most important trading partner. These figures confirm that New Zealand has quietly undergone a profound revolution, both economically and demographically. From being one of the world’s most homogeneous societies, it has become one of the most diverse.

With these changes in the immigration mix, did New Zealand put any special emphasis in its policies on the promotion of citizenship? Unlike in the US and more recently Australia, the notion that citizenship marks national identity gained little traction in New Zealand (Green, 2006). In 1960, the New Zealand Secretary for Internal Affairs reaffirmed this view: “there is no economic and little social pressure on aliens to become New Zealand citizens, nor does New Zealand seek to influence or persuade aliens in this matter. It is better that resident aliens should themselves decide freely and at leisure whether or not they wish to become New Zealand citizens.” And there has been no New Zealand counterpart to Australia’s campaign in the late 1990s, notes Green, to encourage long-term residents to take up Australian citizenship. Since 1955, the New Zealand government has introduced a naturalisation ceremony to welcome new citizens whereby they publicly swear allegiance to the Queen and loyalty to New Zealand by oath or confirmation. This is a rather low-key affair that attracts little attention from the wider public writes Green (2006).

Despite New Zealand’s tolerant policies towards immigrants, the rapidly expanding influx of newcomers (with nearly one in four New Zealanders born overseas) has raised challenges of how to maintain a socially inclusive, harmonious society in the face of increasing cultural diversity. Some politicians have portrayed Asian immigrants in particular as a problem because of their lack of interest and familiarity with the New Zealand culture. Research results released by the Asian–New Zealand Foundation (2012) revealed that New Zealand citizens of Asian descent remain at risk of being perceived as outsiders. Therefore as in many other countries, the debate about citizenship, national and cultural identity has been for a number of years a very controversial political topic in New Zealand (Castles and Spoonley, 1997).
4 DUTCH NATIONALITY LAW

We will limit ourselves in reviewing the Dutch nationality law to what it has meant for Dutch emigrants to maintain their own nationality in combination with obtaining citizenship of the host country. Secondly, what the possibilities are for second and third generation migrants overseas to inherit Dutch nationality. This section will concentrate on the principles of Dutch citizenship, the political debate about dual nationality and the options and regulations for obtaining Dutch nationality abroad.

Before discussing these nationality issues, we briefly touch upon the history of the Dutch diaspora (van Dalen and Henkens, 2008). Until 1800, the Dutch had only a modest share in overseas emigration as a whole. The first great emigration wave happened between 1820 and 1920 when almost 300,000 left. Their main destination was America. The 2000 Census in the US showed that 4.5 million American citizens are of Dutch descent. The second emigration wave took place after the Second World War. Over about 15 years, 400,000 people moved away. They went mainly to Canada (140,000), Australia (120,000), US (70,000), South Africa (30,000) and New Zealand (25,000). From the mid-1960s till the early 1980s the Netherlands changed from an emigration to an immigration country. Because of the economic recession in the 1980s, immigration slowed down and emigration picked up again. Recent figures (Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2012) indicate that of the 142,000 emigrants in the year 2012, only one third was born in the Netherlands. The Netherlands counted in the same year an almost similar number of immigrants, namely 156,000. About two thirds of these emigrants came from Europe and almost one fifth of them were Dutch-born return migrants. The Table below gives an overview of the more recent emigration by Dutch-born citizens.

Table 1: Destination of the Dutch-born Emigrants (2000–2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Destination</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Country of Destination</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Belgium</td>
<td>78,218</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9 Canada</td>
<td>9,176</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Germany</td>
<td>67,905</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10 Switzerland</td>
<td>8,756</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 U.K.</td>
<td>37,106</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11 Sweden</td>
<td>6,723</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 United States</td>
<td>25,199</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12 China</td>
<td>5,874</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Spain</td>
<td>24,641</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13 Italy</td>
<td>5,771</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 France</td>
<td>23,334</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14 Norway</td>
<td>5,445</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Australia</td>
<td>14,254</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15 New Zealand</td>
<td>5,117</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Turkey</td>
<td>9,407</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>16 South Africa</td>
<td>4,534</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The total number of Dutch emigrants was 459,425
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2013

The CBS statistics show that international migration has become more and more a two-way traffic phenomenon. It is interesting to see what consequences these changes have had on citizenship regulations. And whether we can notice a difference between what is called emigrant dual citizenship and immigrant dual citizenship. In other words, are we more flexible towards our own nationals when they migrate overseas to maintain and promote stronger cultural and economic connections with them when they reside permanently in another country?

Dutch citizenship is conferred primarily by birth to a Dutch parent irrespective of place of birth. Until 50 years ago Dutch nationality was acquired through birth from a Dutch father. This was not the only gender discriminatory provision in Dutch nationality law. It also provided for automatic acquisition of Dutch nationality for foreign women marrying Dutch men and for loss of Dutch nationality where a Dutch woman would marry a foreigner. Both regulations were abolished in 1964. It was not until 1985 that the Dutch nationality regulations provided for acquisition of Dutch nationality also through Dutch mothers. If Dutch citizenship law and policy
from its beginning (in 1892) were to be described as restrictive or liberal, an evolution from restrictive to liberal back to restrictive can be noted, according to Van Oers et al (2013).

From 1892 to the early 1950s, the ideal of the nation-state had exercised a restrictive influence on Dutch citizenship law and policy. Requirements for naturalisation were very strict. In 1953, a process of liberalisation of Dutch citizenship law began. Between the 1950s and mid-1960s, the Netherlands had become a country of emigration. The Dutch government did not concern itself with developing a policy for the influx of newcomers. However, this changed in the second half of the 1960s when many migrants were recruited in Turkey and Morocco to meet the growing demand of the industrial boom. As these migrants were considered temporary workers, integration with preservation of cultural identity was the policy's motto.

At the end of 1970's, it became evident that most immigrants were staying permanently and a new policy was developed aimed at equal participation of migrant minorities in society. The starting point was the improvement of the immigrant's legal position through the stimulation of naturalisation. In the early 1990s it was acknowledged that allowing dual citizenship would serve the realisation of the government's drive for integration and participation in society. It culminated in the complete toleration of dual nationality between 1992 and 1997.

In the late 1990s the integration of immigrants became a subject of public debate. The idea had emerged that immigrants had been treated too liberally, that they had been pampered without imposing obligations. This development was triggered by the publication in 2000 of a very influential article 'The Multicultural Tragedy' (Scheffer, 2000).

This led to a policy shift – the opposite of the multicultural policy of the 1980s – in which the idea prevailed that a strong legal position would contribute to immigrants' integration. Naturalisation was no longer seen as an instrument for integration. Under the new policy, naturalisation was seen as the crown on the completed integration process. Dutch integration policies have shifted from a multicultural to a more assimilationist approach. With this change, naturalisation became more difficult and dual nationality more restricted again.

The introduction of a naturalisation test and later an integration exam has resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of naturalisations. Falling from an average of about 65,000 acquisitions of Dutch nationality in the second half of the 1990s (with a peak of 80,000 in 1996) to around 25,000 on average between 2007 and 2011 (IND, 2012).

As the principle of symmetry is used on policies concerning naturalisation and dual citizenship for immigrants in the Netherlands and Dutch emigrants living abroad, the impact of these reforms should be similar on both sides. But there is always a tendency and political pressure to make exceptions for one's own emigrants, according to van Oers et al (2013). Whereas in the late 1990s it was made harder for first generation immigrants to acquire Dutch citizenship, the possibilities for Dutch emigrants to retain their citizenship were enlarged. Dutch citizens who were going to apply for the citizenship of their partner were allowed to keep their citizenship. Furthermore, Dutch citizenship was no longer lost automatically after spending 10 years abroad, provided that a passport or proof of Dutch citizenship was applied for each of the 10 years. Those who had lost Dutch citizenship in this way were given the opportunity to re-acquire it under easier conditions. The regulation with this option came into force in April 2003. In 2010, another regulation was introduced for the so-called latent Dutch. These were children born before 1985 to a Dutch mother and a non-Dutch father. The option procedures are a simpler and quicker way of acquiring Dutch citizenship compared to naturalisation. The number of options approved from 2007 to 2011 was, on average, 6,000 annually (IND, 2012).

In 2012, a centre-right government coalition proposed a bill to further strengthen the conditions for acquiring Dutch nationality through naturalisation. The amendment sought to block dual nationality to Dutch citizens and to individuals who wish to become Dutch to 'purify' Dutch nationality. This revision not only targeted immigrants in the Netherlands, but also Dutch nationals abroad who opt for dual nationality. Dutch expats and immigrants alike generally prefer to keep their original nationality and so seek dual citizenship. The proposed restriction of
dual citizenship drew a lot of media attention. The Dutch emigrants living abroad started a petition campaign. The campaign received a lot of sympathy and has contributed to the withdrawal of the bill. But a large proportion of the Dutch population (60% according to a poll in May 2011) finds dual citizenship undesirable.

Finally, Dutch nationals also have citizenship of the European Union. This European citizenship does not replace Dutch nationality, but is in addition to national citizenship. European citizenship is still limited in scope. It includes the right to move freely within the territory of the member states, and to settle there. The so-called Schengen territory comprises 28 countries including two non-EU members, Switzerland and Norway. The only countries from the EU that are not party to the Schengen agreement are the UK and Ireland. For those New Zealanders who can get dual nationality this is an interesting option as it provides easier access in the future to European member states to stay, to work and to study.

It may be concluded that the Dutch nationality law has developed in a more restrictive direction. By seeking to toughen its nationality laws, the Netherlands is turning away from what is generally seen as a global trend to become more flexible in allowing dual nationality.

5 RENOUNCING DUTCH CITIZENSHIP

The Dutch are widely praised in New Zealand as role models for integration into the local society. Given their strong assimilation one would expect that many had given up their Dutch citizenship. Many immigrants, writes van Dongen (1992), naturalised as a matter of course feeling it their duty since they had chosen to live in New Zealand. Besides, she states, remaining Dutch was frowned-upon and actively discouraged in these days. In practice any desire by the Dutch to hold on to their heritage was stymied by the government’s settlement policy. But how true is this supposition? Is the naturalisation rate for the Dutch migrants in New Zealand reflecting their strong assimilation?

Nationality rates are defined as the ratio between the yearly number of naturalisations and the number of foreign-born residents in the country. When comparing rates of naturalisation between different countries, some caution is required as people who are not eligible for citizenship may be included in a country’s resident population. For example, long-term temporary residents such as international students as well as permanent residents who have not lived long enough to qualify for citizenship are all included in this category in the census. Therefore standardised or revised citizenship rates are also often presented.

The introduction mentioned that New Zealand’s censuses do not include questions about nationality. An attempt therefore will be made here to estimate the naturalisation rate among Dutch migrants in New Zealand. A number of different data sources are used to measure the naturalisation rate. The three different sources used here were: national censuses, population registers and surveys.

Measuring the rate of those changing their Dutch nationality for a Kiwi citizenship is based on the following two sources: the annual naturalisation statistics of the host country and the emigration and return statistics of the supplying country. As the information for standardising the rates such as arrival date and residential status (to exclude those not being long enough in the country to naturalise) were not available to us we will only be able to give unrevised rates.

In the next two sections (holding and comparing citizenship rates) two other measures are applied to compute the rate of Dutch migrants. Instead of annual immigration statistics we have also used stock measurements of the total Dutch-born migrant community by different population censuses. These results are presented in table 6 where we compare the naturalisation rates of the Dutch with those of other major migrant groups. In the next section, holding citizenship, a third method is introduced to determine the citizenship rates based on a survey of passports issued by the embassy. These different methods also can be used to test the reliability of the scores.
Figure 1 shows both the number of Dutch emigrants that have settled in New Zealand since 1948 (approximately 60,000) and the number of people that returned, almost 30,000 (see Annex 1 for more details). The return rate was relatively low (30%) in the first two decades but increased over the years to around 65% in the 1970s and 1980s and over the last 20 years rose to over 70%. Given the long history of the Dutch migration to New Zealand and with the peak taking place many years ago, it can be assumed that the difference between the unrevised rate and the standardised rate of citizenship will be small.

Figure 1: Emigration and Return Flow of Dutch Citizens to and from New Zealand (1948-2012)

Naturalisation statistics in New Zealand are provided by the Department of Internal Affairs. But first, a brief summary of the basic requirements to be met before a person can apply for citizenship of New Zealand will be given. The main criteria are that you must already have the status of permanent resident and have lived in New Zealand and kept your residence status for a minimum of 5 years before your application for citizenship. You must possess a basic knowledge of English. There are additional regulations for those aged below 16 years.

In the early years the application procedure was far from easy. Department files of the 1950s, writes Schouten (1992), containing as many as 40 pages or more, show how much paperwork was involved in each case. This bureaucratic process, Schouten concludes, was likely to have put people off in the beginning. This procedure has later been considerably streamlined.

Apart from the length of the procedure, application requirements nowadays can be considered modest to minimal and will certainly not be considered a great obstacle in the naturalisation process. In general, New Zealand is one of only a small group of countries with very tolerant citizenship laws and has permitted dual or multiple-citizenship since the creation of New Zealand nationality law in 1949. Permanent residents have the same rights or entitlements as New Zealand citizens.
There are a number of advantages in having New Zealand citizenship. Only citizens of New Zealand are able to stand for public office. To get a permanent job in the New Zealand public service you had to naturalise. In addition there are some public sector jobs that are not open to citizens of other countries. But overall the benefits are marginal compared with the situation of permanent migrants.

The table below gives a historical overview of the numbers of Dutch emigrants naturalising in New Zealand (see Annex 2). For calculating the naturalisation rate we have to compare the number naturalised with the total stock of Dutch emigrants. The stock of Dutch emigrants is here based on arrival and return statistics of CBS. This is a proximate of the actual stock. We have to realise that immigration statistics show slight biases with the factual situation. Moreover we have to remember that it takes at least 5 years to obtain citizenship. Prospective citizens had to be legally in the country for that period of time. This explains why only 10% gained their citizenship during the first decade, 1950–1959. In the period 1960–1969 the rate had gone up to around one third. At the end of the 1970s the take-up rate had further increased to just over 40%.

Table 2: Naturalisation and stock of Dutch Immigrants, 1949 - 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Numbers naturalisation</th>
<th>Arrivals</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949 - 1959</td>
<td>2,068</td>
<td>19,790</td>
<td>2,215</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1969</td>
<td>4,568</td>
<td>9,970</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 - 1979</td>
<td>3,027</td>
<td>7,690</td>
<td>6,267</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 - 1989</td>
<td>1,734</td>
<td>9,949</td>
<td>5,216</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 - 1999</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>4,889</td>
<td>3,219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 - 2009</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>5,372</td>
<td>4,041</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 - 2012</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,038</td>
<td>58,990</td>
<td>28,163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dutch nationals arriving from other places, notably Indonesia are not included in the totals. Schouten reports that the number born in Indonesia is 1,380 according to the 1966 census.

Source: Department of Internal Affairs, Citizenship Statistics New Zealand, 2013; Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2014

Similar observations of the level of naturalisation were made by Thompson (1970), Schouten (1992) and Yska (2006). By 1970 about a quarter of the Dutch-born migrant population had transferred their allegiance to their adopted country. Whereas Yska saw this as disappointingly low, Thompson considered this rate a positive sign for the process of integration. Around the late 1970s there was a strongly integrated Dutch migrant community of which, according to Schouten, 70% still had Dutch citizenship: “in 1977, the last year for which these figures are available, there were 13,600 Dutch people on the register of aliens. According to the census figures of that time about 20,000 had been in the country long enough to qualify for citizenship”.

After 1970, the rate has remained roughly the same. For the entire period the rate is just over 45% (14,038) versus a total population of Dutch migrants that settled permanently of 30,827.

What were the main reasons for the Dutch migrants to abandon their citizenship?

Surveys on the public awareness of New Zealand citizenship (2009) showed that the most frequently mentioned meanings for obtaining New Zealand citizenship were among the foreign-born respondents: proud of New Zealand/to be a New Zealander and a sense of belonging.

In the article the 'Industrious Dutchie: recording the experiences of first generation immigrants to New Zealand in the 1950s', Donaghey and Papoutsaki (2008) quoted two important reasons for naturalisation by Dutch respondents which are worthwhile referring to here. The first quote shows great similarity with the main motives given in the awareness survey. “We’re Kiwis. My father was very insistent on that, he said this country is good to us and we’re going to be good
to it and we're going to be Kiwis.” The second quote refers more to practical/economic reasons for obtaining New Zealand citizenship. "Once you started getting into business you had to be a New Zealander and it was seen as better to be a New Zealand citizen to get on in that company. So we got our citizenship.”

In the early days of migration to get a permanent job in the New Zealand public service you had to naturalise. Many better educated Dutch migrants got jobs and careers there. For the great majority however that was of less relevance as they found employment in the private sector. The absence of economic advantages as a reason for applying for citizenship in the awareness survey however is striking. Given the small advantages citizenship offers, and there are definitely exceptions as mentioned for the public sector, it may well be that the reason for taking up New Zealand citizenship was primarily a social one and not so much associated with financial benefits.

Family issues will definitely have played a key role. Like Peter Grandiek said as rationale for applying for Kiwi citizenship at the Te Papa Exhibition (2000): "I thought this is my home, this is my children's home so I only saw it as the right thing to do....The important link to me was that my children were going to be New Zealander". In general you could say that family obligations and responsibilities feature as strong enduring factors in determining or conditioning migrant's decisions not only on staying or returning but also on integration and identity formation.

A number may have also renounced their citizenship out of bitterness and disappointment with the way the Netherlands had treated them. Some felt that the Dutch government was glad to have got rid of them, with an "out of sight, out of mind" attitude; and a "no longer burden on the Dutch taxpayer" attitude. This was officially stated in some Dutch government publications and statements. That feeling of desertion was deeply hurtful and could have been an important reason for naturalising. Why should they pay homage to a country that apparently had no place for them anymore?

It may be concluded that over the entire period of 65-year emigration to New Zealand the number of Dutch migrants that took up New Zealand nationality was around one quarter and that for those who have settled permanently the rate was less than half. Whereas the great majority of Dutch migrants is well integrated and consider themselves Kiwis, the data above shows that their level of naturalisation is probably one of the lowest among the migrant communities in New Zealand.

6 RETAINING DUTCH CITIZENSHIP

How many people in New Zealand have kept their Dutch citizenship and what do we know of their socio-demographic profile?

In addition to the data sources used for calculating the naturalisation rates (Population Census, immigration and naturalisation statistics) a survey among Dutch passport holders has been carried out by the Netherlands Embassy in Wellington.

The total number of Dutch passport holders is estimated at least 20,000 at the end of 2013. This total is based on the fact that the Embassy now issues almost 4,000 passports per year, with a validity of 5 years. The issuing of passports has seen a steady rise over the past 10 years from 3,000 to 4,000 now.

When analysing these data, caution is needed as passport statistics may create some bias in measuring the number of Dutch nationals. First, not everybody who has Dutch nationality carries a passport. Some are satisfied with only a certificate of Dutch citizenship because of the extra costs of a passport. This is the case with a growing number of dual nationals. Second, many of the older generation do not extend their passport when it expires as they are no longer able to travel. One quarter of all the requests for renewal of passports concerned expired travel documents. Third, passports can be obtained from other sources than the Embassy, outside
New Zealand. And finally, passports can be issued by the Embassy to people who are not in the category of Dutch emigrants but are, for example, visitors. Given these possible biases, we assume that the numbers of Dutch nationals is significantly larger than the number of passport holders.

The passport survey confirmed the earlier findings that around 55–60% of the Dutch immigrants kept their citizenship. The study showed that of the 20,000 passport holders 12,000 were issued to Dutch-born applicants. According to the Population Census of 2013, New Zealand counted in that year almost 20,000 Dutch-born migrants. This implies a Dutch citizenship rate of 60% among the Dutch-born in New Zealand.

These statistics seem to indicate clearly that there is still a very strong sentiment towards maintaining Dutch citizenship. To get a little bit beneath the abstractions of the statistics and to understand the reasoning from the insider’s perspective we will quote here the views of a number of first generation Dutch emigrants over their experiences on maintaining their Dutch citizenship from the report of Donaghey and Papoutsaki (2008): “I still have a Dutch passport and I wouldn’t change it for all the tea in China”. Some, they note, despite the sense of pride in achievements and contributions, do not feel fully integrated, accepted or appreciated by the Kiwis: “I admire people who have totally settled but I’ve never that feeling”. Another stressed the potency of her Dutchness: “the Dutch nationality still is foremost. I’m happy to live here and I think my children are very grateful that I emigrated from the Netherlands but personally I still feel very Dutch”. These days you see among the older Dutch migrants some regret for having lost their Dutch nationality. It is a common trend among first generation migrants that when they grow older that their ethnic identity begins to reassert itself.

The passport study also found that 40% of the applicants were dual Kiwi-Dutch citizens. In overall numbers that means around 8,000 people have Kiwi-Dutch nationality in New Zealand. Dual nationals are almost exclusively second and third generation Dutch, as the study revealed. Only people born in New Zealand from a marriage where at least one of the parents is a Dutch citizen have access to Kiwi-Dutch dual nationality. The second and third generation Dutch migrants automatically received New Zealand citizenship till 2006 because of the law of soil (jus soli). Since 2006, this law has been changed into the law of blood (jus sanguinis) implying that at least one parent has to be a New Zealand citizen. Implying people born from a marriage where the parents have mixed citizenship can apply for both nationalities. Between 2004 and 2013 there was an increase of about 25% of Kiwi-Dutch dual nationals. So there seems to be a growing interest among the second and third generation in obtaining Dutch nationality.

However, despite this significant rise, we have to realise that only a small fraction of the second and third generation of Dutch descent has dual citizenship. Van der Pas and Poot (2011) estimate the number of second and third generation Dutch to be 100,000. The passport survey indicated that the number of second and third generation dual nationals is approximately 8,000. This means that less than 10% was able to arrange dual nationality. The reasons for this relatively low percentage can be manifold. It can be because parents had lost their Dutch citizenship (about 40%, as the above data indicated), or because of lack of interest. But the passport study showed that there is a clear growing interest in dual citizenship.
The survey revealed moreover that the age distribution of Dutch passport holders was close to the New Zealand national age profile (see the table below). Only for the first two age cohorts it showed a reversed pattern. That is, the youngest age group was somewhat underrepresented and the next age cohort overrepresented. The reason could be that very young people did not require an own passport but applied for it as soon they became adults. The age distribution of passport holders differed significantly with the Dutch-born community of which half is 60 years or older. Their underrepresentation confirms that many of the elderly in the Dutch community do not renew their passports anymore.

Furthermore the average age of Dutch single nationals differs significantly from dual nationals. The average age of dual nationals is 23 whereas that of the single nationals is 52 – more than twice as high. Two-thirds of the dual nationals were first applicants.

Another good illustration of the strong sentiments to keep or to get back Dutch nationality in New Zealand was revealed through the option regulation introduced in 2003 where those who had lost their citizenship were given the opportunity to re-acquire it. In 1985, it was decided that Dutch citizenship was lost automatically after 10 years of residence abroad if the person concerned also possessed the citizenship of that country. The period to re-obtain Dutch nationality through this procedure was closed last year, 2013. Former Dutch citizens in New Zealand were the fifth highest users of this option procedure worldwide. A total of 2,147 people re-acquired their Dutch nationality. Morocco, Turkey, Surinam and Germany had bigger numbers. But New Zealand was far ahead of the other traditional emigration destinations such as Australia, Canada and the US.

Why did so many of the first generation Dutch show such a willingness to maintain or even re-acquire their citizenship despite their strong integration?
Although we are not able to give an exhaustive explanation and more research is recommended, it is believed that part of the understanding of the low citizenship rate has to be sought in the history of the migration process; in the legal implications of the citizenship laws from both the home as well as the host country of the migrant; and finally in the risk assessment by the migrant of the socio-economic opportunities and challenges to succeed in their new country.

The resistance to exchange Dutch citizenship for New Zealand nationality may have its origin in the early years of Dutch settlement. In the mid-1950s the rumour was spread that naturalised citizens were permanently relegated to the status of second-class New Zealanders who could be rendered stateless at the stroke of a pen (Schouten, 1992). Well known became the campaigns by the Dutch migrant Hanny van Roekel in the 1950s against New Zealand’s naturalisation laws. Van Roekel argued that if people were treated like second-class citizens they would retain their own nationality and New Zealand would become an “island of aliens”. This law was changed in 1960, however with little effect on the rate of naturalisation, as the statistics show.

In addition when the major wave of migration took place from the Netherlands, New Zealand had adopted a policy of incorporating migrants into society through a more-or-less one-sided process of assimilation. On arrival, all new migrants faced pressure to discard their Dutchness. In the early 1950s the New Zealand government wanted settlers to blend socially and culturally into the British dominated society. The attitude was summed up by the Senior Immigration Official Dr Reuel Lochore: “we must make new Britishers: by procreation, and by assimilation; by making suitable aliens into vectors of the British way of life” (Schouten, 1992). However recruitment of the Dutch was only second choice because of absence of sufficient British migrants. So being seen as second class citizens together with a strong xenophobia against everything that was not British may have led to a certain hesitation to give up Dutch citizenship.

A second explanatory factor was the lack of pressure on migrants to take up New Zealand citizenship. New Zealand’s citizenship policy is considered as very flexible towards its immigrants – immigrants have almost the same privileges as their own population. Assimilating and integrating without a New Zealand passport was not a problem. But although the New Zealand citizenship laws were liberal the Dutch laws were restrictive. Many Dutch had to face the dilemma that if they took up New Zealand citizenship they would lose their Dutch nationality. The tolerant New Zealand policy has meant that the choice to become a New Zealand citizen is largely that of the immigrant and not the government of the host country. The restrictive citizenship laws of the Netherlands therefore play a decisive role by the migrant’s selection. Even from a social-cultural point of view, the need for naturalising diminished as the pressure on assimilation significantly relaxed. From the mid-1970s New Zealand’s migration policy started shifting away from the assimilationist approach towards tolerating greater cultural diversity and allowing newcomers to keep their social values and traditions. This implies that migrants not only kept their passports but were also able to preserve their cultural identity, as we see with the new arrivals from the Netherlands. They show a much stronger cultural connectedness to their home country.

Thirdly, holding on to their Dutch passport was not only important for social reasons but probably also for strong economic reasons. It provided migrants with the opportunity to return if their settlement was not successful. The first wave was not a cross-section of Dutch society. They were mostly working and lower middle class people and had a well below average level of education; few had attended secondary schools, particularly among the women (Leek, 1999). Most hardly spoke a word of English on arrival. And for the great majority it was the first time they went abroad and travelled so far from home to “the end of the earth”. They must have felt pretty insecure about what was going to happen. Many migrants found life harsh in the beginning. This dilemma is best captured by the title of the book Cruel Paradise by Speersta (2005) about the life stories of Dutch emigrants. Although their intention was to stay, almost one third of the first wave of Dutch migrants went back before the end of the 1960s. In their study Blauw and Elich (1983) found that most of the return migration occurred two to three years after the initial emigration. Little is known about their motives to return, but for a number it was probably economic and social factors and having failed to adjust to their new
environment. Especially women, as a number of studies have shown, missed their families and their support (Jansen, 1990; Doornbos, 2005). Since the early 1990s the migration flow is quite different and exists primarily of people who arrive with the intention to stay temporarily and then return back home. During their stay abroad they maintain close ties with home and for these reasons the great majority keeps their citizenship.

To conclude there are three factors that played a key role in the reluctance of the Dutch to give up their nationality. First, many of the Dutch may have initially kept their passport as a form of protest against the assimilation policy. Second, there was little need to have a New Zealand citizenship to integrate successfully for an immigrant. Third, because of the economic uncertainty in their new environment they preferred to maintain the security of return. They witnessed sufficient cases of failure. New Zealand is, because of its economic limitations, as much a country of emigration as immigration. Not only is one quarter of New Zealand’s population born abroad, but an estimated one million Kiwis live and work overseas. So New Zealand is shaped by a culture of migration where one has to keep as many options as possible open for moving to greener pastures. A foreign passport can be of great value in that strategy.

7 COMPARING CITIZENSHIP RATES

How does the naturalisation rate of the Dutch migrants compare with that of other major migrant minority groups in New Zealand? And secondly how do these Dutch naturalisation rates compare with the Australian situation for the Dutch community there? The Table below shows the 10 countries having the largest number of people naturalised since 1949. In total around 675,000 foreigners were granted New Zealand citizenship over the past 65 years.

Table 4: Number of people naturalised in New Zealand by country of birth (1949 – 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 United Kingdom (1)</td>
<td>193,869</td>
<td>6 Fiji</td>
<td>36,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 China (2)</td>
<td>69,261</td>
<td>7 Philippines</td>
<td>20,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Samoa (3)</td>
<td>62,841</td>
<td>8 Korea (4)</td>
<td>19,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 India</td>
<td>45,105</td>
<td>9 Taiwan</td>
<td>19,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 South Africa</td>
<td>42,427</td>
<td>10 Netherlands</td>
<td>14,152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) UK includes England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales; (2) China includes Hong Kong, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Macau en Macao; (3) Samoa includes Samoa and Western Samoa; (4) Korea includes Korea and South Korea.
Source: Department of Internal Affairs, Citizenship Statistics New Zealand

Five major source countries of immigrants to New Zealand are selected for comparison: China, India, South Africa, Korea and the Philippines. Excluded are the British and Samoans because of their colonial historical links and the special consular relations these countries had with New Zealand in the past.

First the policies of citizenship of these countries in particular on the issue of dual nationality are briefly summarised. Secondly, we look at what extent these countries have developed a diaspora policy for their communities abroad. Both are factors that may have influenced the migrants’ decision making.

Factors that contribute to a state’s recognition of dual citizenship are: the state demand for financial capital (remittances); the state demand for human capital (brain drain); and regime type (more dictatorial regimes are less likely to grant dual citizenship to its people abroad). In general Africa and Asia, according to Faist et al (2008), seem to lag behind in recognising dual citizenship. But also some rich democracies like Germany, Switzerland and The Netherlands have very restrictive policies.

Based on the rating of country laws on citizenship (Blatter et al, 2009), for our selection in Table 4 South Africa and the Philippines are considered the most tolerant. South African and Filipino
citizens are legally allowed to hold dual nationality. The other three countries have restrictive laws. That implies that in principle their nationals lose their citizenship by naturalisation in a foreign country. There are however differences in restrictiveness between these countries. China and Korea are the most restrictive whereas India has introduced a kind of ‘light citizenship’ for their nationals. For example, overseas citizens of India will enjoy all rights and privileges available to non-resident Indians.

The other important factor is the level to which the home country of the migrant has developed a diaspora policy for their communities abroad. For many years India and the Philippines have understood the strategic importance of the diaspora in economic and political affairs and therefore include them in their foreign policy planning. Recently China is more actively pursuing policies to connect culturally and politically with its diaspora communities overseas. With these policies they support the ethnic identity of their former nationals, and through that the interconnectivity with their homeland. The Netherlands lacks such a diaspora policy and strategy almost completely.

Table 5: Number of overseas-born by country of origin in New Zealand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4,372</td>
<td>4,944</td>
<td>31,278</td>
<td>85,800</td>
<td>89,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>6,305</td>
<td>6,570</td>
<td>12,807</td>
<td>43,341</td>
<td>67,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3,840</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>11,334</td>
<td>41,676</td>
<td>54,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>12,183</td>
<td>28,806</td>
<td>26,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1,263</td>
<td>7,005</td>
<td>15,282</td>
<td>37,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>21,700</td>
<td>24,486</td>
<td>23,430</td>
<td>22,101</td>
<td>19,815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: China figures on 2006 and 2013 include Hong Kong etc.
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Population Censuses

Importantly, as the above table shows, the five selected countries have a much more recent migration history with New Zealand than the Dutch. Whereas the Dutch major emigration wave took place in the 1950s and first half of the 1960s, for the other communities, the peak of emigration to New Zealand happened in the 1990s and thereafter. Eighty-nine percent of the naturalised Chinese received their citizenship in the 1990s or later, for India this figure is 88%, for South Africa 90%, for the Philippines 93% and for Korea 99%. In comparison, 80% of the naturalised Dutch got their citizenship before 1990s.

In the table below a summary is given of the citizenship rates for different ethnic migrant groups (see Annex 2). For comparison we have tried to select periods with similar conditions regarding the minimum time period needed for the naturalisation process. Whereas for the Dutch the early period of migration (i.e. 1949–1979) is chosen, for the other communities the more recent period (i.e. 1980–2010) is used. Given that one has to live in New Zealand for at least 5 consecutive years to meet citizenship residence requirements, the census figure of 2006 is used as the indicator for the size of the population of the migrant community and 2010 as indicator for the number of people of that community that naturalised. For the Dutch the number of Dutch-born from the 1976 Population Census was taken. Because of increasing death rates later statistics became less reliable. The overall naturalisation rate for these five major migrant communities is 75% – compared to 45% for the Dutch. When comparing over the same period the Dutch rates with three other European migrant communities in New Zealand Germans, Swiss and Polish the rates are respectively 30%, 56% and 85%.
Table 6: Naturalisation rates by country of birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Overseas born (1)</th>
<th>Naturalisation Rates (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1949 - 1979</td>
<td>1980 - 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>85,800</td>
<td>4,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>43,341</td>
<td>3,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>41,676</td>
<td>2,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>28,806</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>15,282</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>21,700</td>
<td>9,663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) Overseas born for The Netherlands is based on the Census of 1976; for the others the reference census is 2006. (2) Naturalisation rates for The Netherlands are based on the period 1949 - 1979; for the others the period 1980 - 2010. China includes China and Hong Kong.

Source: Statistics New Zealand, Population Census 1976 and 2006; Department of Internal affairs, Citizenship Statistics New Zealand, 2013

The Longitudinal Immigration Survey: New Zealand (LisNZ, 2010) confirms these findings. The LisNZ is a survey of immigrants developed by the Department of Labour in partnership with Statistics New Zealand. The LisNZ involves interviews with the same group of migrants at 6 months (wave 1), 18 months (wave 2) and 36 months (wave 3) after taking up permanent residence. At wave 3, migrants were asked whether they had gained New Zealand citizenship or whether they intended to apply for citizenship.

At wave 3, most migrants (90.4%) intended to stay in New Zealand for 3 years or more and 78.4% had gained or intended to apply for New Zealand citizenship. The survey showed that migrants from South Africa (93.3%), the Pacific (93.0%) and South Asia (86.5%) were more likely to have gained, or want to apply for, New Zealand citizenship than migrants from other regions. Migrants from the rest of Europe (excluding UK and Ireland) scored lowest with 62.9%.

According to LisNZ, a range of factors have influenced migrants' intentions to apply for citizenship. First, policies of the home country that restrict their nationals' ability to hold dual citizenship. Take-up of citizenship may be discouraged by such laws, which strip citizenship from those who adopt another nationality. Age also influences migrants' plans for the future. Of those in the youngest age group (16–24 years), 87.4% had gained or wanted to apply for New Zealand citizenship, compared with 64.2% of those aged 65 years or older. Probably the most important factor is the intention of the migrant: whether to stay or return back later to their home country. The LisNZ study clearly indicates that migrants from Asia and South Africa arrive with the intention to stay and therefore want to become New Zealand citizens.

New Zealand Immigration Statistics show indeed that the countries with the highest level of return migration have also the lowest level of naturalisation (see table 7 and Annex 4). Reasons for return vary from macro-scale economic or political events to individual migrant perspectives. Economic stimuli may involve pull factors from the area of origin like the strong economic recovery in the Netherlands since the mid-1960s, as well as push factors such as an economic downturn in the country to which migrants have emigrated. The crisis that hit New Zealand in the early 1970s, when the UK, its largest export market, joined the European Economic Community led to an exodus of people from New Zealand. In reality, the causes of return migration are many and varied, and somebody may decide to return home for a variety of reasons rather than just one. The statistical basis for studying return migration is still weak – a situation which can be seen as both cause and a consequence of the fact that return migration has been a neglected aspect in population studies (Gosh, 2000). For example, different countries have different criteria defining a returning migrant. Many countries even fail to record return migration.
Above data seem to support the assumption that persons from countries with lower economic opportunities are more likely to stay and take up New Zealand citizenship. Many migrants came to New Zealand to escape difficult political situations or ethnic conflicts in their home countries and therefore seek the additional security of New Zealand citizenship. Whereas the more recent Dutch transnational migrants follow this pattern of high return and low naturalisation, the Dutch migrants from the 1950s and 1960s seem not to fit into this theoretical framework.

Finally we will compare the citizenship rates among the Dutch in Australia and in New Zealand. The situation in Australia under almost similar legal conditions shows surprisingly a completely different picture with New Zealand. According to the study of Smith et al. (2010), like in New Zealand also Australian citizenship has little practical effect on the everyday situation of the foreign permanent resident. Smith et al estimated the Dutch citizenship rate in Australia at 75% (adjusted even up to 80%). This rate corresponds closely with the number of Dutch-born passport holders in Australia versus the size of the Dutch-born population. In Australia the Dutch embassy issues annually about 6,500 passports on a Dutch-born population of around 80,000 (2006 Population Census). In New Zealand this ratio is 400 travel documents on a Dutch-born population of almost 20,000 (2013 Population Census). Meaning that on a population size four times as large only one and a half times more passports are issued.

What is different between New Zealand and Australia is the length of the naturalisation procedure being 5 years for New Zealand versus 2 years for Australia. The minimal application requirements in Australia may have contributed to some extent to these higher rates of naturalisation.

But what may be a more important contrast is the greater diversity of the migrant community in Australia in the 1950s till the 1980s. The majority of the migrants to New Zealand were of Anglo-Saxon origin till the late 1980s. Only more recently do we see an increasing diversity of migrants in New Zealand. Immigration and multiculturalism became much earlier important elements in Australia's approach to nation-building. Hereby citizenship was seen as the cornerstone of national identity according to the Joint Standing Committee on Migration. Citizenship as stated in the foreword of that report represents an individual's commitment to Australia.

Another factor that could have had an impact on the difference in naturalisation rates was the greater economic opportunities Australia offers to Dutch migrants in comparison with New Zealand. This is also reflected in the levels of return migration by the Dutch between the two countries. For New Zealand the return rate is almost 50% over the past six decades. For Australia the return rate is 40% for this same period (Statistics Netherlands (CBS), see Annex 4 for statistics about Australia).

Further research will be needed to explain these differences in the naturalisation rates of the Dutch migrant communities in New Zealand and Australia.

---

**Table 7: Return migration rates by country of residence (1990 - 2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Arrivals</th>
<th>Departures</th>
<th>Return Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>162,855</td>
<td>44,841</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>83,113</td>
<td>13,133</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>44,207</td>
<td>6,983</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>46,682</td>
<td>30,499</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>32,200</td>
<td>4,648</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12,834</td>
<td>8,351</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: See annex 4 for more details.*

*Source: Statistics New Zealand, International Travel and Migration*
8 DUAL IDENTITY

Donaghey and Papoutsaki (2008) identified in their study frequently ambivalent feelings regarding the extent to which Dutch migrants retained their Dutchness or embraced being Kiwi, suggesting an enduring ambivalence towards identity and nationhood. Or as one of the respondents said: “there are lots of things where I feel I’m more a New Zealander and then on the other hand there’s still a lot of Dutch in me”. The Dutch look Anglo-Kiwi, and tend to be monolingual in one generation, yet deep down still feel Dutch the respondents of the study were trying to say.

It is possible to maintain multiple identities in different contexts and situations. And these identities moreover may change both through internal as well as external factors. Ethnic intermarriage, increasing cultural globalisation and diversification of society are central to this. Among people born elsewhere, length of residence and age at immigration can mean former ethnic affiliations may change to reflect current self-identified ethnic belonging. Beyond these social processes, the political climate sways public opinion on ethnic identity. And immigrants reconnect with their identity at certain points in their life cycle, for example when they have children or when they retire. So people may change the way they identify themselves over time and in different situations.

A way to measure dual identity among the Dutch is through analysing the self-identified ethnic group question of the Population Census. Before discussing the results on ethnic affiliation for the Dutch of the 2013 Population Census we first will briefly give some background information about the methodology and conceptual and classification issues of ethnicity.

The New Zealand Population Census has been collecting ethnicity information for most of its history. Ethnicity has been asked in each census since 1976. The definition used by Statistics New Zealand to measure ethnicity is: “ethnicity is the ethnic group or groups that people identify with or feel they belong to. Ethnicity is a measure of cultural affiliation, as opposed to race, ancestry, nationality or citizenship. Ethnicity is self-perceived and people can belong to more than one ethnic group”. An ethnic group is further defined as a group made up of people who have some or all of the following characteristics: a common proper name; one or more elements of common culture; unique community of interests, feelings and actions, a shared sense of common origins or ancestry, and a common geographic origin (Statistics New Zealand, 2007).

Worldwide New Zealand is one of a small number of countries that explicitly allows individuals to affiliate with more than one ethnic or racial group in the national census (Kukutai and Thompson, 2007). People can tick as many ethnic groups as they like. Among researchers and analysts of ethnic data, there is a broad consensus that allowing people to choose more than one group is desirable to best reflect the nation’s ethnic milieu (Didham, 2005).

Statistical measurement of ethnicity has a subjective basis. Consequently, there is volatility in the nature of the responses which poses problems for consistent statistical classification. Any ethnicity classification revision or question change in the future is likely to affect the way people respond to the ethnicity question. This will mean the information on ethnicity will also change. As happened with the Dutch ethnic classification in 1996 (Pas and Poot, 2011). In that census the question on ethnicity included Dutch as a separate box that could be ticked. That year 48,000 identified themselves with the Dutch ethnic group. Almost twice as much as in 1991, recording 24,732 Dutch. Since 1996 the form design has been changed and Dutch is only mentioned as an example.

According to the 2013 census there were 28,500 people in New Zealand who identified themselves with the Dutch ethnicity. The size of the ethnically Dutch remained relatively stable over the past decade. The censuses of 2001 (27,507), 2006 (28,641) and 2013 (28,503) showed figures almost similar.
For understanding people’s identification with Dutch culture and descent and continuation of interest in Dutch heritage two factors are of great importance: place of birth and age. In the Table below the Dutch ethnicity data is presented by country of birth and age category.

Table 8: Distribution Dutch Ethnicity by Country of Birth and by Age Category, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>age</th>
<th>Dutch born</th>
<th>NZ and elsewhere born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No DE</td>
<td>Single DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 – 19</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 39</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 59</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>4,341</td>
<td>13,896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbrev.: No DE = ticked no Dutch ethnicity, Single DE = ticked only Dutch ethnicity, Multi DE = ticked Dutch and other ethnicity/ies

Note: New Zealand born includes also those born outside the Netherlands and New Zealand. These numbers are very small; in the order of 5% of the total. For a comparison with 2006 data, see annex 6.

Source: Statistics New Zealand, Population Census, 2013

About 55% of those who identified themselves as Dutch were born in the Netherlands and the remaining 45% was born almost exclusively in New Zealand. Compared with the 2006 data we can see that there is a gradual shift from Dutch-born to New Zealand born in the ethnicity data over the years.

Of the Dutch-born about 20% did not identify themselves any longer as Dutch. This is probably to a large extent the group of migrants who for reasons of disappointment with the way they were treated by their own government in the past changed their Dutch citizenship for the New Zealand nationality. The remaining 80% of the Netherlands-born classified themselves as Dutch. Of this group only a very small proportion ticked more than one ethnic category, i.e. considered themselves Kiwi-Dutch. So the conclusion could be that the great majority see themselves still primarily as Dutch. More than half of them is over 60 years of age and 80% over 40 years.

More research is needed to find out whether these findings support the somewhat controversial conclusions of a case study conducted by Noor (1968). She argued that the Dutch immigrant is fundamentally not happy, and has maintained their Dutchness, contrary to the wide shared opinion that the Dutch have been successfully assimilated into New Zealand. According to her the Dutch immigrants had settled into New Zealand economic life very successfully but at the same time in a great many cases still retained elements of their own cultural heritage. In other words do these ethnicity statistics support Noor’s study of a high level of integration and acculturation rather than assimilation of the Dutch in New Zealand?

Besides Dutch-born the Census showed that there is a growing number of New Zealand-born who identified themselves with the Dutch ethnicity. The in New Zealand born have two characteristics in common in which they differ strongly from the Dutch-born group. They are substantially younger in age and secondly they tick in the questionnaire to a very large extent more than one ethnicity. Indicating that they belong to more than one ethnic group. Whereby most likely the Kiwi identity is dominant over the Dutch identity.

They are most probably, giving their age, second and third generation Dutch and dual passport holders. The total numbers correspond strongly with the results of the earlier mentioned passport survey carried out by the Embassy. In sum it is evident from the Census statistics that the size of the Dutch ethnic community has remained very stable despite the ageing of the first generation migrants, but that the composition is gradually changing: by more younger and New Zealand-born who identify themselves as Dutch. In addition, their cultural identity is shifting from a more single Dutch ethnic identity towards a more multi or dual identity.
9 CONCLUSION

It is a common saying in New Zealand that the Dutch migrants are invisible because they integrated so well and had given up their Dutchness. Many migration studies over the Dutch settlers in New Zealand have confirmed this image. This study showed that despite their strong integration the majority kept their Dutch citizenship. The reasons why one chooses to take up local citizenship or not are many, as this study has shown.

First, the research data has clearly indicated that easing the retention of original citizenship by the migrant’s home country will lead to increased naturalisation rates. The restrictive Dutch laws on dual nationality have certainly played an important role in the low rate of New Zealand citizenship among the Dutch. But the high rate of citizenship intake by the Chinese migrant community shows that the correlation is more complex. Like the Dutch, the Chinese also have very restrictive citizenship laws yet it seems that this had no impact on their level of naturalisation.

Second, liberal policies to residence requirements as in New Zealand will reduce the need for obtaining citizenship status. Generally citizenship was regarded as nothing more than a civil document in New Zealand that legitimizes the individual's presence in the society. So there was little pressure to take-up citizenship. But in recent times the increasing diversity has questioned the past policy on citizenship. This is probably also the reason why the naturalisation rate of the Dutch in Australia is twice as high as in New Zealand. Australia had from the start a much more diverse migrant community. Citizenship policies became therefore an important element in Australia's approach to nation-building.

Third, the pressure by the host country to assimilate and to drop its cultural identity may have slowed down the naturalisation process. The study indicated an enduring dilemma of identity and nationhood – ambivalent feelings regarding the extent to which Dutch migrants retained their citizenship and at the same time embraced being a Kiwi. The more recent migrants arrived in a time where New Zealand has shifted towards a more multicultural approach. That may have made it easier for them to naturalise as their national identity and cultural connectedness was not threatened. But the study also revealed that becoming a citizen of a country is not a reliable indicator for adopting the local identity.

Finally the intention to settle permanently or temporarily is another key factor in the decision-making process to apply for citizenship. Most recent Dutch migrants to New Zealand keep their nationality because their plans are to return or move on, not to stay. They migrate not primarily out of economic need but for socio-cultural reasons. This study has shown that there is a strong correlation between the economic development level of the home country and the level of return migration. The poorer the home country the more likely that people want to settle permanently and take up citizenship of the host country. The migration pattern of Asia to New Zealand seems to support this nexus.

What do these findings mean for Dutch citizenship developments in New Zealand in the long run? As the first generation gradually passes away, is Dutch citizenship interest sufficiently rooted in the next generation? Statistics seem to confirm a growing, although still limited, demand. This interest is based on a combination of cultural heritage and economic factors. Of key importance for future Dutch citizenship demands in New Zealand will be the debate on citizenship laws in the Netherlands. Recent discussions in the Netherlands seem to point to a more restricted attitude towards dual nationality, as opposed to a rising trend in dual citizenship that can be witnessed worldwide. A more restrictive policy of Dutch citizenship laws will in particular weaken the future ties with the second and third generation of Dutch descendants overseas.
REFERENCES


## Annex 1

**Dutch statistics of emigration and immigration of Dutch nationals to and from New Zealand, 1948-2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NL to NZ</th>
<th>NZ to NL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>m</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2,033</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>1,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>1,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Tabulated by Statistics Netherlands on request of the Netherlands Embassy in Wellington.
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2014
Annex 2
Dutch statistics of emigration and immigration of Dutch nationals to and from Australia, 1948-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NL to AUS</th>
<th></th>
<th>AUS to NL</th>
<th></th>
<th>NL to AUS</th>
<th></th>
<th>AUS to NL</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>m</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td>m</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>1,102</td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5,470</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>9,570</td>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>179</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>6,479</td>
<td>4,536</td>
<td>11,015</td>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>9,145</td>
<td>7,055</td>
<td>16,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>319</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>515</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>4,477</td>
<td>3,957</td>
<td>8,434</td>
<td></td>
<td>487</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>5,860</td>
<td>4,805</td>
<td>10,665</td>
<td></td>
<td>661</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>7,598</td>
<td>6,208</td>
<td>13,797</td>
<td></td>
<td>688</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>6,143</td>
<td>5,364</td>
<td>11,507</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>3,807</td>
<td>3,475</td>
<td>7,282</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>2,035</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>3,620</td>
<td>7,746</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>1,926</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>4,775</td>
<td>3,968</td>
<td>8,743</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>1,941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,830</td>
<td>3,871</td>
<td>8,451</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>2,203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2,577</td>
<td>2,326</td>
<td>4,903</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>3,392</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>1,628</td>
<td>3,386</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,302</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td>2,480</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,780</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>3,445</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,718</td>
<td>1,558</td>
<td>3,276</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>1,263</td>
<td>2,558</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>1,304</td>
<td>2,955</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>2,403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,337</td>
<td>1,156</td>
<td>2,493</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,796</td>
<td>1,528</td>
<td>3,324</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>3,449</td>
<td></td>
<td>985</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>2,840</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td>2,618</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>1,291</td>
<td>2,668</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>1,374</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>1,903</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>2,887</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>2,293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td></td>
<td>960</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>1,939</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td></td>
<td>819</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td></td>
<td>756</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>1,801</td>
<td></td>
<td>611</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td></td>
<td>611</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>1,529</td>
<td></td>
<td>538</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,184</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>2,314</td>
<td></td>
<td>448</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>832</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Tabulated by Statistics Netherlands on request of the Netherlands Embassy in Wellington.
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2014
Annex 3

Naturalisations of major migrant communities in New Zealand (1949-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Born:</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>S-Africa</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>S-Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born:</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>S-Africa</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>S-Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2,159</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1,533</td>
<td>1,395</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>1,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>2,231</td>
<td>1,418</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>1,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>4,693</td>
<td>1,602</td>
<td>1,784</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>2,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>3,762</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>1,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2,585</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>1,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>1,358</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>1,997</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>2,859</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>1,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>3,339</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>2,931</td>
<td>2,446</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>1,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>3,925</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>4,362</td>
<td>2,812</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>1,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>3,087</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>5,210</td>
<td>3,124</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>1,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1,919</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>3,431</td>
<td>2,413</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2,246</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>1,339</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,649</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2,274</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>2,218</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2,211</td>
<td>3,268</td>
<td>2,785</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 14,152 52,433 16,393 45,105 42,247 20,800 18,924

*Source: Department of Internal Affairs, Citizenship Statistics New Zealand 2014*
### Annex 4: Arrivals and departures of major migrant communities by country of citizenship (1990-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China (Incl. Hong Kong)</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>S-Africa</th>
<th>S-Korea</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrivals</td>
<td>Departures</td>
<td>Arrivals</td>
<td>Departures</td>
<td>Arrivals</td>
<td>Departures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,964</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3,806</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3,339</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3,933</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4,478</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>3,064</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7,112</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>1,849</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>1,927</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6,782</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>2,491</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>2,337</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5,616</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>2,904</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>4,251</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4,724</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>1,869</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6,722</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>2,525</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>2,371</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12,116</td>
<td>1,419</td>
<td>4,249</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>3,086</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>16,888</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>6,860</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>3,053</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>14,144</td>
<td>2,386</td>
<td>5,269</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1,882</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6,847</td>
<td>3,799</td>
<td>3,052</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4,671</td>
<td>3,468</td>
<td>2,569</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>1,492</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4,887</td>
<td>2,889</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,812</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>4,232</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5,615</td>
<td>2,796</td>
<td>5,923</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6,621</td>
<td>2,514</td>
<td>6,888</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>1,838</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6,828</td>
<td>3,003</td>
<td>7,509</td>
<td>1,195</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>8,158</td>
<td>3,143</td>
<td>6,281</td>
<td>1,348</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>8,536</td>
<td>2,890</td>
<td>6,392</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>9,005</td>
<td>2,821</td>
<td>6,704</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total in period:** 162,855 | 44,841 | 83,113 | 13,133 | 44,207 | 6,983 | 46,682 | 30,499 | 32,200 | 4,648 | 12,834 | 8,351
### Annex 5

**Distribution Dutch Ethnicity by Country of Birth and by Age Category, 2006 and 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2006 age</th>
<th>Dutch born</th>
<th>NZ and elsewhere born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No DE</td>
<td>Single DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 – 19</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 39</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 59</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>5,127</td>
<td>14,985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2013 age</th>
<th>Dutch born</th>
<th>NZ and elsewhere born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No DE</td>
<td>Single DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 – 19</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 39</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 59</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>4,341</td>
<td>13,896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abbrev.:**
- No DE: ticked no Dutch ethnicity
- Single DE: ticked only Dutch ethnicity
- Multi DE: ticked Dutch and other ethnicity/ies

**Source:** Statistics New Zealand, Population Census 2006 and 2013
7 Dutch societies in New Zealand

Arie van der Wiel and Christine Hofkens

1 INTRODUCTION

The most visible effort made within the Dutch migrant community to keep cultural heritage alive was the formation of Dutch clubs in New Zealand. In this chapter we will focus on their history and development. Studies on immigration associations have highlighted the fact that their roles are not static, but change during the various migration and integration phases and have a different meaning for the first versus the second and third generation migrants.

Besides a brief theoretical review about different patterns of collective organisations among diaspora or migrant communities, the central questions to be tackled here include: what motivated Dutch immigrants to organise themselves in clubs or associations? What functions did these clubs serve at the various phases of the migration process? What did these associations mean to the people they represent and what identity options did these institutions offer?

We are very grateful for the assistance received from the Federation of New Zealand Netherlands Societies providing statistics and information on the Dutch clubs in New Zealand. In particular, our thanks go to Kees Dorresteijn (President of the NZ-NL Society Wellington), Tini de Winter (Christchurch), Marina Wylaarts, (President of the Netherlands Society Christchurch), Jos Jongenelen (Chairman of the Friendly Support Network Trust) and New Zealand Statistics.

2 THE PHENOMENON OF DIASPORA ASSOCIATIONS

We will start first with a brief definition of the term diaspora. The term was used for the Dutch migrant community Down Under at the Conference in Melbourne. The concept has enjoyed remarkable popularity over the past two decades, but also can easily lead to misunderstanding. In the past the term was often associated with oppression and forced displacement.

In the modern migration literature, the term diaspora refers to migrant communities leaving their homeland and spreading around the globe who share a number of common cultural traits. The following common characteristics of a diaspora movement are usually thereby distinguished: collective memory about the homeland; idealisation of the ancestral home; strong ethnic group consciousness; and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries.

A central issue in the diaspora concept is the way they have organised themselves in the host country to be able to sustain their common heritage. Migration research about the role of voluntary organisations within the diaspora communities has grown over the past decades. The literature on immigrant organisations is becoming quite vast. See for example Moya (2005) and Sardinha (2009).

These studies have demonstrated that diaspora voluntary organisations are not only important for the immigrant themselves, but also for the study of their participation, integration and identity formation in the host country. Studying these organisations enables us to make better sense of the complex and dynamic developments that take place within immigrant communities.

In characterising diaspora associations, one can describe the opposing goals and strategies they perform. On the one hand the associations have inward-looking functions by providing a kind of safe haven for their members. Emphasis thereby is on the role immigrant organisations play in ethnic identity issues. On the other hand, their more outward looking functions concentrate
their attention on economic integration and on strengthening the participation opportunities of migrants in the host country.

We can also make a distinction about the scope of activities these organisations are involved in. An immigrant association may exist for a wide variety of reasons: social, recreational, cultural, religious, political, business, service, citizenship or a combination of some or all of these.

Diaspora associations are not only multidimensional, but also prone to chance in character over time. As studies on the formation of these organisations have revealed, in the initial migration stage, associations function to lessen the impacts of social upheaval caused by migration. As the migrant settlement proceeds, and as increased contact with the host society starts to take place, immigrant associations then begin concentrating their attention also on community integration. In other words, while it is common for immigrant associations to be founded to preserve the identity and culture of their members, inevitably these associations also could end up playing a major role in the socio-economic settlement process of their members.

A factor that can play an important role by the formation of diaspora organisations is the receiving country's political and ideology toward immigration. Thereby it is possible that cohesiveness within the migrant community is much stronger in situations where there is a troubled relationship between the diaspora and the host societies. On the other hand an immigration policy by the host country promoting assimilation may also weaken the development of network-based ethnic societies. In contrast policies by the recipient government emphasising pluralism or multiculturalism may stimulate the start of voluntary associations and local clubs.

Finally, another important dimension of diaspora associations to take into consideration for our discussion is to what extent governments of the diaspora's home countries have developed outreach policies to link up with and promote contact and dialogue with migrant organisations. Some countries like India, for example, have for many years developed a clear diaspora foreign policy strategy to strengthen the relations with their communities abroad.

3 THE DUTCH SETTLEMENT PROCESS

This somewhat simplified settlement pattern and dual role (identity preservation and integration) performed by diaspora associations is not always that straightforward, as not all migration movements follow the same process. We can distinguish a number of factors that affect the immigrant group settlement, such as the socio-economic background of the migrants, the characteristics of the migration flow and the policies of the recipient countries on integration of immigrants.

The Dutch migration to New Zealand in the 1950s took place after a five year war and in a period when the country was struggling to reconstruct its ruined economy and society. High unemployment, housing shortages and a baby boom increased these pressures. Dutch men and women who left were referred to as a lost generation, stigmatized by the disruption and trauma of war, seeking a new life in a new environment.

They were usually young. As the table 1 below shows, 60% was in their twenties. Almost 20% were children joining their parents. Sometimes in the migration literature also referred to as one and half migrants to differentiate them from those called first generation migrants. The age when somebody arrives is an important factor for maintaining its culture, because the younger they are the less they have been exposed to the culture at home and the less likely they are to pass it on to their children.
The great majority of the first wave of migrants belonged to the lower middle class with limited levels of education (Leek, 1999). Very few of them had attended secondary schools, particularly among the women. The best most of the men could show writes Leek was a certificate of the elementary technical institute (‘ambachtschool’ these days called in the Netherlands). The majority came in the Netherlands from heavily overpopulated and economically depressed areas. For many of them therefore the Netherlands had few opportunities to offer. So the option for returning to the Netherlands looked hardly realistic to them. They worked like Trojans, concludes Leek, to make from this journey a success.

Another factor that may have played an important role in maintaining Dutch identity abroad has to do with the Dutch character and psyche. The Dutch are highly individualistic. They do not form a close-knit social network like the Asian, Greek and Italian migrant communities. Furthermore the Dutch have a low ethnic self-image. It is often said that they have little nationalist pride except on the soccer field. The Dutch have never had the feeling that their culture was worth exporting said Prof Albeda, former Minister of Social Affairs and a prominent speaker on migration. Take for example the Dutch cuisine. One sees very few Dutch restaurants abroad. It may be argued therefore that the easy integration may have also been caused by a less visible national identity.

The nature of the migration movement also had an impact on the integration process. The majority of these early Dutch migrants received financial assistance from both the Dutch and the New Zealand governments. This strongly contributed to the feeling that this was not a temporary movement. Dutch emigrants came to New Zealand with the idea to settle here permanently and to become Kiwi – not to stay Dutch. They were therefore generally keen to integrate into their new country. However one third of the original group has returned to the Netherlands making this one of the highest return rates among New Zealand foreign settlers. Failing to assimilate was probably the main reason for return.

From the New Zealand side, the immigration policy was strongly focused on assimilation. On arrival, all new migrants faced pressure to discard their Dutchness. The New Zealand government's policy to achieve this was to ensure migrants were spread out over the country to avoid large concentrations of people with the same ethnic background in one place. Studies have shown that of all different groups in New Zealand, the Dutch have spread themselves most widely over the country. The Dutch in New Zealand live as dispersed throughout the country as the Anglo-Saxon Kiwis, with very few concentrations. Even within an area with a high concentration of Dutch not many Dutch know one another. In addition, many parents were told not to speak Dutch at home as that would be bad for the children’s education. Some even stopped speaking their native tongue completely. As a result, children of Dutch migrants

---

**Table 1: Age Distribution of Dutch Emigrants to New Zealand, 1950-1959**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival</th>
<th>0 - 14</th>
<th>15 - 19</th>
<th>20 - 29</th>
<th>30 - 49</th>
<th>50 - 64</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,655</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>3,335</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1,827</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Tabulated by Statistics Netherlands on request of the Netherlands Embassy in Wellington.*

*Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2014*
retained less of their parents’ language than any other ethnic group. This is unique in the world, but not unique to Dutch migrants; the same happened in Australia, Canada and the US.

So on reaching their new home country, many kept their heads down and suppressed their heritage. Industrious, thorough and enthusiastic they were determined to be the perfect migrants, writes Schouten (1992), merging into the local community and becoming indistinguishable. The tough conditions and the need to adapt forced them to put their origins and heritage aside. It will not be surprising that under these circumstances there were no significant incentives to form Dutch migrant associations.

4 EARLY HISTORY OF DUTCH CLUBS

Despite the strong drive to integrate, some in the community protested against this loss of identity and started Dutch clubs in different parts of the country to keep cultural roots alive. The first Dutch clubs in New Zealand were founded in 1948 in Auckland and Wellington, followed soon after by Christchurch and Invercargill on the South Island. At the end of the 1950s there were 13 clubs throughout the country, in: Wellington, Auckland, Christchurch, Invercargill, Otago/Dunedin, Palmerston North, Taranaki, Rotorua, Waikato, Wairarapa, Wanganui, Whangarei, and Balclutha.

Unfortunately, little written information about the initial period of the Dutch clubs is left. Most of the statistics are therefore based on interviews with members and some jubilee editions, indicating that in the late 1960s to early 1970s Auckland had 1,300 and Wellington 550 affiliated members.

According to these sources it is estimated that Dutch clubs counted in total approximately 3,500 so-called affiliated family members around the beginning of the 1970s. This number is not equal to individual membership. With family membership club affiliation could be boosted to almost the double. The total number of Dutch migrants that stayed in New Zealand in the late 1960s was approximately 20,000. This suggests that 30% of Dutch migrants were members and also indicates that the overwhelming majority, 70%, were not members. The membership rate among the Dutch migrant community was probably much lower than with clubs serving other ethnic groups such as the Italians, Greeks, Poles and Pacific Islands communities, notes Schouten (1992).

One of the reasons for the low participation rates as stated above was the assimilation programme. Staying Dutch was actively discouraged in those days by the New Zealand government. But also the fractional differences in the clubs, either of class, region or religion, were for many a reason not to join. During the time the first wave of migrants arrived, the Netherlands was still strongly characterized by ‘verzuiling’ (pillarisation), a kind of social and cultural segmentation of society. Most of the migrants were born and brought up in a strongly sectarian society. Churches (in particular Roman Catholic, Dutch reformed and Calvinist organisations) played an important part in the recruitment of migrants. For New Zealand the division was roughly as follows for the first 10 years: 45% had a Catholic background, 25% were Dutch Reformed, 10% Calvinist and 15% had no denomination (Hofstede, 1964). Many migrants felt that the clubs reflected that same divided society from which they came. The extensive ‘verzuiling’ in the Dutch community did cause internal divisions.

Another factor for the relatively low interest in club membership may have been the high rate of chain migration among the Dutch to New Zealand. Thompson (1970) writes that almost 40% of the Dutch migrants had close relatives in New Zealand before migration. This makes settling in easier and the need for support by a Dutch local organisation less urgent.

On the other hand, it should also be realised that the early settlement days were tough. Few Dutch emigrants were really aware of the psychological and physical complexities an emigration undertaking would engender. Almost none of them had any overseas experience. The majority
hardly spoke English. Moreover not many felt that the expectations promised by the receiving organisation were delivered at least in the initial years following arrival. Many therefore struggled to settle in. On arrival it was made clear to immigrants that they were aliens and many felt that they were treated as second-class citizens. Some bridged this cultural divide by keeping their Dutchness through joining the Dutch clubs and becoming Kiwis with the New Zealanders.

The prime function of the Dutch clubs according to Tini de Winter was bringing the Dutch culture to the community. She said clubs also became a haven of friendship and companionship for the early migrants (Schouten, 1992). Somewhere they could share their experiences and give each other support.

Many of the clubs started around fundraising activities related to a Dutch event (Schouten, 1992). The club in Invercargill, as in other centres, became actively involved in response to the news of a disastrous flood in ‘Old’ Zeeland in 1953. In Dunedin the fundraising campaign by the Dutch community to support the Assumptionist priests sent out to serve the migrants became the catalyst for the establishment of the Dutch club there. In Wellington, Christchurch and Auckland, the celebrations of Queen’s Day and ‘Sinterklaas’ (St Nicholas) became the driving forces behind the foundation of the clubs.

Not all the clubs managed to get their own premises. Invercargill was one of the first to succeed. Club premises there were bought in the mid-1950s after a successful fundraising event. Christchurch got its society’s home, Everglades a privately owned golf course, through issuing debentures. Others who were able to later buy their own clubhouse included Auckland and Wellington.

People gathered in the weekends in these clubs. The clubs facilitated contact between Dutch immigrants living in New Zealand and offered the opportunity to speak Dutch. They also engaged in a range of Dutch activities. The most popular events were the Dutch National Day celebrations including Orange Balls, Carnival festivities and the St Nicholas parties for the children. Tulip Festivals were annual highlights. For many societies ‘Klaverjassen’, a Dutch card game, became the backbone of club activities.

Most of the Dutch clubs later became branches of the Federation of New Zealand–Netherlands Societies. The Federation functioned as a kind of umbrella organisation for the Dutch clubs. In addition it was responsible for the Holland Festival/Het Festijn (including Dutch Choirs, Dutch Folk Dances and the Dutch Drama Groups) organised every 3 years by one of the larger Netherlands Societies in New Zealand.

The majority of the societies also produced their own magazines. These club magazines together with, for example, the Windmill Post, the Orange Wimpel (Orange Banner), and local Dutch radio programmes became important links towards the Dutch community, providing them with news from the Netherlands and of Dutch activities in New Zealand. The Windmill Post had a circulation of almost 5,000 before it stopped in the early 1990s.

Finally, Dutch clubs played an important role in negotiating with airlines to get cheaper fares back to the Netherlands for their members. Fares back home were at least a third cheaper than normal economy class travel. Some may have joined the clubs just to take advantage of discounted airfares.

In sum, Dutch clubs in New Zealand in the early migration period can best be classified as associations strongly focused on issues related to their home country. These clubs were hardly involved in matters dealing with the integration of the Dutch community in New Zealand.
5 THE DECLINE OF THE DUTCH CLUBS

From the 1980s onwards clubs were facing a decline in membership, particularly because of lack of interest by second generation Dutch descendants. The overwhelming majority of the second generation regard themselves as Kiwis. Apart from a limited knowledge of the Dutch language and a bit of a taste for typical Dutch food, they probably see themselves as Dutch in name only.

What also contributed to the assimilation process was the fact that among the second generation, marriages between partners both of Dutch descent had become unusual. Some 25% of the first wave (1950–1955) of Dutch migrant males and fewer than 10% of the women married outside the clan. For those who came in the second half of the 1950s till the end of the 1960s the rate of intermarriage increased to 60% and for those born in New Zealand to 80%. At the end of the 1960s the rate of intermarriage for Dutch males had risen to 85% (Thompson, 1970). This unusual high rate of intermarriage has been one of the major factors in the degree to which the Dutch, unlike other immigrant minorities, have blended into New Zealand society.

| Table 2: Affiliated Members Of The Federation Of New Zealand Netherlands Societies, 1997-2014 |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Christchurch | 238 | 236 | 302 | 269 | 293 | 305 | 305 | 301 | 292 | 291 | 245 | 260 | 256 | 272 | 295 | 308 | 315 | 307 | 331 |
| Auckland | 190 | 216 | 252 | 254 | 265 | 288 | 293 | 310 | 272 | 285 | 285 | 285 | 307 | 334 | 360 | 355 | 361 | 405 | 450 |
| Wellington | 156 | 154 | 157 | 159 | 164 | 173 | 180 | 189 | 190 | 208 | 212 | 208 | 215 | 230 | 230 | 250 | 250 |
| Waikato | 116 | 105 | 129 | 165 | 165 | 175 | 178 | 174 | 165 | 160 | 147 | 150 | 175 | 190 | 210 | 189 | 220 | 255 |
| Rotterdam | 67 | 74 | 82 | 100 | 82 | 82 | 90 | 84 | 90 | 93 | 79 | 93 | 95 | 109 | 138 | 135 | 132 | 140 |
| Manawatu | 62 | 56 | 55 | 56 | 55 | 68 | 73 | 78 | 80 | 78 | 83 | 77 | 91 | 80 | 90 | 103 | 100 | 106 |
| Taranaki | 29 | 34 | 32 | 36 | 36 | 44 | 45 | 47 | 47 | 40 | 45 | 45 | 44 | 49 | 46 | 45 | 50 |
| Whangarei | 22 | 29 | 34 | 34 | 37 | 36 | 41 | 43 | 39 | 42 | 28 | 52 | 53 | 52 | 35 | 33 | 34 | 44 |
| Waikato | 11 | 11 | 16 | 16 | 22 | 23 | 22 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 20 | 18 | 22 | 22 | 26 | 26 | 25 | 26 |
| Wanganui | 16 | 16 | 15 | 19 | 20 | 23 | 20 | 18 | 24 | 24 | 22 | 20 | 20 | 23 | 24 | 29 | 23 | 29 |
| Invercargill | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 75 | 87 | 77 | 80 |
| Otago | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 56 | 61 | 58 | 59 | 62 | 67 | 69 |
| Balclutha | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 24 | 21 | 27 | 28 | 34 | 34 | 36 | 36 | 37 | 35 | 36 | 40 |
| Total | 907 | 931 | 1,074 | 1,108 | 1,159 | 1,241 | 1,264 | 1,283 | 1,247 | 1,231 | 1,272 | 1,321 | 1,416 | 1,575 | 1,639 | 1,676 | 1,701 | 1,853 |

Note: annual member data is based on financial years
Source: Federation of New Zealand Netherlands Societies Inc, 2014

Studies in the 1980s confirmed the lack or declining interest among the Dutch community in their communal identity and national character. A study undertaken by two Dutch sociologists, Hoogeveen and Ettema (1984), in Christchurch, found that more than half of their respondents rarely or never attended Dutch club functions, nor listened to Dutch radio broadcasts; and four out of five never read Dutch newspapers.

In the late 1980s and during the 1990s we could witness, writes Schouten (1992), a renewed interest among the older settlers as they reached retirement age. A kind of nostalgia is feeding this revival. Those who didn't want to be seen related to these clubs in the past suddenly were quite happy to get together with people they have a lot in common with. The reactivation of the clubs came with a realisation that it could take a completely different role: providing regular companionship and interest for the growing number of elderly Dutch.

It will therefore not be surprising that all the other efforts by the Dutch clubs and the Federation to try to involve the next generation and encourage them to become members, such as the Tulip Queen Contests and Abel Tasman Awards, more-or-less failed. While they were big events and received a lot of publicity few, if any, of the participants became members of the Dutch societies.
As the above table shows, the numbers have gone down substantially over the past years. The total is now below 1,000 and only a handful of clubs are still viable. With the overwhelming majority of the members of Dutch societies over 80 years of age, there is a clear shift in both their interest and their potential.

Since the late eighties two changes in the migration landscape of New Zealand could have stopped this decline of Dutch migrant networks. In the first place there is a shift away from assimilation to a more multicultural approach in New Zealand’s immigration policy, and secondly, there is a growing interest in a new wave of more transnational migrants from the Netherlands settling in New Zealand.

In the 1990s, a multitude of newcomers, mainly from Asia, arrived in New Zealand. In New Zealand from the mid-eighties onwards the emphasis in the migration policy has been put upon multiculturalism. This means that all immigrant groups have the right to retain their language and their culture - their ethnic distinctiveness. In fact they are encouraged to do so. Integration not assimilation is the preferred concept. Whereas the Dutch culture was suppressed in the time the first Dutch emigrants arrived, these days cultural traditions and heritage by new migrants are very much welcomed including the establishment of clubs and voluntary associations.

The new generation migrants who arrived since the 1990s could have been a potential source of revival and change in the Dutch clubs. These so-called transnational migrants maintain strong ties with their countries of origin. They came with the idea to stay only temporarily and go back after a number of years. Return migration for this group of Dutch immigrants is according to CBS figures around 70%. They often maintain, build and reinforce multiple linkages with the Netherlands. They speak Dutch within the family and stay in close contact and pay regular visits to home. However they are less traditional in their culture and more international in their outlook. So for them joining a Dutch club in New Zealand is like stepping into Dutch history of fifty years ago. This is probably the main reason that till now very few new generation migrants have become member of Dutch Clubs in New Zealand. Some years ago the Wellington Society managed to attract a group of new generation migrants to the club. The question is to what extent they will stay open for changes in their club to accommodate these newcomers?

6 AGEING ISSUES

Migrants, writes Schouten (1992), go through four stages. First they seek fellow Dutch people already living here, who can speak their language and give advice. Next they strive for total independence, concentrating mainly on careers. In the third stage, typically at age 55 after children have left home, they ask why we are here. Finally there is often a reversion to the language and culture of their birth.

What indeed has been noticed among the first wave of Dutch migrants was that their affiliation to their roots became stronger as they became older. Advancing age seems to bring an increased need to be with people who share the same background and upbringing, and who have the same sense of humour, mother tongue and value system. As they get older, they revert more and more to the Dutch ways or come to terms with who they are.

It was out of this back-to-the-future shift in perspective that Ons Dorp in Henderson was created in 1984. It became the first ethnic retirement village in New Zealand. The concept was also born out of concern about the elderly Dutch emigrants. Other villages were later built in Morrinsville and Hamilton. Ons Dorp looks like a piece of Holland in New Zealand – the streets are cobbled and the roofs are like those of a Dutch farmhouse (van Dongen, 1992). These retirement villages responded to the growing need of the elderly Dutch and played an important role in establishing a center of Dutch identity.
The Dutch people who came to New Zealand in the 1950s and 1960s are now in their 70s and 80s. Around one third of the Dutch born in New Zealand is over 70 years of age and around one tenth is over 80 (see table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 – 19</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 39</td>
<td>3,381</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,430</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 59</td>
<td>7,011</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5,682</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 – 69</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,675</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 – 79</td>
<td>5,559</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3,243</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80+</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,822</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22,101</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19,815</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: New Zealand Statistics, Population Census 2006 and 2013

Care for the elderly Dutch has been a major issue and concern for a number of years. A growing problem among the Dutch elderly is language loss. Studies have shown that if you are bilingual and you develop dementia you will lose your most recent language first. You are left with only your native language at a time of critical need. This occurs in an environment where hardly anybody speaks Dutch, including most of your own relatives. Language loss implied that they became suddenly very isolated.

Elderly care started in the mid-1980s with establishment of a voluntary organisation to support the ageing people in the Dutch community, the so-called Friendly Support Network (FSN) (Jaspers, 2009). The FSN provides support to the Dutch elderly in the form of visits and in many other ways such as transport, practical help and coffee mornings. The FSN works closely together with the Dutch Societies and Clubs and receives financial support from the Federation of NZ NL Societies.

More and more the focus of Dutch Societies is on support and care for its ageing members. The original aim of Dutch Societies to promote Dutch culture and heritage to the wider New Zealand community has become of less relevance to them.

7 NEXT GENERATION

The first-generations’ children and grandchildren are often referred to as the next generation migrants. The next generation comprises not only the second and third generation but also includes the so-called one and half (1.5) generation (those born in the Netherlands, but who emigrated with their parents at an early age). The next generation has remained relatively invisible in participating and identifying themselves with Dutch heritage activities in New Zealand. According to Schouten (1992) Dutch descent is no guarantee for Dutch identity. In his book Tasman’s Legacy he states “the majority of migrants’ children regard themselves as New Zealanders, and apart from a limited knowledge of the Dutch language and a taste of Dutch food, they probably see themselves as Dutch in name only”.

Thorough research about second and third generation migrants is still very scarce. Most generalisation and assumptions are based on relatively small case studies.

The most widely stated assumption about the next generation and identity is that it dilutes over time and when generations pass on. In other words the second generation has a stronger connection with its roots than the third. The interest in the Dutch heritage declines the further removed they are from their ancestors who migrated from the Netherlands.
Some researchers like Kappert (1988) reported that the second generation hailing from the late 1960s and early 1970s were different, and showed again a greater interest in their cultural heritage compared with children of Dutch migrants from the 1950s who preferred to lose their distinctiveness as much as possible. Similar remarks are made by Yska (2006), Tap (1997) and Slot (1992). Slot observes in the early 1990s a trend among young people to return for some time to the Netherlands. Clearly they feel a need to rediscover their roots, he writes.

Others like van Dongen (1992) argue that the third generation may even be more interested in their grandparents’ origins than their parents were. The further you are from the migration movement itself the more interested you are in its history. Or as a historian wrote about the migration process: “what the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember”.

But what most studies seem to agree about is the language loss over the generations within the Dutch migrant community. Kroef’s (1977) study in the 1970s already indicated that language maintenance among the Dutch has been poor and language shift faster and more nearly complete than among other ethnic groups. She noted a sharp decline of language maintenance from the first to the second generation and an all but total loss, even of passive competence, amongst the third. Numerous other studies (Hulsen, 2000; Crezee, 2009) have shown that Dutch migrants are some of the quickest language shifters.

Many respondents in the study of Crezee (2009) reported to regret having shifted from the use of Dutch at home. An overwhelming majority also said to her that their adult children are now criticising them for not having maintained their language with them. There appears to be a resurgence of pride in their identity among second - and third generation Dutch and this is apparent from the real level of interest in the Dutch classes which were offered at the university of Auckland for a while she concludes.

Census statistics of 2006 seem to confirm the fact that there is still a small minority among the New Zealand born that identify themselves with the Dutch ethnic group who do speak the Dutch language. Around one quarter of the 27,000 who indicated to speak Dutch in New Zealand are local born and therefore most likely second and third generation Dutch descendants.

What became clear from the pilot study carried out by Tanja Schubert was that the strength of the Dutch connection is not only dependent on the degree of kinship, i.e. being second or third generation, but is as much determined by factors as for example age when parents and grandparents emigrated (how exposed were they to the Dutch culture when they left), the immigration policies at the time of arrival, the opportunities to continue speaking their own language at home, the level of intermarriage i.e. whether one or both parents were Dutch and the possibilities of retaining dual citizenship. More research on a sufficiently large scale is needed to be able to draw more general conclusions on the relationship between the degree of Dutchness and kinship dimension.

8 NEW PLATFORMS

Today diversity has become a fundamental feature of New Zealand society. New Zealand is one of the most diverse societies in the OECD with over 200 ethnicities recorded in the 2006 census. According to 2013 census, 25% of the people in New Zealand were born elsewhere.

The old notion of assimilation as experienced by the first Dutch migrants is no longer seen as the desirable outcome of immigration. New Zealand society and government now sees a positive value in diversity and the retention by ethnic minorities of their cultural heritage. Active celebrations of the many different ethnic heritages which contribute to modern New Zealand are now a noticeable and welcome feature.
The preservation and promotion of Dutch heritage is gradually taken over by others. Two organisations are worthwhile mentioning here: the New Zealand Netherlands Foundation and the Dutch Connection Museum Trust.

In 1990, the New Zealand Netherlands Foundation was established: to enhance and implement cultural and educational exchanges between New Zealand and the Netherlands; to recognize and acknowledge the contribution Dutch settlers have made to New Zealand, and promote a wider understanding of this; and to facilitate and commission research into the contribution, both past and present, that Dutch New Zealanders have made. Over the past 22 years the Foundation has organised a large number of projects including the Publication of the Book Tasman’s Legacy; Dutch Exhibition in Te Papa; the travelling exhibition of Anne Frank’s History; the World Press Photo; the Dutch Touch; and the Mana Maori Exhibition and Waka Maori project in the National Museum of Ethnology in Leiden.

The Dutch Connection is an organisation that aims to establish a museum and cultural center where the history, culture and artefacts of the Dutch migrants could be saved and displayed. The Dutch Connection has been developing its museum project since 2005. The Dutch Connection plans to build this museum in Foxton. In 2010, it partnered officially with several local organisations into ‘Te Awahou – Nieuwe Stroom’ to realise its objectives. The main aim of the Dutch Connection is to preserve the Dutch legacy in New Zealand. As the Dutch integrated so well, and therefore often are referred to as the Invisible Migrants, most New Zealanders don’t know much about the stories of the Dutch and their contribution to the country’s development. However it is also envisaged that the museum will become a focal point, a centre of learning about the modern Netherlands and promote more socio-economic and people-to-people exchange between the two countries.

As both organisations have no members they are very much dependent on donations from sponsors. The Foundation had a range of sponsors for their different projects both from the private sector as well as from the government, including the Dutch Embassy over the past decades. They also generated income through sponsoring initiatives promoting Netherlands New Zealand cooperation. The Dutch Connection is primarily focused on a single project – the establishment of a Museum and Cultural Centre. One of their main sponsors is the Federation of NZ NL Societies. The Dutch clubs who may disestablish themselves in the near future because of falling memberships have to make up their minds about their assets. An option could be to invest these funds in a project promoting their Dutch Legacy in New Zealand.

It seems clear that the future, if any, of the Dutch clubs will not rest with the second or third generation. Some, like the Wellington Club, have vested their hopes in the new migrants. The more recent Dutch migrants are very different from those who emigrated in the 1950s. They are less traditional in their culture, and more international in their outlook. In addition they are not permanent settlers and may return back home after a number of years. That is why they like to keep in touch with the Dutch and with home. It is still too early to say that this combination has a future.

The Foundation has for a number of years started to explore the level of interest in Dutch heritage amongst the second and third generation descendants. This is by far the largest group within the Dutch migrant community with approximately 100,000 people. As the second and third generation grew up and established their families, the connection with their Dutch heritage became more tenuous. Focusing on the next generation is the approach with the most challenges, but also the most opportunities when successful.

In the past, a number of attempts have been undertaken to see whether more cooperation between the different platforms was possible. In 2008 the Dutch Forum ‘Onze HoeWie’ was organised. One of the objectives was to establish a Dutch Council that could speak on behalf of all Dutch in New Zealand. This conference showed that the various Dutch groups have strongly diverse interests, but as somebody concluded at this meeting: united we stand; divided we fall. Unfortunately until now, no agreement has been reached.
9 CONCLUSION

Five general conclusions emerge from this study about the way the migrant community has organised itself in New Zealand to be able to sustain their common heritage.

First, the history of the organisation of Dutch migrant communities in New Zealand showed great reluctance towards participation in local Dutch institutions. At its height, only about 30% were members of Dutch societies or clubs. The existing organisations were strongly inward looking and primarily interested in keeping a certain kind of traditional Dutch identity alive. Dutch associations played no significant role in the integration process of the Dutch diaspora in New Zealand. The integration process of the majority of Dutch migrants was successful primarily as a result of a personal drive and not because of group pressure. The Dutch prefer to deal with problems privately.

Second, the Dutch clubs have failed to attract the interest of the second and third generation to join them. Pilot studies have shown that most of the Dutch descendants identify themselves as Kiwis with a pride for the Dutch ancestry. Their main interest is to learn more about their roots; however more about the Netherlands than about the Dutch community in New Zealand. This goes beyond the traditional clogs and tulips the clubs are associated with. More research is needed to find out what the meaning of a Dutch identity is for the second and third generation Dutch in New Zealand.

Third, with the ageing of the Dutch first generation migrants the clubs’ relevance further declined. It has now reached such a low level that the future of the Federation and its affiliated societies is at risk. With these institutions gradually fading away, their role of caretaker for promoting and maintaining the Dutch identity in New Zealand disappears. Some believe that an important revival can be brought about by the new generation migrants who can inject new energy in the Dutch clubs. The new Dutch migrants are more interested in keeping their Dutch identity than the second and third generation. For example, most of them speak Dutch at home. They seem to have more in common with the first generation migrants, especially now their affiliation to their original roots has become stronger as they become older.

Fourth, there is a strong desire for more cohesion among the Dutch organisations in New Zealand. Two organisations, the Dutch Connection and the Netherlands New Zealand Foundation, try to claim the Federations heritage. These two organisations both focus on keeping the Dutch legacy alive as well as strengthening the socio-cultural ties between our two countries. Their success on the one hand will to a large extent depend on the way they will be able to include the second, third and new generation in their initiatives, while on the other hand being better able to coordinate their efforts and initiatives.

Finally, what opens opportunities is the change of New Zealand’s migration policy. Since the 1980s the country has moved away from a sort of monocultural domination. Diversity has become the new national identity. If this multicultural diversity is to be fostered and encouraged then it is essential for the New Zealand government to provide the necessary resources and develop a set of policies for culturally based needs; a policy that is probably most successful when carried out together with the governments of countries having large diaspora communities in New Zealand. The Netherlands has never actively pursued policies to connect culturally and politically with its diaspora overseas. However, more and more countries these days recognize the strategic importance of the diaspora.
REFERENCES


8 Recent Migration to New Zealand from the Netherlands

Paul Merwood and Jelle Hatenboer

1 INTRODUCTION

New Zealand has long been a destination of Dutch migrants. Yet the migrants of today, and their migration experiences, are vastly different to the early waves of Dutch migrants of the twentieth century. Globally people are more mobile, demand for talent has broadened the horizon of the young and qualified, and modern immigration policy settings have changed the nature of migration and helped shape the demography of countries to which people migrate. These global changes are reflected in the characteristics of today's migrants. In New Zealand, as with many OECD countries, there has been a fundamental shift towards temporary migration as the dominant form of entry, with the number of visitors, international students and temporary workers making up the majority of new migrants to New Zealand.

Migration to New Zealand from the Netherlands is now much lower than it has been at other periods in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the arrival of Dutch migrants has remained a small but stable component of New Zealand's migration landscape. Since the mid-1980s, when the number of permanent migrants from the Netherlands began to ebb, New Zealand has received an average of 430 Dutch migrants each year who intend to stay long term in New Zealand (Figure 1). Statistics New Zealand data on the permanent and long term arrivals and departures from New Zealand show that nearly half of these migrants return to the Netherlands over time, resulting in an average net migration gain to New Zealand of 221 people annually between 1985 and 2012.

Figure 1: Permanent and long term migration to and from the Netherlands: years to December

![Graph showing net migration, arrivals, and departures from 1979 to 2011.]

Note: Includes movement of non-NZ citizens to and from the Netherlands
Source: Statistics New Zealand
2 COMPONENTS OF RECENT MIGRATION FLOWS FROM THE NETHERLANDS

An analysis of Immigration New Zealand administrative data on visa approvals shows that the majority of new migrants from the Netherlands enter New Zealand on a temporary visa. Some of these temporary migrants remain in New Zealand and gain permanent residence. This pattern of migration, characterised as ‘two-step’ migration, has been evolving in New Zealand (and elsewhere) for well over a decade and is now a well-established trend. Visa approval data on Dutch migrants for the 16 years between 1997/98 and 2012/13 shows people granted permanent residence comprise only 20 per cent of visas granted – the majority enter New Zealand as temporary work visa holders (Table 1).

Table 1: Number of visas issued by category: 1997/98-2012/13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Resident</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997/98</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>1,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/00</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>1,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>1,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>1,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1,336</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>1,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>2,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>1,491</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>2,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>1,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1,371</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>1,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>1,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>1,409</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>1,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>1,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>18,486</td>
<td>5,174</td>
<td>25,749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This is a count of individuals approved a visa per year rather than the number of applications. If a person was issued a visa of the same type in one year they are counted once only. Otherwise a person is counted for each visa type they held in each year.

Source: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.

3 COMPONENTS OF PERMANENT MIGRATION

Permanent migration from the Netherlands in the first decade of this century is characterised by young, highly skilled people, many of whom work in professional or managerial occupations. Since 2001/02, when New Zealand adopted a streamed approach within its residence programme, 4,113 Dutch migrants have been granted residence. This is equivalent to 0.75 per cent of the total number of people granted residence over the period. Most Dutch migrants were approved through the Skilled/Business stream (74 per cent) with the remainder (26 per cent) being sponsored relatives of New Zealand citizens or residents. The average age of permanent migrants over the period was 37 years for principal applicants and 22 years for secondary applicants (including partners and children of the principal applicant). The average family size was 1.9 people, and most were not ‘new’ to New Zealand, having already spent time in the country on a temporary visa. In the last five years, nearly 80 per cent of those approved as principal applicants through the Skilled Migrant Category were working in professional or managerial occupations in New Zealand.
Table 2: Number of people approved residence by stream: 2001/02-2012/13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Zealand Residence Programme Stream</th>
<th>Number of people</th>
<th>Proportion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business / Skilled Stream</td>
<td>3,039</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Migrant</td>
<td>2,801</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Entrepreneur policies</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncapped Family Sponsored Stream</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Child</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent Sibling Adult Child Stream</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Child/Sibling</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International / Humanitarian Stream</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,113</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

4 COMPONENTS OF TEMPORARY MIGRATION

Temporary migration has become the main entry point to New Zealand for Dutch migrants. While New Zealand is a study destination for a small number of Dutch international students each year, the majority of new Dutch migrants come to New Zealand as temporary workers. Temporary workers currently outnumber permanent migrants by seven to one, making up over 80 per cent of all visas granted to Dutch nationals in 2012/13.

There is a strong link between temporary and permanent migration in New Zealand. Many migrants first enter as temporary workers and those with the skills, qualifications and work experience required to meet the selection criteria of the Skilled Migrant Category can become permanent migrants. On average, around twenty per cent of Dutch temporary workers enter New Zealand through the main temporary labour migration Essential Skills Policy. These temporary workers have a job offer in New Zealand and can be granted a visa of up to five years duration. Dutch migrants who enter through Essential Skills Policy are highly skilled – nearly 60 per cent have occupations classified at skill level 1 and typically work in professional and managerial occupations. Around 13 per cent of Dutch Essential Skills workers (since 2007/08) entered as trades workers at skill level 3. Over one-third of Dutch Essential Skills workers transitions to permanent residence over time.

Figure 2 shows that the number of Dutch migrants entering New Zealand through the Essential Skills Policy has slowed over the last decade, a fall exacerbated by the global financial crisis. This fall mirrors the decrease in temporary migrant labour during and immediately following the 2008/09 recession in New Zealand.
By far the largest component of Dutch migration to New Zealand is through the Working Holiday Scheme between New Zealand and the Netherlands. Currently, working holidaymakers represent 64 per cent of Dutch temporary workers and just over half (52 per cent) of the total number of Dutch migrants granted a visa each year. Figure 2 shows the steady increase in the number of Dutch working holidaymakers coming to New Zealand each year.

5 WORKING HOLIDAYMAKERS

Working Holiday Schemes allow young people from a select number of countries whose primary intention is to holiday in New Zealand, to work and study during their stay. New Zealand’s working holiday schemes are generally reciprocal and allow young people aged 18-30 to live up to 12 months in New Zealand.

New Zealand established its first working holiday scheme with Japan in 1985. The programme grew in the 1990s and particularly in the 2000s with both an increase in the number of countries participating and the number of places offered (to both new and existing schemes). The working holiday programme has evolved as a tool to promote foreign policy, trade and economic, and tourism interests. Research has shown working holidaymakers to have positive impacts on the domestic economy – they spend more money than they earn and therefore create more jobs than they take. Working holidaymakers are also considered to benefit New Zealand through export education and the tourism industry in particular and also as potential source of skilled migrants to New Zealand.

Working holiday schemes were initially with mainly high-income OECD countries, but the programme has expanded to include countries in Asia and South America such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay. The most recent schemes, however, are relatively small-scale compared to the high-income OECD countries. New Zealand currently has working holiday schemes with 40 countries with an annual cap of 52,000 places in the total programme. While New Zealand has a smaller programme than Australia and Canada with respect to the number of places available in the programme, New Zealand has working holiday schemes with a greater number of countries (Canada has schemes with 30 countries, Australia has 28).

Working holidaymakers represent the second largest category of temporary workers within the OECD – some 413,000 in 2011, or 21 per cent of temporary workers. Working holidaymakers are the largest category of temporary workers in New Zealand, currently representing around one third of all temporary workers approved.
In 2012/13, 48,639 working holidaymakers were approved New Zealand visas. The number of working holidaymakers coming to New Zealand more than trebled in the decade from 2002/03. Those from the United Kingdom, Germany, and France contributed half of all working holidaymakers in 2012/13, and the European countries combined (including the UK) comprised seventy per cent of the programme (figure 3). The remaining 30 per cent were from the Asian countries in the programme (15 per cent), Canada and the USA (9 per cent), and Mexico and South America (6 per cent). Dutch working holidaymakers comprised two per cent of the total programme in 2012/13 ranking 7th largest of the European countries and 15th largest overall.

The New Zealand–Netherlands Working Holiday Scheme came into effect in 1998, around the same time as New Zealand’s agreements with France (1999), Germany (2000) and Sweden (2001). The Netherlands scheme is uncapped, as is the case for many of the other high-income OECD countries in the programme. Dutch working holidaymakers can stay in New Zealand for up to 12 months, can study for up to 3 months on a working holiday visa, and there is no restriction on the time spent working for a single employer. There are no requirements for Dutch working holidaymakers to have a minimum level of qualification or English, as is the case with some of the more recent schemes with non-English speaking countries such as China, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey.

The number of Dutch working holidaymakers has grown steadily since the scheme’s inception in 1998 and currently attracts over 900 people annually (Figure 4).

“There were several reasons that came together and made me decide to go to New Zealand. After I finished my degree it was difficult to find a job in the Netherlands. I had a few administrative positions but couldn’t find a job that really suited me. I then traveled to Asia for two months and started to like the idea of moving abroad. I heard finding a job was easier in New Zealand and starting looking into moving there, the Working Holiday Visa came up as the best option overall.” (Dutch working holidaymaker, female, aged 27).
Table 1: Comparisons between Dutch working holidaymakers and those from all other schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>working holidaymakers</th>
<th>all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median age in 2012/13</td>
<td>22 years</td>
<td>24 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion female in 2012/13</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual growth (decade to 2012/13)</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average length of time spent in New Zealand</td>
<td>6.6 months</td>
<td>8.1 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion who work in New Zealand</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of months spent working</td>
<td>2.4 months</td>
<td>4.1 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average proportion of time spent working</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean gross monthly earnings in New Zealand</td>
<td>NZ$1,800</td>
<td>NZ$1,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of jobs held in New Zealand</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dollar values CPI adjusted to March 2010 dollars.
Source: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. Figures on employment and length of stay have been extracted from the Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI) prototype managed by Statistics New Zealand and relate to working holidaymakers arriving in New Zealand in 2009.

Figure 2: Number of Dutch working holidaymakers approved by financial year: 1997/98-2012/13

There is a relatively strong correlation between income levels in the country of origin and the proportion of working holidaymakers who work during their time in New Zealand. On average, working holidaymakers from countries with a lower gross national income per capita than New Zealand spend longer on the working holiday scheme and spend a greater share of their time working. Figure 5 shows Dutch working holidaymakers follow this trend and spend a similar amount of time working as other high-income OECD countries such as Germany, Finland, Sweden and Denmark.

“I really like living in New Zealand, not necessarily for its nature but more for its city life. I would love to stay here but that really depends on whether or not I can find a good job. I would need an employer that will support me through the process of applying for a working visa.” (Dutch working holidaymaker, female, aged 27)
Many working holidaymakers find jobs in the agriculture, accommodation and food services, and administration and support industries. Analysis of working holiday makers arriving in 2009 showed these three industries accounted for over three-quarters of all jobs held. Australian research similarly indicated that the occupations in which working holidaymakers work are typically in the low-skilled end of the spectrum. However, working holidaymakers are not necessarily low-skilled as many may have qualifications and worked in skilled jobs in their home country.

Working holidaymakers find jobs throughout New Zealand although there are some areas that attract significant numbers. These include Auckland (much more so than the other main centres) and provincial areas where work opportunities in agriculture and tourism exist such as the Bay of Plenty, Hawke’s Bay, Nelson/Marlborough, and Otago (Queenstown).

"My girlfriend travelled to New Zealand a few years ago for her studies and really enjoyed it. When we both had finished our veterinary medicine degrees in the Netherlands we wanted to live abroad for a while. Jobs in our profession are hard to find in the Netherlands so it was an added benefit that veterinarians are on the skills shortlist in New Zealand. That allowed my girlfriend to apply to a working residence visa and I applied for a Working Holiday Visa." (Dutch Working holidaymaker, male, aged 26).

6 WORKING HOLIDAYMAKERS AND PERMANENT MIGRATION

Working holidaymakers can make a positive contribution to New Zealand’s economy by transitioning to other work visas and gaining residence. Over time as many as 10 per cent of working holidaymakers gain permanent residence in New Zealand with a high proportion (58 per cent) of these migrants transitioning as skilled or business migrants.
For Dutch working holidaymakers the transition rate to permanent residence is around 9 per cent. This is higher than some of the other high-income OECD countries such as Denmark (4 per cent), Finland (6 per cent), France (8 per cent), Germany (6 per cent) and Sweden (6 per cent). Like other working holidaymakers who gain residence, the Dutch are most likely to transition through the Skilled/Business stream (56 per cent). The remainder are sponsored for residence by a New Zealand resident or citizen or partner.

7 CONCLUSION

Consistent with global trends, a large share of today’s migrants enters New Zealand on a temporary visa. Eighty percent of new migrants from the Netherlands arrive as temporary migrants, predominantly work visa holders, and around half of the total entrants each year are young people participating in the New Zealand-Netherlands working holiday scheme that has been in place since 1998. The working holiday scheme offers young Dutch migrants the opportunity to live, work, and study in New Zealand. The working holiday visa has low entry costs and offers a great deal of flexibility when combining work and travel.

Like working holidaymakers from other high-income OECD countries, those from the Netherlands divide their time in New Zealand between work and travel and spend on average 7 months on the working holiday visa. The working holiday scheme plays a vital role in Dutch migration – around one in four Dutch migrants approved through the Skilled Migrant Category for permanent residence were former working holidaymakers. While the working holiday scheme is not a significant source of permanent migrants, the majority of those who do transition to residence are skilled and are likely to make a positive contribution to New Zealand’s economy.

Dutch migration to New Zealand is lower now than it has been at various times over the second half of the 20th century. In addition to the positive contribution made by working holidaymakers and temporary labour migrants, Dutch migration and the Dutch community remain an integral part of New Zealand’s cultural landscape.

REFERENCES


DISCLAIMER

Access to the data used in this study was provided by Statistics NZ in accordance with security and confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975 and the Tax Administration Act 1994. The results in this paper have been confidentialised to protect individual businesses from identification.

Clogs and Tulips: A Qualitative Research Study on Attitudes and Behaviours of Second and Third Generation New Zealanders of Dutch Descent

Theo Muller

1 INTRODUCTION

This report presents a summary of findings from three focus group discussions with second and third generation New Zealanders of Dutch descent. The aim was to explore ideas for promoting the continuity of Dutch heritage in New Zealand. The report presents the voices of the focus group participants illustrated by their verbatim comments in italics.

However, before presenting these results I will first briefly introduce the New Zealand Netherlands Foundation, which organised several focus group discussions for the research study.

2 THE NEW ZEALAND-NETHERLANDS FOUNDATION

The New Zealand-Netherlands Foundation was set up in 1990 to foster and promote the benefits of the link between our two countries.

Some of the specific objectives include:

- To recognise and acknowledge the contribution Dutch settlers have made to New Zealand, and promote a wider understanding of this.
- To develop cultural and educational exchanges between the Netherlands and New Zealand.
- To facilitate and commission research into the contribution, both past and present, that Dutch New Zealanders have made.
- To financially support worthwhile efforts in pursuit of the above objectives.

These objectives have been refined over the years and now focus mainly on developing and maintaining links between our two countries by building and maintaining relationships with the young people of New Zealand and the Netherlands. In support of this objective, the Foundation has embarked on an ambitious internship initiative and exchange programme, which is still under development.

The almost complete assimilation of the Dutch immigrant into New Zealand society has conferred the somewhat dubious reputation of the invisible migrant. Dutch immigration is characterised by assimilation and the experiences in Australia and Canada are no different. In Canada, reference is made to silent ethnicity where Dutch beliefs and values may not be apparent to outsider groups or the host society.

Over time and across generations, assimilation may manifest itself culturally particularly when the mother tongue ceases to be spoken. Structural assimilation is evident when migrants discontinue associating within their ethnic group. Marital assimilation occurs when migrants marry exogenously. For the Dutch immigrant community, the process of assimilation was a relatively instant process of acculturation started by the first generation immigrants. Second and third generations were already assimilated by birth, so to speak, often with the loss of the Dutch language as a result. As the second generation grew up and established their own families, the connection with the Dutch heritage became more tenuous.
Delving into the Dutch disposition and temperament, there is the assertion that the Dutch are a very independent people. They look after their own affairs ("doppen hun eigen boontjes") and don’t like to be told what to do. The Dutch living in New Zealand are no different. Unlike other immigrant populations such as the Greek, Italians, people from the sub-Indian continent and immigrants from Eastern Europe, the Dutch have an individualistic streak and have always had a strong desire to assimilate and integrate into New Zealand society. To some extent, this has led to a (partial) loss of identification with the Dutch heritage, particularly where second and third generation Dutch New Zealanders are concerned. Appealing to their Dutch heritage and overcoming a degree of inertia will be a challenge to the Foundation in achieving its goals and objectives. Another challenge would be to move beyond the obligatory stereotypes of windmills, clogs and tulips, and to provide a contemporary vision of what it means to be a New Zealander of Dutch descent.

3 IDENTITY

One challenge is the identification of those with Dutch heritage in New Zealand. Common identifiers of Dutch descent were discussed; these included many iconic features such as:

- Dutch names, a source of pride, or occasionally derision
- Looking Dutch
- Traditions, like clogs in the house
- Aspects of personality, such as confidence, tenacity, stubbornness, but also a homeliness and respect for family
- Having a Dutch passport

However, many descendants are less visibly Dutch, especially those without a “Dutch” name and those whose family may have reached New Zealand via Indonesia. Many of the first generation focused on successful assimilation rather than retaining their heritage. The aspects of Dutch life that have tended to be passed on focused around food and family.

Few of the second and third generation spoken to were fluent in the Dutch language. This loss of language raises a barrier to full participation in Dutch culture. However, many of the younger generation are confident in the English abilities of the Dutch and see language as less of a problem.

One question raised is - do descendants want to be recognised as Dutch New Zealanders? Although some do, there is perhaps more interest in the concept of a European New Zealander – with access to Europe.

- So what it means to me having Dutch heritage is I’ve got a European passport. (Wellington male 3G)

Those with this view may be less interested in learning the Dutch language, which is viewed as having limited use.

4 STRENGTHS

Amongst the Dutch descendants spoken to, their Dutch connection can be a source of pride. This includes:

- A sense of being special, different
- Appreciating food and family
- Pride in Dutch history
- Recognition of Dutch businesses
- A fondness for traditional celebrations
The extent to which Dutch descendants participate in various aspects of Dutch culture varies. For some the language is integral, and they find their lack of skill in Dutch is a barrier. There was a real sense of pride in the growth of Dutch language schools amongst those whose families participate. However, for others knowing Dutch is less of a priority especially when English is so widely used.

Once descendants have their own children there appears to be more of a focus on continuing Dutch traditional celebrations, and sharing them as a family.

The strongest aspect of Dutch heritage maintained is an appreciation of Dutch food, and/or Indonesian dishes. This can be associated with happy memories and as a shared activity is seen as encompassing all ages and continuing family traditions.

- Food triggers a memory and you know whether it’s a memory of an occasion or a parent or grandparent, but food brings people together. (Wellington female 2G)

Although many Dutch descendants expressed an interest in their Dutch heritage, the strength of their feeling was mixed. Interest definitely appears to be strengthened by visits to the Netherlands.

- Feeling that you became a whole person in the sense that – I remember in my mid 20s going, or a bit later, thinking, “God, I actually belong here”. I mean I’m very happy to live on the other side of the world, but it was almost as if I became a whole person. It was actually quite an unusual thing, you sort of felt you belonged – really belonged. (Auckland male 2G)

5 BARRIERS

For some Dutch descendants there is a real feeling of “coming home” when visiting the Netherlands, but for others there is a realisation that the Dutch traditions preserved in New Zealand can be rather old-fashioned (including the language taught here). There is a natural hurdle that the Dutch appear to be more independent and better integrated than some other immigrant groups. Other barriers include competition for time, and the need to create a network of Dutch community contacts.

For many descendants the Dutch connection has become diluted over time through assimilation into New Zealand society and inter-marriage with people of different cultural backgrounds. Also those whose family came from Indonesia feel further removed from their Dutch heritage. However, there does appear to exist a certain nostalgia associated with happy childhood memories of Dutch activities.

6 WHAT ARE DESCENDANTS INTERESTED IN?

There appeared to be most interest in:

- Better publicity about existing Dutch organisations, businesses and events – perhaps in the form of a directory
- An informal community of Dutch descendants with communication via the Internet – perhaps via Facebook, LinkedIn or a website
- Social food and drink events – up-market, well promoted, but low commitment events
- Travel to the Netherlands – exploring the potential for assistance with “overseas experiences” (OE’s), student and cultural exchanges, also with general travel and “passport” advice
There is interest in fostering a sense of community; however the potential pool of people is fragmented by age, interest and commitment. An attempt has been made to summarise the relationship between commitment and interest levels below.

The matrix attempts to highlight the tensions between commitment and interest. Although some descendants are very interested in their Dutch heritage they have a low level of commitment to actually putting their time and energy into community events. In part there is a lack of confidence and knowledge amongst the younger generations who are further removed from the Netherlands. To get them involved would require some mentoring and guidance. They would need to be convinced that community involvement would benefit them and their family and that it would be fun.

Although the younger generation has a lot of respect for their elders, they appeared to have no interest in participating in the existing Dutch clubs that are viewed as old fashioned, and may feel uncomfortable for those who are not fluent in Dutch. The younger generations (whose families may have come to New Zealand more for “lifestyle” than economic reasons) would be more interested in “modern” up-market (English language) activities.

- Well I think that if the second or third generation Dutchies were to get together, we’d all need to come together to do something we enjoy in common, which would be eating and drinking. [Laughs] There could be a new movement - without the word ‘clog’ - that focuses on not the things that they knew back then but the traditions that they brought to New Zealand. (Christchurch 2G female)

7 OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN A SENSE OF COMMUNITY

Participants stressed that “Dutch” events are happening but there need to be improvements in the publicising of events to potential attendees. Given that many participants expressed a fondness for existing Dutch-run businesses in New Zealand (e.g., cafes, language schools) it makes sense to focus on strengthening these as potential “hubs” for the community. However, many saw the existing groups as fragmented and expressed a desire to link them somehow.

There was strong interest in the production of a Directory of Dutch-related businesses, events, and things of interest. This increased publicity would assist in developing a sense of community, in bringing like-minded people together.
Many of the young Dutch New Zealanders see the benefits of connecting through Facebook – it’s modern, and free. However, others would be more interested in an informative website offering advice and information on:

- Travel to Holland – including cultural exchanges
- General information
- Current events

Perhaps there is greatest interest in a food and drinks festival. But the question is who would organise that? There appear to be only a few volunteers from the younger generation who would be willing to step up, but often their available time is sparse. If the Foundation feels an event is a priority, they may need to appoint a committed organiser.

8 WHERE TO NEXT?

Overall there appears to be a tremendous amount of pride in their Dutch heritage amongst the second and third generation Dutch descendants. Often that pride is focused on their personal forbears as well as broader aspects of Dutch cultural achievement. Perhaps a way of promoting Dutch heritage in New Zealand would be to focus on some individuals and to tell their stories more widely. Facilitating visits to the Netherlands for second and third generation Dutch New Zealanders would probably be a valuable strategy to strengthen ties between the two countries. Because of the low levels of commitment expressed any attempts to promote the Dutch connection would be most successful in terms of community participation if they were made very easy for participants to have a casual involvement. One important theme emerging from this research is the need to create connections between Dutch descendants and to better publicise events to the broader Dutch community. Overall, in terms of the objectives of the New Zealand-Netherlands Foundation:

- To recognise and acknowledge the contribution Dutch settlers have made to New Zealand, and promote a wider understanding of this.

The younger generations are definitely proud of the contributions their forbears have made in their new land. However, most appeared to focus on their personal family history rather than the contributions other families and individuals have made. There is potential to explore this further and to better publicise existing resources.

- To develop cultural and educational exchanges between the Netherlands and New Zealand.

There is definite interest in cultural and educational exchanges. This is also seen as having many benefits, including: deepening understanding of Dutch culture, strengthening familial ties and developing business opportunities.

- To facilitate and commission research into the contribution, both past and present, that Dutch New Zealanders have made.

This could assist with the production of publications to tell stories of Dutch New Zealanders to a wider audience.

- To financially support worthwhile efforts in pursuit of the above objectives.

Areas where financial support could prove beneficial include:

- Assistance with the organisation of an on-line network
- Organisation of up-market food events in the main centres
- Assistance with cultural and student exchanges

Although the task of the Foundation appears difficult in the face of people’s busy fragmented lives, there is definitely interest amongst young Dutch New Zealanders in exploring their Dutch heritage. They appear to need a firm nudge to have the confidence to get involved. As one participant suggested, the Foundation needs to put on a really successful enjoyable event and to publicise it extremely well (using social media) and then word will spread.
10 Outcomes round table discussions at Conference on Dutch Diaspora in Australia and New Zealand

1 ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION A: PRIVATE AND PROFESSIONAL/BUSINESS TIES WITH THE HOMELAND
Chairied by: Sander van Amelsvoort (Economics & Industry Policy Department VECCI, VIC & Netherlands Chamber of Commerce Australia (NCCA), VIC)

Australia/New Zealand and the Netherlands share a long and rich history. This productive relationship is reflected in the strong trade links between the countries. Figures for Australia show that the Netherlands is Australia’s second largest export destination in the EU. Dutch foreign direct investment (FDI) has been growing at a healthy rate of 6% per annum since 2006. In 2011, the Netherlands was the fourth largest source of FDI in Australia. These figures show that the groundwork has been laid.

Group A recognized three perspectives to look at the subject: companies, people and government. Due to time constraints, the group decided to focus on the people’s perspective. Key points and recommendations:

I. Trade missions
The group recognized the value of trade missions between the countries. Australian and New Zealand businesses appreciate face-to-face contact and, in combination with the solid reputation of the Dutch in Australia and New Zealand, it would create significant possibilities for Dutch business looking to break into or expand in both countries markets.

II. Knowledge/expertise exchange
There is significant value to Australian and New Zealand businesses in the know-how and expertise that companies in the Netherlands have developed. The key to success in this area is to successfully communicate and promote these areas of expertise. Part of a promotion strategy could include the trade missions.

III. Different generations, different value add
One discussion point in the group was the recognition of different generational groups in the Dutch communities in Australia and New Zealand. The second and third generation Dutch migrants have amassed considerable experience and networks in the Australian and New Zealand (business) communities. This is of enormous value when attempting to increase professional/business ties between the countries. The first generation (expats) were perceived by the group to be less bound to Australia and New Zealand. This can be turned into an advantage when properly recognized. When these people return home, they will largely have favourable impressions of Australia and New Zealand and can become powerful ambassadors for increased trade ties between the countries in question. A concerted effort should be made to see if we can define these groups, how can we target them, and how can we create mutual benefit?

IV. Return visits
In line with action point two, when Australians/New Zealanders, or Dutch people living in Australia/New Zealand, go to the Netherlands for a period and gain know-how/skills that are of value when returning, this needs to be recognized and capitalised by communicating and promoting this. It will enhance the reputation of Dutch skills/know-how/expertise which will facilitate increased business ties between the countries.
V. What next?
The most important action point is to ensure follow-up on this preliminary roundtable discussion. There are a lot of potential and new and emerging technologies which provide a great platform to leverage these initial thoughts.

2 ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION B:
CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY
Chaired by: Professor Lydia Wevers (Victoria University of Wellington, NZ)

Migration is a history of emotions. This is a very important consideration. Even second and third generation Dutch migrants can have a very emotional response to their family’s migration. These emotions, which can be grief, pain, a feeling you have made the right but difficult choice, uncertainty about where your home really is, a feeling of always being between cultures, have to be acknowledged. The influx of people wanting citizenship is one of these acknowledgements.

Key points and recommendations:

I. Citizenship policy
Group B recommended that the citizenship policy be reviewed, particularly in the case of older first generation Dutch migrants who cannot hold two passports. Consideration should be given to aligning ‘official’ identity with emotional identity. Migrants feel they belong to two countries.

II. Culture institute & pilot study
Establish the equivalent of the Goethe Institut, Alliance Française and the British Council, to promote Dutch culture and conduct two-way initiatives such as writer exchanges. Group B recommended a pilot study be set up to conduct exchanges in 2016, the year commemorating what one historian describes as the ‘Tasman World’, began. There is, for example, no consciousness of Dutch literature in New Zealand or Australia. Do the Dutch care about the connection of their literature to the world?

III. Professionalising
There should be a more professionalised approach to facilitate associations, activities, language learning and cultural activity to enhance “Dutchness”. The group suggested getting the most successful organisations together, such as Erasmus Mundus in Indonesia, and taking advice from them.

IV. Involve the youth
There should be a particular focus on youth in relation to cultural exchange and activities. Make it cool to be Dutch.

V. Funding
All these initiatives will require funding. Does the Dutch Government have the political will and the economic means to provide funding? The benefits for both the Dutch migrants and the Dutch in the Netherlands will be very great, in the sense of strengthening connections, building networks and opening opportunities. The Dutch diaspora should be regarded as a resource and not a burden. Who knows what might unfold from it?

3 ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION C:
EXCHANGE OF KNOWLEDGE THROUGH RELOCATION/STUDY EXCHANGE/WORKING HOLIDAYS
Chaired by: Professor Leo van Wissen (NIDI, NL)

Student exchange programs may work, but there are always costs and benefits to these activities. Key is to see who pays the costs and who gets the benefits. These are not always the same parties.

Key points and recommendations about student exchange programs:
I. Broader focus
Not only student exchange is an issue, also other groups in the educational sector may be targeted, such as: academic staff, but also high school pupils.

II. Dual citizenship
Students with a dual citizenship have many advantages of engaging in a student exchange programme (e.g. lower fees, employment possibilities during or after study). This could be advertised more broadly.

III. Up to date inventory
There are numerous exchange programs in place already. An up to date inventory should be made for both countries and made available to potential candidates.

IV. Involve private sector
Very important is to have the private sector involved. For this to happen something visible should be produced, such as a publication and/or a website.

V. Funding
Australia is a priority country within the cultural heritage program of the Dutch Government, New Zealand not. Is it possible to change this status and receive funding for specific activities out of this program?

VI. Exchange to the Netherlands
Exchange means that there are also students from Australia and New Zealand moving to the Netherlands. We do not know much about these persons. Who are they? Why do they come? What is their ancestry? Do they return? Etc. This type of information is relevant to understand how the linkages between the countries may be strengthened and what the role of Dutch ancestry in this may be. The embassies of Australia and New Zealand in the Netherlands should be involved in researching this issue.

VII. Networks
Many contacts between universities are informal, e.g. through personal networks of academic staff. It is important to set up a flexible institutional framework that facilitates these informal arrangements.

Key points and recommendations about working holidays:

I. Proof of participation
Exchange through the working holiday program is increasingly popular. In order to tie the participants permanently to the host country something should be given to them, such as a certificate, or a status, e.g. as a youth ambassador.

Key points and recommendations in general:

I. Media
More use could and should be made of the new media: websites, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc. It can be used to inform potential candidates about the possible programs. Group C recommended a permanent website which can serve multiple purposes, for example:

- Giving information about existing exchanges and similar programs;
- Networking;
- Creating an institutional network that is visible to the private sector to generate funding;
- Giving access to individual migration records so people can trace the migration history of their family, privacy laws and regulations however might not allow this.
11 Biographies of the contributors

Arie van der Wiel, Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Since September 2010 Arie van der Wiel is the Netherlands Ambassador to New Zealand. From profession an anthropologist with a strong focus on the Pacific during his study. Before joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he worked for the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and was lecturer at the Anthropological and Sociological Centre of the University of Amsterdam. Over the past thirty five years he was employed in different policy functions by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs both at headquarters and abroad. Since 1998 he served as ambassador to Mozambique 1998 - 2002, Ghana 2002 - 2006, Nigeria 2006 - 2010 and currently in New Zealand.

Professor Jacques Poot
Jacques Poot was born in The Netherlands. He obtained his PhD in economics at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand in 1984. He has held academic positions in New Zealand, Australia, Japan and The Netherlands. He is currently Professor of Population Economics in the National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis (NIDEA) in New Zealand, but also adjunct professor at VU University in Amsterdam, Affiliate of Motu Economic and Public Policy Research in Wellington, Research Fellow at the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM) at University College London, Research Fellow at IZA – Institute for the Study of Labour in Bonn, Honorary Fellow of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences and elected Member of Academia Europaea. Professor Poot's teaching and research interests include all aspects of the economics of population, but particularly: international and internal migration, local labour and housing markets, regional development, forecasting and meta-analysis. He currently co-leads several collaborative research projects on: the economic integration of immigrants in New Zealand; population ageing and regional development; as well as migrant diversity and regional disparity in Europe.

Dr Tanja Schubert-McArthur
Tanja Schubert-McArthur studied anthropology in Tübingen, Germany and recently completed her PhD at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Her master’s thesis focused on German immigrants to New Zealand, preparing her well for a research project on second and third generation Dutch that she carried out for the Netherlands Embassy in Wellington.

Paul Merwood
Paul Merwood is a Principal Analyst, Migration Research, Evaluation and Analysis, within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. Paul is a member of the OECD Expert Group on Migration and has been involved in migration research since 2003. He has a range of experience leading and working on migration research projects that contribute to a robust evidence base on migrant outcomes in New Zealand.

Theo Muller
Theo Muller was born and educated in the Netherlands. He obtained a law degree from the Law School of Tilburg University in the early 70’s and emigrated to New Zealand with his wife, Wieke, to New Zealand in 1974, where he embarked on a career in marketing. He was Brand Manager for Unilever and Marketing Manager for the New Zealand Dairy Board, now Fonterra before starting out on his own. Theo founded MMResearch, a market research company in Wellington, in the mid-nineties. In 2010 Theo was asked to join the Board of Trustees of the New Zealand-Netherlands Foundation and in 2012 became its Chairman. Theo was also instrumental in re-establishing the Stichting Nederland Nieuw-Zeeland, based in the Netherlands, and sits on its Board of Directors.
The main objective of the Foundation and the Stichting is to develop relationships between the young people of our two countries and the principal mechanism chosen for realising this objective is to facilitate internships for these people and allow them to experience life in all its facets at opposite ends of the globe.

Christine Hofkens
Christine Hofkens belongs to the ‘new migrants’ group, migrating to New Zealand in 1991. She joined the Embassy of the Netherlands in Wellington in 1994. Her studies of the Dutch language, education, management and hospitality were useful for the variety of tasks within the embassy. Currently, her work consists of economic and cultural affairs. Her contact with the Dutch community in New Zealand and the inspiration of Ambassador Arie van der Wiel made her into an enthusiastic researcher of Dutch migrants in New Zealand and the position of Abel Tasman in both countries.

Jelle Hatenboer
Jelle Hatenboer was an intern at the Netherlands Embassy in Wellington from mid-August to mid-December 2013 as a part of his study. When in Wellington, he was studying Business Administration under the Honours Program at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. His interests lie in economic issues and society, which he researched in Taiwan. In New Zealand he concentrated on a research project on Dutch migrants, which he executed with Paul Merwood from the migration research department of MBIE New Zealand.